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Catalyzed by welfare reform legislation in 1996, welfare systems across the nation shifted to a “work first” approach aimed at moving recipients quickly into unsubsidized employment. Yet today, almost a decade and a half after 
those changes, we still know little about which frontline practices are most effective 
within the work-first framework. In particular, why are some work-first employment 
programs more successful at helping individuals get and keep jobs? Insights into that 
question can help states and localities better serve the more than two million American 
families currently on the welfare rolls.
This book is a case study of how New York City’s welfare-to-work programs were 
managed and implemented in the mid 2000s. It is a performance analysis, using both 
qualitative and quantitative methods to examine the operations and performance of 26 
nonprofit and for-profit welfare-to-work programs. The book draws on individual-
level data on more than 14,000 participants, and the use of random assignment creates 
a natural experiment that assists in comparing program performance.
The findings provide insights, based on New York City’s programs, into:
• The unique characteristics that differentiate New York City’s welfare system from 
others across the country;
• The broad similarities that exist among work-first employment programs in the 
city. 
• Whether encouraging quick placement into jobs is more or less effective than 
emphasizing short-term training or more intensive case management prior to 
placement;
• How the use of performance incentives may affect outcomes; 
• Differences between nonprofit and for-profit employment programs; and 
• The effect of frontline management, as well as broader strategic management 
decisions, on performance.
The book also contains a foreword by Mary Jo Bane, Harvard University. 
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The idea for this book came from Bryna Sanger of the Milano New School 
for Management and Urban Policy, whom I contacted after reading her book 
The Welfare Marketplace. After explaining my research interest in the inter-
section of poverty policy and public management, she suggested that I focus 
on performance issues—in particular, why some welfare-to-work programs 
are more effective than others. She also suggested that I contact New York 
City’s welfare department (the Human Resources Administration or HRA), 
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tions on the book’s first draft. Carolyn Heinrich and her colleagues at the La 
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insightful comments on my research at a presentation there in early 2010. The 
book was copyedited by Bob Wathen, whose careful and thoughtful editing 
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in New York City that are the focus of this volume. Their openness to having 
a researcher observe their programs and interview them and their staffs was 
critical to this research. 
Finally, I would also like to acknowledge two scholars who have played 
important roles in my life and who therefore influenced this volume. Bob 
Behn at the Kennedy School inspired me, during graduate school, to add pub-
lic management as one of my main research interests. His guidance and in-
sights over the years have been invaluable. And Rob Hollister of Swarthmore 
College inspired me, in college, to become a poverty researcher. Since then 
Rob has been an important guiding influence to me, with his commitment to 







In October 2004, Andy Feldman began doing the fieldwork for this book in 
the welfare-to-work programs of New York City. The welfare system in New 
York City, as in the nation as a whole, was in the midst of a massive trans-
formation. The 1996 federal welfare reform legislation had promised to “end 
welfare as we know it,” and in many ways it had succeeded. Nationally, wel-
fare rolls fell by two-thirds between 1994, their peak, and 2005. In New York 
City, the number of people receiving welfare fell from 1.1 million in the spring 
of 1995 to 420,000 in March 2005 when Andy was finishing his fieldwork. 
Caseloads have continued to fall, even in the midst of the serious recession of 
2007–2009. Nationally, the Temporary Assistance to Needy Families Program 
(TANF, formerly Aid to Families with Dependent Children or AFDC) average 
monthly caseload was 4 million in 2009, down from 14.2 million in 1994. In 
New York City, the caseload continued to fall after 2005, and was at 350,000 
in early 2010. 
These dramatic caseload declines inspired a small army of researchers who 
attempted to explain them. The resulting analyses have not been very satisfy-
ing. The declines were far larger than anyone would have predicted from previ-
ous history. The econometric studies established the importance of expanding 
the Earned Income Tax Credit and child support enforcement activities, but 
they mainly focused on the effects of an extremely good economy and tight 
labor market. The fact that caseloads have increased very little and in some 
places continued to fall during the 2007–2009 recession casts some doubt on 
the power of this latter explanation. Perhaps in desperation, researchers also 
hypothesized that a change had taken place in the “culture” of the welfare sys-
tem and in the perceptions of recipients and potential recipients about welfare. 
This book is an important contribution to our understanding of what was in 
fact going on in the welfare system and in related work programs after welfare 
reform. New York City’s welfare system is unusual in many ways. The size, 
scale, and diversity of the city are huge. Moreover, New York City is governed 
by New York State’s constitutional guarantee of assistance to the needy and 
by legislation and court decisions that are unusually generous. There is no ef-
fective time limit for welfare receipt in New York and only modest financial 
sanctions for noncompliance with rules. New York guarantees assistance to all, 
not just to families with children, and the New York caseload is thus unusual 
in its high proportion of men and of nonparents. But these very differences 
make New York an interesting place to study what goes on in welfare offices, 
where the attitudes and behaviors of the workers are almost by definition more 
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important than the federal rules, and where the diverse caseload increases the 
relevance of the findings to employment programs generally. 
New York City refers all employable applicants to work programs and 
assigns them randomly to sites, which is a boon for researchers. All the pro-
grams employ a basic “work-first” strategy, which means that their goal is to 
place participants in jobs as quickly as possible. This book documents how 
that strategy is put into practice, how variations on it are developed by in-
dividual programs, and how well programs do in achieving their goals. The 
programs themselves differ in their demographics, size, for-profit or nonprofit 
status, and structure of performance incentives, as well as in management style 
and emphasis on different tactics within the basic work-first strategy. Because 
New York City also has a reasonably good system for tracking participants, it 
provides an opportunity to study the effects of this variation. 
The most sobering finding of this study is undoubtedly the overall place-
ment rate. Of the 20,677 welfare recipients assigned to employment programs, 
the subjects of this study, only 6 percent were placed in jobs and still employed 
six months after placement. But of those who showed up and persisted in the 
program (20 percent of those assigned), almost two-thirds were placed in jobs 
and of those almost half were employed six months later. This study does not 
help us understand the 32 percent who never showed up at all or the additional 
48 percent who showed up at least once but did not complete the program. 
Their experiences, like those of the programs’ successes, must be part of the 
explanation for the caseload declines that were continuing during the period of 
this study—declines that are clearly not explicable by a 6 percent placement 
rate from employment programs. Perhaps an awareness of the implicit mes-
sage conveyed by required work-first employment programs had an impact on 
those who never showed up, contributing either to them succeeding on their 
own or giving up on the system as a whole. This would be a nice topic for 
further research on the dramatic change in welfare, the shape and causes of 
which remain something of a mystery. The detailed descriptions in this book 
of how programs create a spirit of partnership, get participants job ready, make 
good placements, and promote employment retention provide hints of how 
this might work, conveying an expectation about work and a seriousness about 
pursuing it. 
The most important contributions of this book, however, are its insights 
into what distinguishes the most successful work-first programs from those 
that have less-good placement and retention rates. Increasing the effectiveness 
of employment programs is important beyond the narrow confines of the wel-
fare system. Even after the economy recovers from the serious recession it is in 
as of this writing, many will remain unemployed and out of the labor force, in 




The findings of the study are suggestive and relevant beyond both the wel-
fare system and New York City. To some extent they are intuitive and predict-
able: The most effective programs at placing people quickly into jobs are those 
that emphasize quick job placement, require immediate job search rather than 
encouraging job training, focus on job placement rather than case manage-
ment, and operate under performance incentives that reward quick placement 
and retention. These results confirm unsurprising findings from the manage-
ment literature that organizations can indeed get what they measure and that a 
clear focus on well-defined goals can lead to the achievement of those goals. 
This appears to be what is going on in these New York City employment pro-
grams. The most successful programs are intensely focused on their clients’
getting jobs quickly and making sure they stay employed, and they put in place 
programs and approaches that work toward this goal. 
More surprising are the findings about management as distinguished from 
strategy. Those of us who care about the management of organizations firmly 
believe that it matters whether organizations are structured and led well. Ele-
ments of that would include the right strategy, of course, but they would also 
include articulating a clear mission, establishing goals consistent with the mis-
sion, and monitoring performance. They would also include building a staff 
team, and motivating and mentoring all staff. We expect that organizations 
that are managed well along these dimensions will achieve better results. Andy 
Feldman expected that as well and designed his research to look both at the 
dimensions of good management and at their relationship to organizational 
performance. 
What he found among the employment programs that he looked at, how-
ever, was that the strategic dimensions of organizational leadership were con-
siderably more important than the management dimensions. Programs that had 
made good strategic decisions about immediate job search and a quick-place-
ment approach were more successful than programs that made other strategic 
decisions, even if they were not particularly well managed along the standard 
dimensions. The book provides some evidence that good management can 
somewhat mitigate the effects of bad strategic decisions. It also offers some 
insightful diagnoses about why organizations persist in less effective strate-
gies—some because of incomplete information, others because their concep-
tions of who they are and what they do well are not consistent with quick-
placement practices. 
The findings and insights in this book should be taken seriously by both 
designers and managers of employment programs, whether or not they are in 
New York City or are connected to a welfare system. If nothing else, the sober-
ing overall placement numbers are a reminder of the magnitude of the chal-









	 	 	 	
and better ways of helping people find work. The findings about strategies that 
do seem to advance quick placements are good reminders that focused strate-
gies aligned with desired measurable outcomes can in fact be effective. 
More generally, the book is an important reminder of the power of perfor-
mance management (you can indeed induce what you measure and pay for) for 
both potential good and ill. Its reminds us that managers ought to measure and 
monitor what they care about and provide strategies and incentives that push 
their organizations toward achieving the results they have decided to focus on 
and measure. But they also need to think every so often about whether what 
they are measuring is indeed what they care about and about what they might 
be missing. 
Toward that end, it is worth remembering another aspect of the context 
of this study. During the 1980s and 1990s, states across the country experi-
mented with a variety of welfare-to-work approaches. A few dozen of these 
were rigorously evaluated using the methods of random assignment. The non-
profit research firm, MDRC, conducted most of these evaluations, which in-
cluded cost-benefit analyses. These evaluations found, importantly, that work-
first programs, most of which were built around initial mandatory job search, 
were the most effective in moving people off the welfare rolls—presumably 
into employment—and saving government money. They tended to be either 
neutral or only very slightly positive in terms of income gains for the recipi-
ents, but their clear effects on the diminution of welfare rolls and government 
budgets meant that they were widely adopted across the country, including 
in New York City, and incorporated into the logic behind the welfare reform 
legislation of 1996. Another important finding of these evaluations was that 
mandatory education-first approaches had pretty uniformly negative effects 
both on government budgets and on participants’ incomes, at least in the short- 
to medium-term time frame of the evaluations. This finding seems counter- 
intuitive to many service providers, but it is quite well documented and con-
sistent across studies, and has reinforced what has become the conventional 
wisdom about the superiority of quick-placement strategies. 
Since this first round of welfare-to-work studies, states have experimented 
with other strategies, with somewhat less clear results. One group of experi-
ments has looked at earnings supplement programs, which have unambigu-
ously positive effects on recipients’ incomes and mostly negative effects on 
government budgets. Other experiments have looked at mixed strategies that 
try to tailor their interventions to the situations of recipients. Some of these 
have generated very positive results for both participants and government bud-
gets, and they are clearly worthy of further exploration. 
These studies, which are analyzed very well in the 2009 MDRC publica-
tion Welfare-to-Work Program Benefits and Costs, are important reminders 
xviii 
that there is a good deal of high-quality empirical analysis that is relevant 
to the design of welfare-to-work programs and that some approaches have 
been clearly demonstrated to dominate others in achieving desired outcomes. 
Questions of what is right for whom in what circumstances, however, have not 
been settled. It is crucial that we continue to learn from ongoing comparative 
evaluations as well as from studies of specific strategies and approaches. This 
book, I believe, is a fine example of the kind of learning that we need to be 
engaged in. 













This book is a case study of how New York City’s welfare-to-work 
programs were managed and implemented in the mid 2000s. New York 
City’s welfare system is unique in many ways, so the results may or may 
not be generalizable to other cities. Even so, the case study is intended 
to be a rich source for the generation of hypotheses and a compelling 
and interesting story in itself. 
What makes New York City’s welfare system unique? To start, it is 
the largest urban welfare system in the nation, with about 350,000 indi-
viduals receiving cash assistance in early 2010 at a cost of more than $10 
million per month.1 About one in 25 individuals in the national welfare 
caseload resides in New York City.2 Another relatively unique feature 
is the use of private contractors (nonprofit and for-profit organizations) 
to provide all of the employment services for welfare recipients. A few 
other cities also use private contactors, including San Diego, Milwau-
kee, and Houston, but most cities use government agencies to provide 
welfare-to-work services (Sanger 2003). New York City also stands out 
because of its use of performance-based contracts, with the providers’
compensation tied to job placement and employment retention out-
comes of participants, not simply to the number of people served. And 
finally, the scope of the New York City’s welfare benefits is unique. 
In terms of eligibility, for example, the city (and, in fact, all of New 
York State) provides benefits to qualifying noncustodial individuals, in 
addition to qualifying custodial parents and their children. As a result, 
the city’s caseload has a much larger percentage of noncustodial adult 
men than most other cities. And in terms of time limits, New York City 
(and State) does not have the typical five-year limit on lifetime benefits. 
Instead, once custodial recipients exceed five years of cash benefits 
(or noncustodial individuals exceed two years), they are eligible for a
safety-net program without a time limit, paid for with state and local 
funds.3 
Two additional unique features of New York City’s welfare system 











to-work programs operate within the five boroughs in New York City, 
and the city randomly assigns welfare recipients to different programs 
within their boroughs.4 Recipients who live in Brooklyn, for instance, 
are randomly assigned to one of the eight programs within that bor-
ough. The city uses random assignment to be fair to programs, aiming 
to create an even distribution in terms of participant characteristics. But 
from a research perspective, this form of assignment creates a natu-
ral experiment that reduces selection bias when comparing programs’
results. Second, the city gives programs latitude to design their own ser-
vice strategies, as long as those strategies emphasize a relatively quick 
entry into jobs. The resulting differences in program practices create 
useful variation for investigating which practices are more effective 
than others. 
Despite its unique features, New York City’s welfare system shares 
a fundamental similarity—its work-first approach—with almost all
other current U.S. welfare systems. Work-first programs use immediate 
job search, or short-term training followed by job search, rather than 
longer term education and training. Their goal is to move individuals 
quickly into unsubsidized employment. 
The shift to work first occurred across the nation in the mid 1990s 
catalyzed by federal welfare reform. In the decade preceding that 
reform, rigorous evaluations of welfare-to-work programs were inter-
preted as documenting that work-first (or “labor-force-attachment”) 
programs produced better results than skill-building (or “human-
capital-development”) programs, including higher employment rates, 
less welfare usage, and higher incomes (Bloom and Michalopoulos 
2001). Influenced by those evaluations and, most importantly, by the 
new mandates of 1996 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity 
Reconciliation Act (PRWORA), states and localities across the nation 
adopted a work-first approach. 
Today, almost a decade and a half after that sea change in policy and 
practice, we still know surprisingly little about which frontline prac-
tices are most effective within the work-first framework. In other words, 
why are some work-first programs better able to help welfare recipients 
become and stay employed? This book aims to provide new insights 







TANF AND OTHER U.S. EMPLOYMENT
AND TRAINING PROGRAMS
PRWORA created the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families 
(TANF) program, established a five-year lifetime time limit on receiv-
ing welfare using federal funds, and gave states broad flexibility to 
design their own TANF programs. It also imposed new requirements on 
states to connect welfare recipients with work. In particular, states were 
required to have 50 percent of all families on cash assistance participate 
in a work activity by 2002 or face financial penalties. In accordance 
with TANF’s work-first emphasis, vocational educational training can 
count toward work requirements for no more than 12 months and for 
no more than 30 percent of the caseload. Moreover, all recipients are 
also required to engage in work within 24 months of receiving cash 
assistance. In terms of funding, the federal government provides about 
65 percent ($16.5 billion in 2009) of TANF funds, while states provide 
the remainder.5 
Since the mid 1990s and the passage of PRWORA, the number of 
welfare recipients in the United States has declined dramatically. After 
peaking at more than 5 million families in the mid 1990s, the national 
welfare caseload dropped by more than half, to fewer than 2 million 
families by 2000.6 By 2009 there were about 1.7 million families on 
TANF, but it appeared that the decline had stopped as a result of the 
recession that began in December 2007. Some states, in fact, saw double-
digit percentage increases in 2009. 
To situate TANF in a broader context, consider the other main fed-
eral employment and job-training policies for adults. They include the 
Workforce Investment Act (WIA), Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA), 
services to veterans, vocational rehabilitation, and adult apprenticeship. 
Unlike TANF, these policies are not specifically targeted to low-income 
individuals, but like TANF, they are implemented by states and locali-
ties using federal funds. 
WIA, which was passed by Congress in 1998, provided $1.3 bil-
lion in 2009 to serve more than 300,000 dislocated workers who lost 
their jobs because of plant closings or mass layoffs. It also provided 
$900 million to deliver services for 2.7 million adults through One-Stop 







boards. Like TANF, WIA has a work-first emphasis—initial services 
under WIA focus on job search and career counseling, with education 
and training only available after efforts to place an individual into a job 
have failed. 
Next, TAA targets workers who lose their jobs because of foreign 
competition. Established in 1974, it provided almost $1 billion in 2009 
for classroom or on-the-job training, job-search assistance, and reloca-
tion allowances for trade-dislocated workers. Services to veterans are 
another element in the federal policy, and they include employment and 
training assistance for those who are disabled and unemployed, as well 
as employment workshops for those transitioning back to civilian life. 
In 2009, the federal government allocated $200 million for employment 
and training services for veterans. Those services reached more than 
850,000 veterans in 2008. 
Grants to states for vocational rehabilitation are provided under 
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, which provided $2.9 billion in 2009. 
Services are designed to help individuals with physical or mental dis-
abilities obtain employment and live more independently. They include 
counseling, medical, and psychological services, job training, and other 
forms of individualized assistance. Finally, adult apprenticeship offers 
a combination of on-the-job learning and related instruction in a skilled 
occupation. Apprenticeship programs are sponsored and operated on a 
voluntary basis by employers, employer associations, or partnerships 
between employers and labor unions. Federal funds ($21 million in 
2009) are given to states to oversee and enforce federal and state stan-
dards for registered apprenticeships. Annually, almost 30,000 appren-
ticeship program sponsors representing about 225,000 employers offer 
registered apprenticeship training to more than 300,000 apprentices. 
THE NEED FOR BETTER WELFARE-TO-WORK PRACTICES 
PRWORA clearly did end welfare as we knew it, but it did not end 
the need to help low-income Americans gain self-sufficiency and a 
foothold on the American Dream. The increased unemployment and 
poverty caused by the deep recession in the late 2000s make that clear, 






welfare-to-work services are needed today. One is that many of those 
who have left the welfare rolls are still poor. High poverty rates among 
welfare leavers demonstrate the need for more effective policies (for all 
low-income individuals) to help people move up the economic ladder 
and to achieve sustained employment. The other reason is that states 
will soon face new mandates under TANF to place a larger percentage 
of their welfare recipients in work or job-preparation activities. More 
effective ways of helping individuals become and stay employed can 
assist states in meeting that challenge. 
Addressing High Poverty Rates among Leavers 
Welfare reform, increased financial supports for work through the 
Earned Income Tax Credit and minimum wage, and the strong economy
in the mid to late 1990s combined to produce remarkable success 
in boosting employment rates among welfare recipients and reduc-
ing dependence. For example, the employment rate of never-married
mothers over the age of 16 who lived with their own children (those 
under age 18)—the group most likely to receive public assistance—rose 
from just under 45 percent in 1993 to over 65 percent by 2000 (Burtless 
2004). During the same period, almost three million families moved off 
the welfare rolls, and poverty rates dropped sharply. The share of single 
mothers below the poverty line fell by about a fifth between 1995 and 
2000, from 36.5 to 28.5 percent, according to the Census Bureau. The 
poverty rate for this group has since increased to 32.5 percent in 2009, 
a figure that may continue to increase as a result of the effects of the 
economic recession from late 2007 to mid-2009. 
In short, despite the notable successes of welfare reform, almost 
a third of single mothers remain poor. Looking specifically at welfare 
leavers, in fact, poverty rates are even higher. About 40 to 50 percent 
of leavers are poor (Acs and Loprest 2004). Why are so many leav-
ers poor? One obvious reason is low skills that lead to low wages. A
related factor is tension between motherhood and career advancement 
opportunities, such as returning to school or moving up the job ladder. 
When faced with a choice between higher wages or control over their 
schedules, for example, many leavers choose the latter (Seefeldt 2008). 
A third often-overlooked factor behind leavers’ high poverty rates is 




work upon exit from welfare, and four out of five work at some point 
during the year after exit. Moreover, when leavers are employed, they 
usually work full time and earn wages several dollars above the fed-
eral minimum wage. But many individuals lose their jobs within a few 
weeks or months of starting, often leading to significant periods of job-
lessness before they become employed again. In fact, only about 4 in 
10 leavers work consistently during the year (Acs and Loprest 2004). 
Nonwork, in other words, remains an important cause of poverty in the 
United States, despite the shift to work-oriented welfare policies. Only 
11 percent of the working-age poor held full-time, year-round jobs, 
according to one study (Schwartz 2004). In contrast, only 2.6 percent 
of all full-time, year-round workers were poor. Fighting poverty among 
leavers today, therefore, will require finding better ways to help people 
boost their earnings potential, balance work and family, and achieve 
greater sustained employment.7 
Meeting the Challenge of New TANF Rules 
Congress reauthorized TANF in 2006, a decade after it became 
law. In doing so, it significantly toughened TANF’s work requirements. 
Prior to reauthorization, states were required to place half of all single-
parent welfare recipients in jobs, or work-readiness activities such as 
job search, or face financial penalties. There was a loophole, however.
States could reduce their work requirements by the percentage by 
which their welfare caseloads fell after 1995. Because most states expe-
rienced large caseload declines in the mid to late 1990s, the majority 
of states ended up facing no effective work requirement. That changed 
with reauthorization, which essentially eliminated the caseload reduc-
tion credits.8 This means that states must place a much higher share of 
their caseloads in work or work-related activities, or else face financial 
penalties. 
Those tougher work requirements are temporarily on hold because 
of economic weakness. In particular, one provision of the American 
Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009—the federal stimulus bill—is 
to hold states harmless in terms of work requirements for TANF case-
load increases that occur in 2009 through 2011. When that provision 
expires, states will likely need to boost their work participation rates by 






help states meet those requirements by assisting more people to become 
and stay employed. 
Summary of Findings
To investigate what works within work first, this study focuses on 
New York City’s welfare system, with 16 nonprofit and 3 for-profit 
organizations operating 26 welfare-to-work programs (or “sites”) at the 
time of this study. These Employment Service and Placement (ESP) 
programs, as they are called, are paid solely based on performance.9 
Moreover, as noted earlier, they are given broad discretion by the city’s 
welfare department to design and operate their own programs. As a 
result, although all the programs are work first—all are focused on 
getting individuals into jobs relatively quickly and none offers longer 
term education and training—their strategies and practices differ. Read-
ers should be aware, however, that the training-related findings of this 
study apply only to the type of short-term, classroom-based training 
used within the city’s welfare system, not to longer term education and 
training or on-the-job training. 
Both qualitative and quantitative methods are used in this volume to 
examine program operations and performance, as described in greater 
detail in Appendix A. First, field research was conducted from October 
2004 to March 2005, including program observations and interviews 
with 86 staff members. Next, individual-level data were analyzed for 
the more than 14,000 individuals who participated in one of the 26 
programs during the study period, with follow-up data through March 
2006. Performance is measured based on programs’ abilities to place 
people into jobs and to have them be still working (at any job, not nec-
essarily the original one) six months later. 
Common aspects of work-first programs
Judging from the range of nonprofit and for-profit providers in New 
York City, today’s work-first programs have several aspects in com-
mon, beyond the obvious commonality of being work first. Specifically, 
the programs have four similar components to their service strategies 
(Figure 1.1). First, all of the programs aim to create a “spirit of partner-
ship” with participants—the staff works to gain participants’ trust to 






















means setting expectations about participants’ professionalism while in 
the program, such as showing up on time and following directions and 
other rules to help people prepare for the workplace. Creating a spirit 
of partnership requires a careful balance of trust-building and setting 
expectations for behavior. 
Second, programs help participants become job ready. This often 
includes preparing people for job interviews through employment-
readiness workshops and through case management to help people 
deal with issues that are preventing them from becoming or staying 
employed. At some programs, it also includes encouraging and assist-
ing participants to enroll in short-term job training. Training programs 
typically last a few weeks to three months and are run by private train-
ing providers, community colleges, or associations of employers. They 
include training to be a food service worker, certified nurse’s assistant, 
medical assistant, customer service worker, commercial driver, building 
maintenance staff, security guard, administrative assistant, and more. 
A third commonality is that programs aim to make good job matches
by connecting participants with job leads that fit with their skills and 
interests. This process is usually led by “job developers” who act as 
intermediaries between participants and employers. Job developers use 
their existing employer contacts, or hunt for new leads, to maintain an 







views when peoples’ abilities and interests match the existing job open-
ings. Although job developers have been part of past welfare-to-work 
efforts in the United States, the developers in New York City play a 
somewhat broader role, including screening participants to determine if 
they are qualified for particular job openings and coaching them before 
interviews. 
Finally, all of the programs provide assistance to those who have 
gotten jobs to help them stay employed over time. Most commonly, this 
is done by “retention specialists” who keep in touch with participants 
after placement, giving them encouragement and advice about work-
place or personal issues. They also encourage participants who lose 
their jobs to return to the programs to be placed in new jobs. 
Given these four commonalities, some programs emphasize cer-
tain aspects more than others. For example, some providers have more 
urgency about getting people into jobs quickly and offer only a few days 
of job-readiness counseling. Others make job readiness a central part of 
their programs, including encouraging short-term training opportuni-
ties and providing substantial case management and multiweek work-
shops about thriving in the workplace. Different approaches reflect, in 
part, different views among program leaders about effective practices 
for facilitating employment. They also reflect different organizational 
missions among the programs, as well as different staff capacities and 
skills. For example, some programs have orientation staffs with espe-
cially engaging personalities that enable them to create a strong spirit of 
partnership within the first few days, whereas others do not. 
For-profit providers have better overall results 
Six of the 26 program sites are run by for-profit organizations, with 
the remainder being nonprofit, which provides a window into perfor-
mance by profit status but certainly not a definitive one given the sample 
size. The results from New York City show that for-profit employment 
programs achieve higher placement rates than nonprofit ones, although 
their employment retention rates are lower. In other words, you are 
more likely to get a job when served by a for-profit program, but once 
employed you are less likely to keep it. Even so, for-profit programs 
have better overall results. The total share of participants that becomes 
employed and is still working (at any job) six months later is higher at 





These findings suggest, maybe not surprisingly, that for-profits are 
more responsive to contractual incentives than nonprofits. This means 
that, when governments design service contracts with for-profits, they 
need to be especially careful that financial incentives are aligned with 
the results they wish to achieve. If agencies are able to specify particu-
lar outcomes they wish to maximize, and if they target financial rewards 
to those outcomes, for-profits will likely be more responsive than non-
profits to those rewards. 
Although for-profits perform better, on average, it is worth noting 
that among the 26 programs in New York City, the top two in terms of 
overall results are nonprofits. There is no doubt, in other words, that 
nonprofits can be high-performing organizations. But at least in this 
sample, the range of performance among nonprofits is wider. In fact, 
while the top two programs are nonprofits, so are the bottom 12. For-
profits, on the other hand, have a narrower range of performance that is 
centered within the top half of performers. 
Programs that are paid fully based on performance do better
than those with only partial performance-based pay 
New York City uses fully performance-based contracts for all its 
welfare-to-work programs. The contracts specify that, for every welfare 
recipient assigned to a program, the program receives one payment if it 
places the person in a job, a second payment if the person is still work-
ing (at any job, not necessarily the original one) three months later, 
and a third payment if the person is still working (again, at any job) 
six months later. But a coalition of nine programs pools the revenues 
from their contracts and operates under a compensation scheme that 
is only partly performance based. Under their agreement, half of each 
program’s revenue is based on its performance, while the other half is 
based on cost reimbursement. 
The results suggest that stronger financial incentives for per-
formance lead to better outcomes. Programs in the coalition, which 
receive only partial performance-based pay, have lower job placement 
rates. Their employment retention rates are also lower, at least for non-
custodial individuals, more than half of whom are men in New York 
City’s programs. For custodial individuals, who are mostly women, 





performance incentives are noteworthy given the rarity of performance-
based contracting within the social services field in the United States. 
Programs that encourage immediate job search are more 
effective than those that encourage short-term job training 
prior to job search
Within the context of helping participants become job ready, an 
important difference among programs relates to job training. At some 
programs, staff members assess participants’ needs and interests and 
then refer some individuals to short-term training prior to job search, 
while referring others to immediate job search. This practice has been 
referred to as a “mixed initial activities approach.” At other programs, 
the staff emphasizes immediate job search for all participants. These 
two different approaches echo an older debate, prior to the 1996 welfare 
bill, between advocates of longer term education and training versus 
advocates of immediate job search. Today, within the context of work 
first, the range of strategies has narrowed toward the quick-placement 
end of the spectrum. 
The results imply that the more effective approach is immediate job 
search for all. Programs that send fewer participants to training have 
higher job-placement rates. Noncustodial individuals who are placed 
into jobs also have higher employment-retention rates at these quick-
placement providers. For custodial individuals, the effect on retention 
appears to be positive as well, but it cannot be measured precisely. 
In one sense, these results are not surprising because past evalua-
tions of welfare-to-work programs have demonstrated the advantage 
of immediate job search over intensive training or education for wel-
fare recipients (Hamilton 2002). Yet the type of training used in New 
York City differs from the typical training of the past. It is shorter term, 
focused on specific job skills, and targeted to those with strong basic 
skills.10 This more customized approach to training, however, did not 
produce more positive outcomes. The use of random assignment and 
the inclusion of individual-level controls in the analysis make it unlikely
that this result stems from selection bias. 
These findings are also noteworthy because a mixed initial activi-
ties approach was used by two high-profile, successful welfare-to-work 





Riverside, California, and Job Opportunities and Basic Skills (JOBS) 
in Portland, Oregon (Greenberg et al. 2009). The negative results for 
training in New York City provide evidence, albeit indirectly, that the 
success of Riverside GAIN and Portland JOBS may not have stemmed 
from their use of training. This is consistent with analysis by Walker et 
al. (2003), who attribute these two programs’ success to other factors, 
including caseload demographics. The hope that a mixed initial activi-
ties approach would enable training to be a productive service strategy 
is not supported by the outcomes in New York City.11 
Why would this type of targeted, short-term training produce worse 
employment outcomes for welfare recipients? Program leaders and 
staff in New York City suggested several possible answers. One is that 
training is often used as a way for participants to avoid work require-
ments or to continue working off the books, weakening the connection 
between training and results. Another is that many individuals on wel-
fare may not be well suited to thrive in classroom-based settings, mak-
ing on-the-job training through employment a more productive option. 
To paraphrase one program executive, most participants didn’t do well 
in school in the first place, so why put them back in a classroom? Others 
suggested that the quality of training programs for welfare recipients 
is often low or “poor education for poor people,” as one person put it. 
Other possible answers exist as well.12 Determining the actual causal 
links between training and program results is a worthy area for future 
research. 
The results from New York City highlight the continuing chal-
lenge in American poverty policy of designing training options within
welfare-to-work services that demonstrably improve program out-
comes. Meeting that challenge will require innovation, whether it is 
redesigning when and how training is delivered or better aligning the 
content of training with employer demand. The need to help welfare 
recipients and other low-income individuals increase their job skills— 
and therefore their wages—is obvious. Finding productive ways to pro-









Programs that use a quick-placement approach are more 
effective than those that use a case-management approach, 
at least for noncustodial individuals 
Another difference within the framework of helping participants 
become job ready relates to case management, meaning helping par-
ticipants address any barriers to work that are preventing them from 
becoming or staying employed.13 Those barriers can include unstable 
child care, transportation issues, family problems, or apprehension 
about entering the work world. (Individuals needing more specialized 
services are referred to other programs, as discussed below.) The effect 
of case management on welfare recipients’ outcomes has not been well 
studied, especially in the context of work first. 
The results from New York City show that programs with more 
urgency about getting people employed—that is, those that do less case 
management—are more successful at placing noncustodial individuals 
in jobs. For custodial individuals, modest amounts of case manage-
ment can facilitate placements, but more intensive assistance reduces 
employment outcomes. Longer term results show that fewer non-
custodial individuals become employed for at least six months when 
served by programs with a stronger case-management focus. The effect 
on custodial individuals is uncertain, but the data suggest, at best, only a 
small gain in sustained employment from a case-management approach. 
Past research has shown mixed evidence about the benefits of per-
sonalized attention (Bloom, Hill, and Riccio 2003; Peck and Scott 2005; 
Riccio and Orenstein 1996). But because welfare caseloads have fallen 
dramatically in New York City, as elsewhere in the nation, it would be 
plausible to predict that those still on the rolls would benefit from more 
individualized help. The evidence does not support that conjecture. 
Why might an emphasis on case management be an ineffective 
strategy for helping welfare recipients connect with work? Past research 
has not investigated this question, nor did fieldwork within New York 
City’s programs highlight any particular answer. However, program 
leaders who are proponents of a quick-placement approach argue that 
discussing people’s problems focuses them of their own limitations. 
Doing that, they said, lowers people’s confidence and undermines pro-
grams’ sense of momentum towards employment. They also noted that 








lar individuals from getting or keeping jobs is difficult to determine. 
This point is underscored in the research as well (Strawn and Martinson 
2000). 
Another possibility is that many welfare recipients are more resil-
ient than some might expect, enabling them to overcome their own bar-
riers to work or at least to learn to work around them. That might be 
particularly true for individuals for whom apprehension about starting 
work (described by staff as a common occurrence) is the main employ-
ment barrier. A quick path into employment may be the best way to deal 
with that fear. 
It is important to note, however, that the findings in this volume do 
not apply to welfare recipients with the most serious life challenges for 
whom intensive personalized assistance is likely required to become 
employed. In New York City, individuals must be deemed “employ-
able” by the city’s welfare department before they are assigned to one 
of the ESP programs. To be employable, individuals must not face a 
significant barrier to work, including substance abuse, homelessness, 
limited English skills, illiteracy, domestic abuse, or a physical or men-
tal disability. Individuals with those barriers are referred to specialized 
employment programs and are excluded from this study’s sample.14 
Also, custodial individuals must have child care in place before they 
are deemed employable, and those who lack child care can receive free 
vouchers from the city. The majority of welfare recipients in New York 
City are deemed employable, giving broader applicability to the find-
ings in this volume. 
Finally, it is also worth noting that work-first programs do not 
necessarily need to eschew social work to be effective. In fact, a few 
high-performing programs have robust case-management components. 
But case managers at these programs are focused mostly on vocational 
issues, often addressing immediate barriers to employment, such as 
making sure the participant has appropriate work clothes. Moreover, 
they see themselves as an important part of their programs’ job place-
ment efforts rather than as a separate case-management component of 
the program. These high-performing programs’ placement speeds were 
not among the fastest—some had only average speeds—but they main-
tained a palpable sense of urgency about getting people into jobs. For 
program leaders, therefore, building teamwork and shared incentives 







strive to provide robust job-readiness assistance while still achieving 
strong results.15 
Frontline management practices affect performance, but 
broader strategic decisions matter more
What is the effect of management and leadership on the perfor-
mance of work-first programs? This question is not formally tested in 
this study, but fieldwork from New York City suggests some prelim-
inary answers. In particular, the results imply that effective frontline 
management, such as establishing a clear organizational mission and 
goals, monitoring performance and operations carefully, and develop-
ing a motivated and well-trained staff does boost performance. All else 
equal, in other words, better managed programs produce better employ-
ment outcomes for participants. But the stronger, more evident finding is 
that broader strategic decisions impact performance more significantly
than frontline management practices. For work-first providers, those 
strategic decisions include whether or not to emphasize training and 
whether to use a quick-placement or case-management approach. 
The results suggest, for example, that programs with effective strat-
egies but weak management practices can do quite well, while those 
with ineffective strategies but strong management practices are limited 
to only modest performance. Even programs with insightful, dedicated 
leaders and motivated staffs were constrained from being top perform-
ers if they emphasized both case management and training. 
These findings underscore the central role of strategy formation 
for the successful management and leadership of social programs. To 
a large extent, it appears, strategy is destiny. Program leaders can boost 
participant outcomes by improving frontline management practices and 
by improving program strategies, but especially by doing the latter. 
Notes 
1. This figure was somewhat higher during the research period of this volume. In 
2005, for example, the city had about 400,000 welfare recipients (New York City 
Human Resources Administration 2009a). 
2. The average monthly TANF caseload was 1.7 million in the first half of 2009 (U.S. 
Department of Health and Human Services 2009). The average monthly Family 
Assistance caseload (the city’s TANF cases) was approximately 68,000 during the 
   
  
  











same period (New York City Human Resources Administration 2009b). 
3. In this program, a portion of the grant is paid directly to recipients’ landlords, 
another portion is paid to the utility company, a small amount of cash is provided 
($86 per month), and the rest is put on a debit card that can be used at stores 
that have the equipment to accept that card. State funds are used because federal 
regulations prohibit federal funds from being used to pay for benefits after an 
individual has exceeded five years on welfare. 
4. Anecdotally, the city sometimes grants requests by individuals who wish to attend 
certain programs, but it appears that most assignments are random. See Appendix 
A for further details. 
5. All years in this section refer to fiscal years. Moreover, allocated amounts in this 
section do not include additional funds provided by the American Recovery and 
Reinvestment Act of 2009, including $5 billion a year in emergency TANF funds 
for 2009 and 2010. 
6. That decline has been attributed to a combination of factors, including the effect 
of TANF, a strong economy in the second half of the 1990s, and increases in sup-
ports for low-wage workers such as increases in the federal minimum wage and 
the Earned Income Tax Credit (Council of Economic Advisers 1999). 
7. In terms of promoting sustained employment, research to date on employment 
retention efforts for the poor have shown limited success (Scrivener, Azurdia, and 
Page 2005; Wavelet and Anderson 2002). The results underscore the need for fur-
ther policy innovations in this area. 
8. The reauthorized legislation changed the base year of the credits from 1995 to 2005. 
Since significant caseload declines have not occurred since 2005, the caseload 
reduction credits have been much smaller than they were before reauthorization. 
9. Specific contractual pay points and dollar amounts are discussed in Chapter 2. 
10. This is because Human Resource Administration rules about training vouchers 
specify that individuals must have decent scores on their basic skills tests (taken 
by every participant upon arrival into a program) to qualify for a voucher. 
11. To obtain definitive answers about the effectiveness of the mixed initial activities 
approach, impact evaluations would need to directly test this approach against a 
quick-placement approach. Evaluations of Portland and Riverside did not conduct 
head-to-head tests of these programs against a quick-placement approach. 
12. Another possibility is that programs that encourage training may be using other 
practices that are the actual source of the performance shortfall. For example, 
emphasizing training as an option for participants might weaken a program’s 
sense of urgency about becoming employed for its whole caseload, even if only a 
small fraction of participants actually enters training. 
13. The term “case management” is used rather than “social work” because most case 
managers are not licensed social workers. 
14. Individuals needing specialized services are typically identified when they apply 
for welfare at their Job Centers. The extent of these targeted services in New York 
City is relatively unique in the United States. For more information on the city’s 




15. The challenge of creating teamwork is analogous to an older challenge within 
welfare systems of integrating eligibility staff with employment staff. In New 
York City, Job Centers do all the eligibility determination, while the for-profit and 
nonprofit employment programs provide all the employment services. But this 
study shows that within employment programs, staff can still become bifurcated. 
In this case, the bifurcation is between case managers and job developers. Tension 
between these roles was apparent at several programs. One site had even recently 








Welfare to Work in New York City 
New York City’s welfare system is one of the most interesting and 
important welfare systems in the nation. Although it shares a work-first 
emphasis with practically every other state and local welfare system 
today, it also has several unique features, as described in the previ-
ous chapter. These include its size, partial privatization, and pay-for-
performance contracts with employment programs. We turn next to a 
more detailed examination of the system’s key features, followed by an 
overview of how welfare-to-work programs within the system operate 
and a discussion of the programs’ results.1 
KEY FEATURES 
Partial Privatization 
Nonprofit and for-profit organizations in the city provide all of the 
employment services for welfare recipients. But unlike some other 
cities that have used privatization, such as Milwaukee, public-sector 
employees in New York City maintain a significant role. In particular, 
the city’s Human Resources Administration (HRA) operates welfare 
offices around the city, called Job Centers, where individuals apply for 
benefits and have their eligibility verified. Job Center staff members 
also help individuals secure (and pay for, if needed) child care so that 
they can begin the employment process. 
During the period of this study, from 2004 to 2006, individuals with 
pending applications for assistance were assigned to one of six Skills 
Assessment and Job Placement providers (SAPs). These employment 
programs, run by private contractors, taught job-readiness skills and 
provided job-search assistance to first-time applicants for welfare.2 Indi-
viduals who did not become employed after two months were assigned 








organizations ran 26 ESP sites in the city during this period (Table 
2.1). They included for-profit corporations such as America Works and 
Affiliated Computer Services (ACS), large nonprofit organizations such 
as Goodwill Industries and Wildcat Service Corporation, and several 
smaller community-based nonprofits.3 Compared to SAPs, ESPs had 
caseloads that were more representative of the national welfare case-
load because they serve ongoing welfare cases rather than just new 
applicants. They are the focus of this volume, and references hereafter 
to programs, contractors, providers, and sites all refer to ESPs. 
Pay-for-Performance Contracts 
As noted earlier, the city compensates employment programs on a 
pay-for-performance basis. The three main pay points, or milestones, 
that were used are shown in Figure 2.1, along with bonuses that are 
available if participants achieve certain wage levels and if their wel-
fare cases are closed. As the dollar amounts imply, two-thirds to three-
fourths of the potential compensation per participant is tied to employ-
ment retention, as opposed to simply job placement. Both the use of 
pay-for-performance contacts and their focus on retention are relatively 
unique among welfare systems. 
Figure 2.1  Performance Payments for Employment Programs 
                   (per participant) 
Initial job placement:  $1,227 (job must be at least 20 
hours per week) 
Employed at the 3-month mark after initial placement:
$2,209 ($2,700 if job is “high wage,” defined as $344 per 
week or more) 
Employed at the 6-month mark after initial placement:
$491 ($1,473 if welfare case is also closed) 
NOTE: Dollar amounts are sample payments for one ESP. Payment amounts vary 
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Table 2.1  Employment Services and Placement (ESP) Programs 
Contractor Borough 
America Worksa Bronx 
America Worksa Queens 
America Worksa Manhattan 
Borough of Manhattan Community College Manhattan 
Career and Education Consultantsa Brooklyn 
Career and Education Consultantsa Staten Island 
Catholic Charities Bronx 
Center for Family Life Brooklyn 
Citizens Action Bureau Bronx 
Cypress Hills Local Development Corp. Brooklyn 
East New York Development Corp. Brooklyn 
FEGS Bronx 
Goodwill Industries Brooklyn 
Goodwill Industries Bronx 
Goodwill Industries Queens 
Harlem Congregations for Community Improvement Manhattan 
Henry Street Settlement Manhattan 
Laguardia Community College Queens 
New York City College of Technology Brooklyn 
New York Job Partnersa Brooklyn 
Northern Manhattan Improvement Corp. Manhattan 
NYANA Brooklyn 
St. Nicholas Neighborhood Preservation Corp. Brooklyn 
WHEDCo Bronx 
Wildcat Service Corp. Bronx 
Wildcat Service Corp. Manhattan 
a For-profit. 
Accountability Tools: JobStat and VendorStat
To oversee the performance of contractors, HRA took the account-
ability tool used by New York City’s police department, known as 
CompStat, and adapted it to the welfare-to-work field. In doing so, HRA
created “JobStat” and “VendorStat.” In JobStat, directors of the Job 
Centers (the city-run welfare offices) periodically come before HRA









ing results (Sherwood 2005). VendorStat, on the other hand, focuses on 
the 26 employment programs. Twenty different performance measures 
are reviewed for each program during VendorStat meetings, including 
comparisons between a program’s performance and the average for all 
the programs.4 These two “stat” systems ensure that performance is 
reviewed on a regular basis for both welfare offices and employment 
programs.5 
Public Service Jobs (“Workfare”) 
New York City is among a handful of cities with workfare pro-
grams, meaning that welfare recipients are required to work in public 
service jobs in return for their welfare grants (Besharov and Germanis 
2004; Clark 2005). New York’s version is called the Work Experience 
Program (WEP), and it involves about 15,000 welfare recipients who 
work in WEP jobs at city agencies or nonprofits three days a week. The 
other two days are spent at their employment programs. 
The WEP program has been a controversial aspect of the city’s wel-
fare system, particularly in the mid 1990s when the mayor at the time, 
Rudolph Giuliani, began requiring all able-bodied, unemployed welfare 
recipients to participate in workfare jobs. To critics, the WEP program 
forces welfare recipients to work at often menial, low-skill tasks such as 
cleaning parks without being paid a regular wage, although participants 
do receive their welfare benefits. Proponents, on the other hand, argue 
that workfare jobs help people prepare for a regular work schedule and 
that doing these jobs encourages people to move into regular wage-
paying jobs given that the alternative is unpaid work. 
Relatively Lenient Sanctions and Time Limits 
New York State’s constitutional guarantee of aid to the poor restricts 
the city from imposing strong sanctions for noncompliance and from 
establishing a time limit on assistance for families with children. Most 
states use full-family sanctions, meaning that noncompliance can lead 
to a termination of all welfare benefits (Bloom and Winstead 2002). 
New York, on the other hand, imposes partial-family sanctions that lead 
to benefit reductions but not terminations of aid. As noted earlier, it also 
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a few states, including California. Families in New York who reach the 
five-year federal time limit can enter a state- and locally-funded safety-
net program. 
Those at the frontlines—the staff and leaders of the employment 
programs—have differing views of these relatively lenient policies. 
Some see them as an important safety net for the most vulnerable in 
society, preventing women and children from becoming homeless and 
destitute. Others see the policies are overly permissive, facilitating job-
lessness and dependency. In particular, some criticize the fact that indi-
viduals who drop out of their programs are, in many cases, reassigned 
to new programs (or sometimes the same ones) without incurring any 
penalties. Regardless of one’s view, limited administrative authority 
makes the city especially challenging for employment programs. Weak 
sanction policies make it more difficult for staff to discourage people 
from dropping out of their programs, and the lack of a time limit on 
welfare benefits reduces participants’ sense of urgency about becoming 
employed. 
Eligibility for Custodial and Noncustodial Individuals 
Welfare recipients in the United States are mostly custodial single 
mothers because most welfare systems limit eligibility for benefits to 
low-income individuals with custodial children. In New York City, 
however, noncustodial poor individuals can also qualify for benefits. If 
they do, they are required to participate in employment programs just 
as custodial individuals are. As a result, about 40 percent of employ-
ment programs’ participants are noncustodial individuals and about 30 
percent of the recipients are male. Nationally, less than 10 percent of 
welfare recipients are male.6 
WHAT EMPLOYMENT PROGRAMS DO: AN OVERVIEW
The 26 employment programs range in size considerably, with the 
smallest receiving about 15 new participants every two weeks and the 
largest receiving 175 every two weeks.7 Some participants stay for only 







out of their programs. Others stay for several weeks or months. Pro-
grams can work with participants for up to six months before they are 
randomly reassigned to another program. 
All of the programs have an orientation period that lasts for a day 
or two. During orientation, participants learn about the program, meet 
with case managers to create an employment plan, and take a skills test. 
(The employment plan and skills test are required by the city.) Individu-
als who are deemed immediately job ready are usually fast-tracked and 
sent on job interviews within a few days. Staff estimated that about 10 
percent of participants are job ready at program entry. 
Following orientation, participants attend job-readiness workshops 
that last from a few days to about two weeks. Workshop topics typically 
include how to apply and interview for jobs, what to expect in terms of 
workplace norms of behavior, and transitional benefits and work sup-
ports that are available such as the Earned Income Tax Credit. When 
not in workshops, individuals meet with case managers to address any 
barriers to work that may be preventing them from getting or keeping 
jobs. Individuals with significant barriers are usually screened out prior 
to arriving at the programs, but in cases where staff members become 
aware of significant barriers, programs can deassign individuals by 
referring them back to their Job Centers for further evaluation. 
Participants also meet with job developers either at the start of the 
program or, at some programs, after case managers have deemed par-
ticipants “job ready,” a process that can take anywhere from a day to a 
few weeks or longer. Job developers are in charge of building and main-
taining employer contacts to provide job leads to participants. They also 
assess participants’ fit with particular job openings and refer them to job 
interviews. 
Some participants are referred to short-term training before they are 
sent on job interviews. Programs can request HRA training vouchers for 
some participants.8 If a request is approved, the participant is given a 
$1,500 voucher that can be used at any of the dozens of private training 
providers in the city. Voucher-eligible training usually lasts from a few 
weeks to three months. About 5 percent of all participants receive these 
vouchers. Some participants also receive free training from employer-
sponsored programs. This type of training is sometimes called “certifi-
cate training,” since graduates receive a certificate showing that they 
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System-wide data on the use of employer-sponsored training are not 
available, but anecdotal evidence indicates that employment programs 
that use more voucher training also tend to use more free employer-
sponsored training. 
After spending two weeks, full time, at their employment programs, 
individuals who have not yet become employed start a new schedule, 
spending two days a week at their employment programs and three days 
a week at WEP (workfare) jobs. 
Participants who become employed are eligible for two-week sub-
way passes, paid for by HRA, for up to six months. They are required to 
pick up those passes at their employment programs every two weeks.9 
This provides an incentive for participants to return to their programs 
on a regular basis so that staff can interact with them—asking them how 
their jobs are going, providing encouragement, and determining if they 
need any help to stay employed. 
People who are placed in jobs and then lose those jobs have two 
options. Some choose to go back to their Job Centers and request that 
their full welfare benefits be reinstated. In that case, they are randomly 
assigned again to an employment program. Others return to their previ-
ous employment programs for help in getting another job. Programs 
encourage individuals to choose the latter option because it gives the 
programs the opportunity to find participants new jobs prior to their 
three- or six-month retention milestone dates. Recall that programs get 
paid for retention as long as people are working at any job on those 
milestone dates. 
Program Performance 
The outcomes for welfare recipients served by the 26 employment 
programs are summarized in Figure 2.2. About 68 percent (14,000) of 
the 20,677 people assigned to the programs during the study period 
showed up for at least a day.10 The roughly one-third that fails to show 
up may face benefit cuts unless they request a new start date and begin 
to attend a program. 
Among those who begin attending their employment programs, 
some are deassigned by the staff because of significant barriers to work. 
After deassignments, about 60 percent of those initially assigned are 
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commonly, violate other program rules, resulting in termination from 
their employment programs and possible HRA sanctions.11 In fact, 
about half of all participants drop out during the first week, and only 20 
percent of those assigned to programs show up, are not deassigned, and 
are not terminated. 
Among the latter group of “active participants” (meaning people 
who go through the programs), almost half became employed. But, as 
the figure shows, this group of placed participants represents only 13 
percent of the total number initially assigned. In fact, only 8 percent 
of assigned individuals become employed and are still working (at any 
job) three months after placement—a figure that drops to 6 percent at 
the six-month mark. 
To some observers and community advocates, these outcomes rep-
resent “a failure of this work-first model in achieving its main goal— 
moving people from welfare to work, into jobs and towards economic 
independence” (Youdelman 2005). According to this view, the fact that 
only 13 percent of assigned individuals become employed, and even 
fewer keep those or other jobs, is a sign that people need more intensive 
help, including more opportunities for education and training.12 
From a different perspective, though, one could see these results as 
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policy and its lack of a time limit on aid likely contribute to widespread 
noncompliance. Two-thirds of those assigned to employment programs 
never show up, drop out, or violate program rules. The job placement 
and retention rates of those who do actively participate are much higher. 
Figure 2.3 shows that among those who show up, are not deassigned, 
and are not terminated, 62 percent become employed. Moreover, the 
six-month retention rate among placed participants (47 percent, not 
shown in the figure) is higher than that of a well-known employment 
program in Chicago, Project Match. At that program, which provides 
long-term, individualized employment services to welfare recipients, 
40 percent of placed participants are still working after six months 
(Olson, Berg, and Conrad 1990). 
How do the employment outcomes from New York City compare to 
other cities? Data are limited on this question, but one piece of evidence 
comes from a comparison of outcomes of single mothers (not necessar-
ily those on welfare) in New York City with the average for other U.S. 
central cities from the mid 1980s to early 2000s (O’Neill and Korenman 
2005). Throughout the period, the share of single mothers on welfare 
was higher in New York City than the national average, while the share 
that was employed was lower. It appears, though, that the employment 
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rate of single mothers in the city grew closer to the national average in 
the late 1990s (O’Neill and Korenman 2005). 
Recall that program performance in this book was measured in the 
mid 2000s, when the economy was growing modestly and labor mar-
kets were relatively tight. Another question is whether program perfor-
mance would be lower today, given the continued effects of the national
economic recession from 2007 to 2009. Theoretically, the effect of 
economic weakness on program performance could be either positive 
or negative, on balance. For example, in a weak economy there are 
obviously fewer job openings, making job placement more difficult, 
all else equal. But economic weakness also tends to bring more advan-
taged individuals into the welfare caseload, including those with more 
skills, education, and recent work experience. The data from New York 
City suggest, in fact, that these two factors may have largely balanced 
each other out. Job placement rates among welfare recipients remained 
fairly constant from 2006 through 2009, with a slight increase during 
the period.13 
Notes 
1. A key feature of New York City’s welfare system, its specialized employment 
services for hard-to-serve participants, was discussed in Chapter 1 and is not dis-
cussed further in this chapter. 
2. In 2006, after the period of this study, HRA eliminated the separate programs for 
new applicants and combined the SAPs and ESPs into what it now calls “Back to 
Work” providers. 
3. In 2003, ACS acquired the welfare-to-work services business of Lockheed Martin, 
best known as a defense contractor. 
4. Performance measures include the percentage of participants who become 
employed by the end of 4, 13, and 26 weeks of the programs; the average wage of 
placed participants and recidivism rates back onto welfare; employment retention 
rates; and process measures such as the share of participants who have worked 
with a case manager to complete an “employment plan.” Also, note that the use 
of random assignment of participants to programs, within boroughs, helps city 
administrators (and programs) compare VendorStat performance data across pro-
grams. The city’s decision to use random assignment was not related to Vendor-
Stat, but it had the effect of making VendorStat data much more straightforward to 
interpret, given that programs have a more even distribution (within boroughs) of 
participants in terms of measured and unmeasured characteristics. 
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audits of welfare recipients’ case files to ensure that Job Centers and employment 
programs are adequately serving individuals. 
6. The city’s inclusion of noncustodial individuals may be ahead of its time given the 
seemingly growing focus in the United States on efforts to reduce prison recidi-
vism among ex-felons, a population that is mainly low-income, noncustodial men. 
Since employment programs involving low-income men are relatively rare, New 
York City provides insights into serving that population. The results presented in 
Chapter 9 show that men in the city’s programs had similar employment outcomes 
as women. This is contrary to what may be conventional wisdom in the United 
States that poor males have weaker results than poor females in employment 
programs. 
7. These data pertain to the average number of people that show up for at least one 
day to their programs. 
8. Requests for training vouchers must show that the participant has good attendance 
at their employment program, that they have the necessary basic skills to receive 
the training desired, and that there is a cogent rationale for needing training. 
9. Some programs shift to a monthly pickup schedule after people have been 
employed for a few months. 
10. The fact that about one-third of assigned individuals do not show up to their pro-
grams raises the possibility of selection effects. To investigate this issue, quan-
titative results were run using alternative sample definitions, including anyone 
assigned to a program, whether or not they showed up. The results were fairly 
consistent across sample definitions and none of the main findings of the vol-
ume would change using alternative sample definitions. The case for defining the 
sample as participants (those who show up for at least a day) is also stronger 
if program characteristics (other than geographic location) are uncorrelated with 
whether people show up. Only one program characteristic was correlated with 
show rates, deassignment rate. When two outliers in terms of this characteristic 
were removed, however, even this variable became uncorrelated. 
11. Those who are terminated may face benefit cuts unless they show good cause in 
conciliation meetings with HRA. If they show good cause (which anecdotally is 
fairly easy), they are randomly assigned to an employment program again. 
12. A lack of jobs might be another factor in these low employment rates, although 
during the study period in the mid 2000s, that did not appear to be the case. Staff at 
employment programs typically said that there were enough jobs for participants. 
13. The data show that about 1.7 percent of all Family Assistance and Safety Net 
recipients were placed in jobs per month during early 2006, a figure that rose 
to about 2 percent by the end of 2009. These data pertain to placements among 
all welfare recipients in the city, not just those who participated in employment 
programs, so they are not directly comparable to the placement rates discussed in 
this chapter. Even so, they show no major shift in placement rates as the economy 
weakened in the later 2000s (author’s calculation based on total placements and 
caseload size from New York City Human Resource Administration 2009b). 

Part 1 
Shared Strategic Elements among 

















The first common element among today’s welfare-to-work pro-
grams, judging from the range of programs in New York City, is what 
I call “creating a spirit of partnership.” It involves staff working to 
develop productive working relationships with new participants. This 
usually occurs during program orientation, which lasts a day or two. As 
a result, orientation staff members play a central role in creating a spirit 
of partnership. The task of maintaining that spirit is then handed off to 
others, including case managers and job developers, who work with 
participants after orientation. 
Successfully establishing a sense of partnership is not a simple task. 
It is multifaceted and requires staff with strong interpersonal skills. 
Participants must see that the organization and its staff are concerned 
with their well-being, which is important in building trust. Participants 
need to be convinced that the program will be useful in improving their 
lives. Doing this engages participants in the program or, at a minimum, 
reduces the chances that they will drop out. And finally, establishing a 
sense of partnership includes setting expectations in terms of partici-
pants’ professional behavior such as showing up on time, dressing pro-
fessionally, and following directions. Setting these expectations gives 












important for those who have been out of work for longer periods of 
time. 
The term “partnership” reflects two emphases—what the staff does 
for participants and what the staff expects of participants. There is a 
simultaneous pull and push to the dynamic. The “pull” is about building 
trust and emphasizing the program’s usefulness.1 The “push” is about 
requiring people to meet workplace norms.2 
RATIONALE
Program staff members explained that the pull side of the spirit of 
partnership is important for several reasons. One is that participants, 
especially those who are longer term welfare recipients, are aware that 
they can drop out of their employment programs and usually avoid 
HRA sanctions by getting reassigned to a new program. People are 
more likely to drop out if they do not feel a connection with the staff 
or if they believe the program will be a waste of time. As a site director 
explained, “Trust is a huge issue because if they don’t trust us, they’re 
not going to want to stay.” 
Another reason for building trust is that participants often enter the 
programs angry about being required to attend. When asked whether 
participants knew they could be sanctioned by HRA if they did not 
attend, a case manager explained: “They know for sure. That’s part of 
the reason why they don’t want to come from the beginning or why they 
may be a bit upset when having to come someplace . . . because it’s just 
a threat that hangs over their heads.” Newer welfare recipients are more 
fearful of being sanctioned than long-term recipients because the latter 
group knows how to “play the system.” 
Other participants are angry or distrustful because they feel they 
have been treated poorly at the Job Centers (the city-run welfare of-
fices), at other employment programs they have attended, or by society 
in general. As one staff member commented, “They do not come in here 
wanting to give you even that slightest bit of trust. They come in here 
with a lot of bad thoughts . . . because they figure ‘I’m on welfare. I’m 
just on the bottom of the pit.’And they feel like they get treated that way 
wherever they go.” 
 
 
Creating a Spirit of Partnership 35 
Personal problems can be another source of anger. Some people are 
frustrated, a job developer explained, “not [being] able to get a job to 
provide for their family. They have problems with their family. They 
have problems with their children. It’s a lot of things.” 
By gaining people’s trust and emphasizing that the program can 
help them, staff members try to reduce dropout rates and form produc-
tive working relationships with participants. One orientation facilitator 
noted that she can assess how well she conducts the first day’s orienta-
tion session by the turnout rate on the second day. Another explained, 
“Once they come here, I think we have control over whether they come 
back or not . . . [It’s] the way we present ourselves. First impressions 
are important.” 
The push aspect of partnership involves setting expectations and 
rules about workplace norms. One reason programs do this is to prepare 
people for work by replicating (at least to some extent) a workplace 
environment. As a case manager explained: 
Our program functions as a mirror of how they will be expected to 
function in the world of work. The program is nine to five because 
most jobs are nine to five. You are expected to be here on time. You 
are expected to come here and manage your time—your transpor-
tation and commute here—to follow a schedule. This hopefully 
will prepare you as a warm up to your job. 
Another rationale for professional standards is that it helps staff 
members determine who is job ready and who needs more coaching. 
If someone consistently shows up late to a program, for example, they 
are unlikely to arrive on time to a job. Moreover, if the staff refers par-
ticipants to jobs and if (assuming they are hired) those individuals do 
not perform well because of poor behavior, programs can hurt their 
relationships with those employers. 
A third reason to enforce work norms is to help create more order 
within programs. Without rules about attendance, for example, people 
would “fall through the cracks,” one site director explained. “We run a 
very tight ship here, and we have to or else you lose control.” Finally, 
programs enforce rules to push people to take greater responsibility for 
their actions. For example, a director explained why she puts people on 
probation (meaning at risk of being removed from the program) if they 




I put them on probation [and say,] “if you want your [training] 
certificate, it’s not going to be handed out to you because you were 
here four or five days. You have to earn that. So what kept you 
away?” They’ll say “I don’t know. I just didn’t feel good.” [I’ll 
say,] “Well I didn’t feel good either but I was here.” . . . When you 
give them those doors [opportunities to improve], they’ll come 
back and say thank you. You see the thank you notes? [She points 
to her wall] “Thank you. If you had not stayed on my case I would 
not have finished that. Thank you for really telling me I had to be 
disciplined with my time and my personal life.” They come back 
and thank me. That’s the tough love. 
TECHNIQUES 
Creating a spirit of partnership involves blending several messages 
to build trust, demonstrate programs’ usefulness, and set expectations 
about behavior. One orientation facilitator, in fact, used the term “part-
nership” to describe the process: 
[I tell them:] “I’m not their friend . . . I’m your partner . . . We’re 
going to partner together to try to seek employment . . . That’s what 
the first part of orientation is. What can you expect from your time 
here and what can I expect from you when it comes to partnership. 
You can get 100 percent from me, but I want 100 percent from 
you.” 
Another program director noted: 
Our famous line is “If you don’t quit on us, we won’t quit on you.” 
But there are guidelines we need to follow and we give them all 
of the guidelines . . . Someone described it as tough love. That’s 
what we try to do here. Professional standards—we’re strict. If you 
work with us, we can get you to the next level. 
Building Trust 
By building trust, staff members hope to gain participants’ coopera-
tion and interest in the programs. As a site director explained, “They are 
not coming in on a voluntary basis . . . What we hope happens is that as 
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they get to know us and trust us and see exactly what it is we do, that 
then they would want to come in [and] get engaged and be part of the 
program.” 
Giving individual attention during orientation 
One way to build trust is through individual attention during the 
first few days of a program. This helps demonstrate the staff’s interest 
in people’s well-being. In the words of one staff member, “When you 
get to a place and you’re frustrated, but then you get that individual 
attention, you’re like ‘Oh, yes, somebody can relate to me. Somebody 
really cares.’” Many programs have one-on-one meetings with partici-
pants during the first day or two. 
Emphasizing empathy and a desire to help 
Some individuals arrive with confrontational attitudes, but show-
ing empathy and a willingness to help can ameliorate that negativity 
and build trust. One way of doing that is by having orientation staff 
members share their own experiences of financial struggle or of mov-
ing from welfare to work. “Some of us have personal stories on public 
assistance,” a job developer explained, “and sometimes it helps the cli-
ent to know that you do know what they’re going through.” 
Demonstrating Programs’ Usefulness 
Another set of practices to build partnership is aimed at convincing 
participants of the program’s usefulness, particularly in terms of con-
necting them with jobs. 
Pitching the program on the first day 
As with building trust, the first day is critical for demonstrating a 
program’s value and, in doing so, reducing dropout rates. One orienta-
tion facilitator explained to new arrivals, “We only get paid once you 
get a job, so we’re really partners in this whole activity.” Her goal, 
she said, was to “let them know that there are real jobs available, real 
opportunities . . . If, in that first day, the great majority of the group can 
believe that they can have success here if they do their part, then by the 





Conducting useful and engaging workshops 
All of the programs conduct job-readiness workshops, sometimes 
starting on the first or second day and lasting from a few days to about 
two weeks. Although their primary purpose is to get people job ready, 
workshops also signal program quality, based on the usefulness of the 
information presented. A program director explained, “It’s important 
to put the right person in front of that classroom because, if you don’t, 
people aren’t going to come back. They feel that they’re wasting their 
time . . . So you have to put someone there that can relate to the clients 
in the room.” A few programs also had former participants who are now 
employed talk to new groups during orientation and vouch for the value 
of the program. 
Demonstrating employer connections 
Another way programs show their usefulness to new participants 
is by describing current job leads. For example, one director described 
how, during orientation, her job developers list the types of jobs that 
people in previous cohorts have gotten in recent weeks. The goal, she 
said, was to get people thinking, “Wow, if I stay here for two or three 
days, I’m actually going to get a shot at an interview.” Emphasizing 
job leads also helps reduce the negative expectations that some partici-
pants have. Those expectations, in the words of a workshop facilitator, 
include the belief that, “They’re not going to really have any jobs for 
me and what they do have is going to be at McDonalds.” 
Enforcing Workplace Norms 
The final technique used to build partnership is enforcing workplace 
norms. All of the programs discuss rules about professional behavior, 
although the level of emphasis varies. For example, some programs 
are strict from the start, while others phase in enforcement over time 
to provide an adjustment period. Either way, enforcing professional 
norms while simultaneously building trust requires that rules are set 
and enforced in a way that the participants will accept. One approach is 
to model respectful behavior. A workshop facilitator explained: 
We believe words are powerful. If you want someone to behave in 
a certain way, you have to show that behavior. I’ll say “thank you 
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very much,” “excuse me.” I don’t allow outbreaks in the classroom 
. . . There’s a whole reconditioning the first couple of days. I hate 
using that word, but I think that’s what that is—reconditioning to 
be treated a different way. 
Another technique is to downplay hierarchy. For example, one 
director said members of her staff use themselves as examples, empha-
sizing how they have to show up to work on time everyday. The mes-
sage, she said, was, “The world is not requiring something different 
from you than from me.” Staff also spoke about showing leniency if 
people appear to be legitimately trying to meet expectations. “You’ve 
got to show the compassionate side,” one case manager noted, “so they 
say, ‘They’re pushing me for a reason.’” 
VARIATION IN APPROACHES 
Engagement 
Programs differ in their emphases on trust and engagement, as well 
as in their abilities to achieve them. In fact, a few workshop facilitators 
appeared to create more frustration for participants than engagement. 
One program, for instance, was disorganized and kept participants wait-
ing in a classroom for an hour before the workshop facilitator arrived. 
At a different program, a facilitator ran a session using true/false ques-
tions related to basic workplace norms, but the information was confus-
ing and contradictory and ended up visibly frustrating people. At still 
another program, the facilitator was too meek to control the group dur-
ing a skills-assessment workshop. Some participants began to ignore 
the facilitator and, in fact, started sharing job leads with each other. 
At the other end of the spectrum, some programs were especially 
skilled at engagement. One had several job developers discuss their 
current job leads during orientation, with participants noticeably inter-
ested and asking follow-up questions. Others had staff with impres-
sive abilities to connect with people and to convey useful information. 
One workshop facilitator, for instance, blended humor, encouragement, 
professionalism, and an extensive list of tips on becoming and staying 
employed. She urged participants to take available jobs and then move 





up over time. In doing so, she described how she had moved from a 
fast-food cashier as a new émigré from Jamaica to (after six different 
jobs) a professional: 
I remember there were times after hearing so many “no’s” and the 
tears would be coming down my face. And I’m like “God, am I 
ever going to find a job?” . . . But I had to take baby steps. I started 
out at Arby’s restaurant . . . [Eventually the manager] said to me 
“Miss [first name], I can’t stand my bookkeeper.” She said “I’m 
going to train you to be my bookkeeper” because she liked my 
attitude and she saw that I was a team player . . . [You see,] there 
are certain qualities that God has blessed you with. [Participants 
acknowledge: “Uh huh.”] . . . So what I need you to do is to take 
what you have and let it work for you until the type of position that 
you’re really looking for comes along. [Italics are emphases of the 
speaker.]3 
Finally, one nonprofit program took a unique approach to partici-
pant engagement. According to the director, the program tries not to 
be too engaging during the first few days of the program. For example, 
the staff purposely does not meet one-on-one with participants until the 
third day, nor does the director want staff to encourage unmotivated 
people to stay: 
In effect it’s two days of probation. If they begin violating [rules] 
the first two days [e.g., not showing up], it’s a good sign that they 
have a poor prognosis . . . From a business point of view, it’s good 
[if they drop out]. They’re showing me that this is someone that’s 
going to do it [drop out] anyway and I’m saving staff labor if they 
do it on the first week. I’m not going to make it easy on them or try 
to sell them on being here . . . Part of being job ready is the desire 
to work. 
Fieldwork showed that the program’s orientation is average (not 
low) in terms of engagement. Even so, this program’s approach could 
be considered “creaming,” meaning focusing on the most job-ready 
individuals. The director noted, in fact, “There’s a tremendous pres-
sure to cream.” But looking at the program’s performance, its place-
ment rates (among all participants, not just those who remained after 
the unofficial probation period) are in the top third of the 26 programs. 
And its placement rate for long-term welfare recipients is sixth high-
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of a program is not essential—even if it is still helpful—to achieving 
relatively strong employment outcomes. 
Setting Expectations about Work Norms 
All programs set expectations about behavior, but some are stricter 
about enforcing rules than others. According to staff at more lenient 
programs, leniency gives people time to adjust to new expectations, and 
flexibility about attendance allows people to take care of personal mat-
ters before they begin employment. “We’re starting to get harder on the 
rules,” a case manager explained. “But that’s not our focus . . . I feel like 
people know this is not a job . . . If they need to go to doctors’ appoint-
ments, they bring us the documentation, but that wouldn’t work on the 
job necessarily. But if you can get those appointments out of the way 
while you’re with us before you start working, maybe that’s [helpful].” 
At a few programs, in fact, there was noticeable disagreement among 
the staff about how strictly to enforce workplace norms. The result was 
a confusing message for participants and conflict among staff.
Notes 
1. In the welfare-to-work field, the concept of engagement has not been closely 
examined. One reason may be that, until the 1990s, many welfare-to-work pro-
grams in the United States served mostly voluntary populations for whom engage-
ment was less of a concern. With participation mandates increasing, especially 
since the 1996 welfare reform bill, engagement is a more salient issue. One area 
where engagement has been examined more thoroughly is in child welfare ser-
vices, where participation is mostly mandatory. Based on a survey of the litera-
ture, Dawson and Berry (2002) find that program success in family preservation 
and other outcomes is linked to families’ early cooperation and engagement in 
services, as well as to caseworkers’ ability to develop empathy, trust, and respect 
with participants. A way to promote engagement, according to another study, is to 
provide simple and effective services at the beginning of the treatment relationship 
so that some progress is made quickly (Lewis 1991). 
2. In terms of research on enforcing workplace norms of behavior, studies have 
not examined the link between that emphasis and performance. But Strawn and 
Martinson (2000) note, “Several successful programs, such as the Center for 
Employment Training in San Jose, believe strongly in the importance of having a 
work-like environment, with participants punching time clocks, having a dress code, 





of the workplace. Participation in pre-employment services then becomes a ‘dress 
rehearsal’ for work.” Research also demonstrates that a failure to meet workplace 
norms on the job is a prime cause of job loss among low-income workers (Berg, 
Olson, and Conrad 1991; Hershey and Pavetti 1997; Holzer and Wissoker 2001). 
3. Interestingly, organizations that run multiple sites did not always show consistency 
in terms of engagement across their sites. In fact, two of the examples discussed, 
one of strong engagement and one of weak engagement, come from different sites 
run by the same organization. This may reflect, in part, the challenge of finding and 
keeping staff with dynamic interpersonal skills. 
4. This program also has strong employment retention results, an outcome that may 


















Helping participants become “job ready” is a second common ele-
ment of work-first employment programs’ service strategies. In particu-
lar, based on the operations of providers in New York City, programs 
work with participants to prepare them for job interviews and to discuss 
potential workplace challenges and employer expectations. They also 
help people deal with immediately pressing issues that are preventing 
them from becoming employed, such as housing or child care issues. 
And finally, programs strive to increase people’s motivation to become 
employed because participants often are apprehensive about leaving 
welfare for work. 
Two types of staff usually take the lead in job-readiness activities. 
Facilitators, as they are often called, run group workshops on topics 
such as filling out job applications, interview techniques, succeeding on 
the job, and transitional benefits. And case managers (or “employment 
counselors” as they are called at some programs) meet one-on-one with 
participants to help them deal with barriers to work and prepare them 












Staff at the employment programs characterized program partici-
pants into three groups: those who arrive essentially job ready (roughly 
10 percent), those who can be helped to become job ready with coach-
ing and assistance (most clients), and long-term recipients (roughly 10 
percent) who are hard to employ. 
Interviewees said that the share that arrives job ready has fallen 
since the 1990s because welfare reform has pushed the most employ-
able recipients off of public assistance and into employment. In the 
words of Karen Smith, the Senior Vice President of Wildcat Industries:1 
At this stage of the program, because the people who we could put 
to work are working, the people now that we’re working with are 
coming with multiple barriers to employment. I mean mental ill-
ness, homelessness, long-term unemployment. So this population 
is very hard to get placed. They’re turning down jobs [or] taking 
the job and not showing up. 
Different groups require different types of assistance. The job-ready 
group simply needs “polishing” and can be sent on job interviews within
the first few days. Programs typically focus their energy on the second 
group. The last group is a challenge, although these individuals can 
sometimes be placed into jobs with enough effort and coaching. 
Barriers to Work 
Participants’ lack of motivation to leave welfare and begin employ-
ment is the most frequently cited barrier to work mentioned by program 
staff. This is noteworthy, given that personal motivation is rarely men-
tioned in the literature on barriers to work.2 “With the population that 
we deal with . . . they don’t have the drive when they first come here,” 
a job developer explained. “They’re more comfortable in their predica-
ment. Not that they want to be there—it’s just more dependable for 
them to rely on the system . . . than to depend on themselves to work.” 
Another staff member said, “Motivation and drive is key. Education is 
important but if you don’t have the motivation to get the job, to keep the 
job, and to do the job that you’re supposed to do, then you’re not going 
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Staff identified several factors behind some participants’ reluctance 
to become employed, including low self-esteem, a mindset of depen-
dency, fear of the unknown (the workplace), being already employed 
off the books, and a short-term focus that makes it difficult to see low-
wage jobs as stepping stones to higher paying ones in the future. This 
staff member’s comment is representative of many others: 
I’d say the number one barrier is probably psychological . . . Once 
you’ve accepted yourself [on welfare], you say, “Ok, now I’m a 
welfare client.” It’s very difficult to self-empower back out of that. 
It also becomes a comfort level for some people . . . who say, “I’ve 
got my child care paid for. My rental issues are taken care of for 
right now.” And it’s scary to transition back into the world of work.
The fear of doing worse financially by working is an important 
source of apprehension about leaving welfare. In particular, some par-
ticipants worry that leaving welfare for work puts them at risk of desti-
tution if they lose their jobs. A program director noted that this concern 
is particularly acute among long-term recipients: 
People who are habitual welfare recipients—I don’t believe are 
lazy. I believe that it is safer to stay on the rolls of welfare because 
you know definitely you will have food on the table for your chil-
dren . . . that you can have medical assistance. But when you sever 
your ties with that guarantee, there’s so much fear. I’m not certain 
I can feed my child. I’m not certain if my child gets hurt that I can 
get medical help. So to me it’s never laziness. Most often it’s fear: 
Will I be able to provide? 
Connected to that fear is the concern among participants that get-
ting back onto welfare could be difficult if they lose their jobs and 
become unemployed again. A similar concern is that transitional ben-
efits such as Medicaid will be cut off prematurely (in error) once they 
start working.3 These fears lead some people to prefer a guaranteed wel-
fare payment over a higher but possibly short-term paycheck. Given the 
low job-retention rates among welfare recipients in the United States, 
this preference may be quite rational for some individuals. The realis-
tic tradeoff for many recipients is not between welfare and work, but 
between welfare and periods of work. 
Aside from a lack of motivation, staff mentioned other issues that 
can hinder employment, including a lack of knowledge about how 






(aggressiveness, for example), a lack of proper work clothing, unstable 
housing, and low skills. A workshop facilitator also described the types 
of family-related issues that can hinder employment: 
Let’s say we have a single mother. She’s 32 years old. She has five 
children by five different fathers . . . Every time she goes to work 
there’s something that goes down, she has to leave [work]. I had a 
young lady, she said . . . “I spent half the night looking for my 13 
year old and my 15 year old . . . ” She has a job that she has to be at 
the next morning . . . Will she be able to maintain her job? 
A final barrier to work—and especially to staying employed—is 
a lack of knowledge about workplace norms. Even seemingly simple 
techniques for navigating the workplace may not come naturally to peo-
ple who have little work experience. For example, some participants 
will walk off their jobs when they need to attend to an ill child rather 
than asking their employers for a day off and are fired as a result. 
TECHNIQUES
Several types of staff are involved in job readiness, including ori-
entation staff who begin the process, facilitators who lead job-readiness 
workshops, and case managers who work with participants one-on-one. 
Common practices can be divided into three groups. The first group 
focuses on addressing general barriers to work. The second deals with 
a specific barrier, the lack of motivation to move from welfare to work. 
The third group aims to increase the chances that people get hired by 
making them more marketable to employers. 
Addressing Barriers to Work 
Every program provides some individual attention to help partici-
pants become job ready. Usually this involves meetings between partic-
ipants and their case managers. The first meeting usually occurs within 
the first day or two, with successive meetings taking place as needed, 
from everyday to a few times a week. “What [the case manager] does, 
which I think is very valuable,” a director explained, “is that she really 
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do this. Do you have your clothing? You don’t? Ok, we have some.’ She 
really pumps them up . . . and I appreciate that because these folks go 
get jobs.” 
Motivating Participants about Employment 
Several of the techniques used to help people become job ready 
have a motivational component that is designed (whether explicitly or 
implicitly) to boost people’s motivation about taking jobs and entering 
the work world. 
Addressing fears about financial loss by leaving welfare 
Workers at these employment programs usually explain transitional 
benefits to participants during workshops. These benefits include Med-
icaid, Food Stamps, child care subsidies, and the Earned Income Tax 
Credit. A few sites screen participants to determine which specific bene-
fits they could receive once they start working. And some staff members 
“do the math” with participants during workshops by explaining how 
a person’s financial situation would improve by working. They may 
also have broader discussions with people, in groups or one-on-one, 
about their fears of leaving welfare. “We make a list of all the fears” 
on the first day, a facilitator explained. “And then we discuss how we 
can overcome those fears . . . So you address each issue separately . . .
That’ll help. It doesn’t do it the first day [i.e., conquer the fear], but it 
will help.” 
Helping people to see entry-level jobs as stepping stones
to something better 
Staff members often pitch minimum-wage or low-wage jobs as 
paths to something better. “One of the atrocities I see of welfare,” a pro-
gram director noted, “is the inability to think for yourself and to plan for 
yourself. Some of them, as simple as that concept appears, think they’re 
going to be stuck in that job forever.” If a participant sees a job as a 
stepping stone, she is more willing to take the job and to “stick it out” 
once she starts working. Programs therefore emphasize mobility. In the 
words of one job developer, “Maybe you’ve been incarcerated for the 







going to be a warehouse . . . It doesn’t make much to go from 6 to 10 
[dollars an hour] in the warehouse field. Then you can grow—you can 
become a shipping manager. It can go up to be a career. That’s how I 
pitch it to individuals—that you start off here but then you move up.” 
Emphasizing the benefits of working and being off welfare 
Another motivational tool is highlighting the benefits of moving 
from welfare to work, including nonmonetary benefits.4 In workshops, 
some staff members discuss the benefits of being free of the welfare 
system, with all of its mandates and rules. Others emphasize that work-
ing is a more meaningful way to live one’s life than reporting to a
welfare-to-work program to collect public assistance. “You have to 
want to do something with your life,” one job developer tells partici-
pants. “Because if not, someone will make decisions for you. That’s 
why you’re here.” Still others emphasized the financial benefits of 
working. Welfare can pay the bills, one staff member explains to par-
ticipants, but it will never provide enough to travel or to do anything 
that requires more income. 
Building self-esteem 
Because participants often have low self-confidence, staff mem-
bers build the participants’ self-esteem, including making people 
aware of their strengths and positive qualities, to increase their motiva-
tion. “You’ve managed to survive, to put food on the table—that’s a 
strength,” a job developer tells participants during orientation. “Let’s 
build on that. Let’s build on trying to get you self-reliant, independent, 
off of HRA [i.e., off welfare].” They also make participants aware that 
being nervous about starting work is natural. As a job developer said, 
“The push [giving encouragement] is very important, because it’s scary. 
It’s really scary out there when you have to stand on your own two feet 
when you haven’t done it in a while.” 
Making participants more marketable to employers 
All of the programs help people create resumes, secure references, 
and practice interview techniques. These services are important for a 
few reasons, as a case manager noted: “A lot of them haven’t worked in 
some time. They’ve forgotten how to sit in an interview. They’ve for-
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gotten to do a test run to make sure they get there on time. How to shake 
hands. How to maintain eye contact. How to present their resume. How 
to dress . . . They are employable, but we just have to refine their skills 
a little.” 
VARIATION IN APPROACHES 
Although every program has a job-readiness component, the scope 
of this activity varies significantly. Some take a more holistic approach 
to addressing people’s work barriers, including focusing on broader life 
issues such as motivation, self-confidence, and family problems. They 
also take more time with people (a few weeks to a couple of months) 
to get them work ready before referring them to job interviews. And 
some encourage short-term training as a way of making people more 
marketable. 
Other programs take a different approach, focusing more narrowly 
on issues that affect people’s abilities to start work right away, including 
interview techniques and resume preparation. Staff members at these 
programs have more urgency about getting people into jobs quickly and 
less focus on assessing and addressing work barriers. 
Another variation among programs (and sometimes among the staff 
within a particular program) relates to the belief that staff can moti-
vate people to want to leave welfare. The views of staff members can 
diverge remarkably. Some argue that attending an employment program 
was not going to change people’s mindset, a sentiment expressed by 
this case manager: 
You try to talk about being independent and “Don’t you want to 
set goals for yourself and be an example?” And they’re like “Be 
an example for what? My mother wasn’t on welfare and I haven’t 
taken her example.” . . . This is what they’ve seen or the surround-
ings they’re in. It’s just they’re so used to it—it’s become the norm 
not to have a nine-to-five per se. So you can’t really change the 
mentality. I’ve tried. 
Others see it as central to their jobs to motivate people to “change 
their mindset” away from dependency and to “inspire people” to want 








1. Only executive-level staff, meaning individuals at senior positions who oversee 
multiple programs or multiple social service programs, are quoted by name in this 
study. Program directors, on the other hand, are considered to be staff and given 
confidentiality. 
2. One reason is probably related to research methodology. Motivation is difficult to 
observe and measure. Another reason may be researchers’ reluctance to appear to 
“blame the victim.” As noted earlier, Dunifon and Duncan (1998) examine factors 
that affect long-term labor-market success, although not among the poor specifi-
cally. They found that earnings are strongly affected by an individual’s motivation, 
including their orientation toward challenge and sense of personal control. 
3. The latter type of error happens quite regularly, according to a few staff 
interviewees. 
4. Staff opinion was split about whether most people would be immediately better off 
financially by moving from welfare to work. 
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The third common element in New York City’s work-first employ-
ment program is the focus on making good job matches between partici-
pants and employers. That is, once participants are deemed employment 
ready by the staff, programs attempt to match them with appropriate jobs. 
Job developers are the central figures in this process, acting as intermedi-
aries between employers and participants. In many cases, employers with 
existing working relationships with job developers will contact those job 
developers when they have positions to fill. Some job developers also 
obtain job leads by contacting employers or by searching want ads. With 
job leads in hand, they determine which participants are good candidates 
for particular job openings, often through one-on-one meetings with par-
ticipants. More rarely, the process is reversed. If participants have more 
specialized skills or interests, job developers use their contacts to search 
for jobs for those individuals. Either way, when a potential job match is 
found, job developers set up job interviews for participants. If the person 
is not hired, the process continues. 
These activities are known among programs as “job matching” or 
“making good job matches.” At a minimum, a good job match occurs 





interests. Some staff articulated additional characteristics of good job 
matches, including that a job is acceptable to the participant in terms of 
wages, work hours, and location; it is not temporary; there are opportu-
nities for advancement; and there is a decent work environment. 
The task of finding job leads (at least during the mid 2000s, a period 
of modest economic growth) was not a challenge at most programs. Job 
developers usually had more job openings than participants, although 
sometimes they lacked participants with the right skills to fill those jobs. 
Others said that the main constraint was finding enough participants 
who were motivated to work. The task of finding job leads, no doubt, 
became more challenging as the economy weakened later in the decade. 
RATIONALE 
Programs focus on making good job matches for two main reasons. 
The first is employment retention. People with poor job matches are 
unlikely to stay for long, either because they will be fired for not having 
the requisite skills or because they will quit because they dislike their 
jobs. Susan Melocarro, President of Career and Education Consultants, 
explained: 
If you’re forcing someone into a job that they’re not interested in, 
then they’re not going to last on that job. What ends up happening 
is they fall off the job and then you have to place them again . . . 
So it’s much better to know up front what they’re interested in and 
what they’re suited to. 
A second rationale for making good matches is that it strengthens 
relationships with employers. If individuals—either in the interview 
process or once hired—do not fit with what an employer wants, the 
employer is less likely to seek out other candidates from that program. 
This rationale is especially important because employers who are 
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TECHNIQUES 
All of the programs use job developers, and most of the programs 
secured the majority of their job placements through these staff. The 
significant role of job developers is noteworthy since, at least anecdot-
ally, welfare-to-work programs in the United States relied mainly on 
independent job search prior to national welfare reform in 1996.1 With 
independent job search, participants take the lead in finding their own 
jobs. Staff at several programs said that independent job search is not 
used because it is too easily abused. For example, people can fake their 
independent job search by collecting business cards to show the staff, 
while not actually looking for work. As a result, most programs now 
rely on job developers to find job leads for participants. A few programs 
supplement the work of job developers by encouraging participants to 
find leads as well. One organization, for example, offers $50 to par-
ticipants who become employed in positions that they find themselves. 
About a quarter of placements at this program are self-directed, staff 
said. 
One program uses a “guided job search” approach. Under this 
approach, the staff teaches participants how to find jobs (similar to 
independent job search) but closely supervises the process. Judging 
from limited evidence—participants’ outcomes at this one program—it 
does not appear that guided job search is an effective strategy. The pro-
gram had the third-lowest job-placement rate among the 26 programs, 
and fewer participants than average become employed for at least six 
months. Appendix B describes guided job search in more detail. 
Given the central role of job developers at most programs, the rest 
of the chapter focuses on how they conduct job matching. The match-
ing process is about screening—job developers screen participants for 
employers while also screening employers for participants. 
Screening and Assisting Participants 
Guiding people toward good job matches 
To make job matches, job developers talk with participants and 
learn about their strengths, limitations, skills, and interests. Participants 






developers, in turn, give guidance about which types of jobs are most 
in demand by employers, and they sometimes encourage participants 
to consider fields they have not have considered before. Job develop-
ers also help people understand the types of jobs and wages they can 
realistically obtain. As one explained, “They sometimes need to come 
back to reality because sometimes they may be stay-at-home mothers 
who haven’t been to work in 10 years and they think they’re clerical and 
have computer skills . . . It’s a big reality check.” 
Preparing participants for interviews 
Although workshop facilitators and case managers usually play the 
lead role in providing interview preparation, some job developers par-
ticipate as well by conducting mock interviews. Since job developers 
usually know which skills and qualities particular employers are looking 
for, they can coach participants to emphasize those aspects. Mock inter-
views also help job developers check whether people are adequately
prepared for their interviews, something that is important to protect job 
developers’ relationships with employers. 
Building Relationships with Employers 
Understanding and meeting employers’ needs 
Job developers try to build relationships with employers and learn 
their staffing needs, although the time actually devoted to relationship 
building varies. For example, some job developers communicate with 
employers mainly by phone. Others spend a portion of each week in 
the field, meeting with employers in person, as described by this job 
developer: 
You have to be able to go out into the field and network with 
people and get to know what they’re looking for when they hire 
someone . . . Get an idea of the skills they need. If someone tells 
me they need someone to do Excel, is it basic, intermediate, or 
advanced? How many words per minute typing? Talk to me about 
the chemistry [office culture]. Is it fast paced or a little laid back? 
It’s very important that you get as close of a match as possible . . . 
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Good job matches are the foundation for a potentially symbiotic 
relationship between job developers and employers. If these staff care-
fully screen participants for employers, those employers will, hopefully, 
contact the program the next time it needs more workers. 
Offering “human resources” services to firms 
A few job developers try to solidify their relationships with employ-
ers by offering to act as auxiliary human resources staff for firms, par-
ticularly in dealing with participants who are having trouble on the 
job. If an individual starts showing up late for work, for example, the 
employer can call the job developer and ask him or her to speak with 
the person and, hopefully, avoid firing the employee. The offer of HR 
services could be part of some programs’ employment-retention strate-
gies, but in practice, it appears to be mainly a marketing strategy by 
programs to engage employers. Job developers said that it was rare 
that employers actually called them for help in dealing with problem 
employees. 
Screening employers 
Another reason some job developers spend time in the field is to 
determine which workplaces have favorable environments for par-
ticipants. For example, one job developer said that he looks to see if 
employees seem happy when he visits firms. If so, “I pitch that to my 
candidates [the participants].” He added: “I deal with the union shop 
ones that . . . make you feel like you’re achieving something and they 
give you raises as time goes on. You get treated better.” A director at 
another program explained that, because most of the potential milestone 
payments (programs’ performance-based compensation) are based on 
retention, her program is “more conscientious about the partnerships 
we form” with employers. “People don’t stay in their jobs to get us 
paid,” she noted. “They stay in their jobs because it pays enough, they 
like what they’re doing, they feel appreciated in what they’re doing, 






VARIATION IN APPROACHES 
Staff at most programs articulated the importance of making good 
job matches, and none of the interviewees said that job matching was 
unimportant. But some program leaders place more pressure on staff to 
make placements and are willing to sacrifice the quality of job matches 
to make their placement goals. For example, a job developer at a small 
faith-based nonprofit felt overworked and often had to focus on get-
ting people out the door, not on making careful job matches. “If I had 
another job developer,” she said, “it would give me more time to work 
with this person—not just send them into any job just to get the place-
ment. Because remember, I also have to think about the placement. If 
we don’t make the placement, our agency will be lost [financially].”2 At 
another nonprofit, a site director felt considerable pressure (and exerted 
it on his staff) to meet monthly placement goals set by the organiza-
tion’s leadership. Meeting those goals sometimes means encouraging 
people to take any available job, as he explained: 
Retention is where the money is, so we want to push for making 
the right match . . . But a lot of times, if we’re in a crunch and we 
need to make a push, we will make an extra effort to just get people 
out there, because a job is better than no job and if they’re making 
six, seven dollars an hour, they’re making more than they are on 
[public] assistance . . . Ideally we’d want to invest a lot of time in 
them and then allow them to really explore what their real interest 
is. But the truth of the matter is I don’t have past the end of the 
month [to make my monthly goals]. If I have to make my numbers, 
I have to get you out there.3 
Other programs, meanwhile, have a strong ethic about not push-
ing anyone into a job just to make placement goals even though all 
of the programs had monthly placement goals for their programs as a 
whole or, in some cases, for each of their job developers. Staff at these 
programs talked about being focused on people’s well-being and not 
being “numbers focused.” In fact, some programs were willing to have 
a greater emphasis on case management even if it meant losing money 
on the contract with the city. A director at another small faith-based 
nonprofit explained, “We do have a [placement] goal and we talk about 
the goal, but we do not take matching a person to a job that is not desir-
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able for them over ‘we need to get this placement no matter what.’” Her 
staff articulated a similar philosophy. 
This small faith-based nonprofit (call it Site A) and the previously 
discussed one (Site B) where the site director felt strong pressure to 
get people into jobs represent different ends of the spectrum in terms 
of their emphasis on job matching. Both aim to make good matches, 
but for Site B, reaching its numeric placement goals is the top prior-
ity. Do these differences affect their performance? Figure 5.1 shows a 
comparison of job placement and employment retention data for both 
sites.4 Consistent with expectations, Site B has a significantly higher 
overall placement rate, but Site A has a larger share of people placed 
in high-wage jobs, using HRA’s definition of high wage.5 Surprisingly, 
the share of placed participants that is still working six months later is 
fairly similar at both programs. The fourth set of columns in Figure 5.1 
shows the best available measure of overall performance: the six-month 
caseload employment rate, meaning the share of all participants (not 
just those placed in jobs) that becomes employed and is still working at 
any job six months later. The results show substantially better outcomes 
at Site B (11 percent) than Site A (7 percent). Of course, neither of these 
results is an uplifting level of success, underscoring the challenge of 
helping welfare recipients get and keep jobs. But Site B’s performance 
on this measure is nonetheless more than 50 percent better than Site A’s. 
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These results imply that, although the quality of job matching may 
be important for promoting sustained employment, it is only one aspect 
that can affect employment retention. For example, Site A is more care-
ful in its job matching and aimed for higher quality jobs, but it lacks 
any retention staff. Site B is focused on quick placement, but it has a 
retention staff to help people stay employed. 
A final aspect of variation in terms of job matching relates to pay. 
Only one organization, a for-profit provider, ties the pay of its job devel-
opers to the employment-retention of participants that they place into 
jobs.6 At the two sites run by this firm, the majority of job developers’
potential pay is tied to the number of people they place that achieve the 
three- and six-month employment-retention milestones. An executive 
explained that under their compensation plan for job developers, “you 
don’t get a lot for the placement; you get a few dollars. But you get 
money on the back end for retention. You give me quality jobs where 
people stay and the big payoff is there . . . It mirrors the goals of the 
contract [with the city].”7 Surprisingly, however, employment-retention 
outcomes at these two sites are not particularly strong. The share of 
placed participants who are still working six months later at these pro-
grams (46 percent and 44 percent, respectively) is near the average of 
the other programs in New York City (45 percent). 
Based on this limited evidence, at least, it appears that retention 
incentives for job developers are not enough, in themselves, to substan-
tially affect performance. 
Notes 
1. Even today, independent job search is the predominant type of job-search assis-
tance under the WIA. It is difficult, however, to apply any lessons from welfare-
to-work programs under TANF (such as those in New York City) to employment 
services under WIA because TANF and WIA target different populations. Recall 
that WIA services are voluntary and are not geared to those on public assistance. 
2. Interestingly, there was no clear connection between the number of job develop-
ers at a program (relative to the number of participants served) and placement 
rates. The correlation (−0.28) is relatively small, negative, and not statistically 
significant (P = 0.19). So too is the correlation (−0.15, P = 0.48) when outcomes 
are defined as six-month employment retention rates among placed participants. In 
short, while job developers play a central role in these programs—obtaining most 
of the job leads for participants—differences in job-development staff capacity do 
not appear to drive differences in program performance. 
3. He explained that to give people a push, “we’ll say ‘Take this job now, because 





Making Good Job Matches 59 
continue coming to us for the remaining hours and we’ll help you get a second 
part-time job, or another full-time job.’” 
4. These results are for participants, defined in this study as those assigned to employ-
ment programs who showed up for at least a day. 
5. HRA defines “high wage” jobs as those paying at least $344 per week. 
6. Other programs pay job developers straight salaries, or salaries plus bonuses tied 
to placement, but not retention. Moreover, aside from pay, many sites set monthly 
placement (not retention) quotas for job developers. 
7. Why don’t more programs use retention incentives for job developers? Some 
programs may see holding job developers accountable for retention as unfair. As 
Karen Smith of Wildcat Industries, noted: “We did it [had incentive pay for job 
developers based on retention] for a little while, but it didn’t make sense because 
the job developers have really no control over that—it’s really the case manag-
ers.” People often lose their jobs, she said, because of an inability to cope with 
problems: “They’re going to have an issue and instead of dealing with that issue 
they’re going to walk away [from their jobs].” According her view, in other words, 
the quality of job matching has little effect on retention rates. 
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Providing postplacement services to help people stay working once 
they become employed is the fourth and final common element among 
today’s work-first programs in New York City. These services typically 
involve keeping in touch with participants to offer support and encour-
agement, and helping people find new jobs if they become unemployed 
again. Some programs have retention specialists who work solely on 
these issues, whereas others use case managers to provide retention 
assistance. 
RATIONALE 
Many welfare recipients in the United States lose their jobs within 
the first few months of employment. In particular, studies from the mid 
1990s showed that about one-fourth of recipients who became employed 
stopped working within three months and at least half were no longer 
working within one year (Strawn and Martinson 2000). At one well-
known program, Project Match in Chicago, 55 percent of participants 





year (Wagner et al. 1998). The results from New York City, from the 
mid 2000s, illustrate that employment retention remains a critical chal-
lenge. More than a third (37 percent) of program participants placed 
into jobs were jobless again three months later, and more than half (56 
percent) were jobless within six months. 
To help people stay employed, New York City’s welfare-to-work 
programs provide postplacement services. In the words of Karen Smith, 
Senior Vice President of Wildcat Industries, “Without intensive case 
management, follow-up, and prodding, those people are not going to 
stay on the job. They’re going to have an issue and instead of dealing 
with that issue they’re going to walk away.” Peter Cove, the founder of 
America Works, elaborated on the reasons behind many participants’
short employment spans: 
We believe that people lose their jobs . . . because they don’t fit in 
the workplace [including] the mores of the workplace. What do 
you do when you don’t have anything to do? How do you han-
dle authority? And also the things that happen on the outside [of 
work]: The sick child, the day care that falls out, the bad transpor-
tation, the housing, the abusive mate—the things that many of us 
[who are not poor] have supports for and ways of dealing with. We 
have resources. The people we’re dealing with often do not. 
Staff cited other factors such as low work hours that can cause peo-
ple to quit out of frustration or they were given jobs that turned out to 
be temporary. 
TECHNIQUES 
Retention practices can be grouped into two categories: monitor-
ing participants’ employment progress and providing reemployment 
services. 
Monitoring Working Participants’ Progress 
Encouraging participants who become employed to stay in touch 
To encourage contact between working participants and program 
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are available for up to six months after starting work. To receive them, 
individuals must bring in their pay stubs to their program office every 
two weeks to prove they are still working. (Staff said that about half of 
working participants come in to pick them up.) This gives staff mem-
bers an opportunity to provide encouragement and to ask people about 
their progress on the job. A retention counselor described a typical 
interchange: “I do small talk: ‘How’s work? Is your child care in place? 
Are you getting your Food Stamps, Medicaid?’”1 
Keeping in touch with working participants by phone 
Many programs contact working participants by phone, although 
the frequency of contact varies. Some make calls a few weeks before 
the three- and six-month retention milestone dates. If a staff member 
learns that a participant is no longer working, the participant is encour-
aged to return to the program to be placed in a new job so that the 
program can get compensated for retention milestones. Other providers 
check in by phone every few weeks, including some that have evening 
call shifts to reach people after work. 
In terms of the effect of these calls on employment retention, some 
staff said that their advice and encouragement helps prevent participants’
job losses. Others felt that the main benefit of phone contact is to find 
out if people had lost jobs, so they can get them reemployed faster. “We 
don’t really save them from losing the job,” one staff member noted,
“but we help them out more quickly.” 
Contacting working participants during the first 
week of employment 
Some programs check in with participants by phone a few days 
after job placement. Others encourage participants to contact the staff, 
especially during the first week of employment, if they need help or 
advice. “That first week becomes crucial,” a job developer explained. “I 
say, ‘If you feel stressed, that first week is going to be [a challenge]. But 
stick it out. Call me.’ Once they get through that first week, that second 







Providing Reemployment and Job-Upgrading Assistance 
Finding new jobs for people who become unemployed again 
When a program learns that a participant has lost a job, it encour-
ages that person to come back to the program to receive help in finding 
a new job. A few job developers said they needed to find some people 
as many as three different jobs within six months to keep them working. 
“A large percentage of our people we place more than once,” said Lee 
Bowles, CEO of America Works. They do this “in part to upgrade and 
in part to find the right match.” 
Helping employed participants change jobs 
Many providers emphasize that they will help participants change 
jobs if they are dissatisfied with their current ones or if they want to get 
higher paying jobs. At the same time, though, they also encourage peo-
ple to “stick it out” in their current jobs to get more work experience. “If 
it really gets to the point where they’re feeling like they’ve got to quit,” 
a retention counselor explained, “I’ll tell them don’t quit. Come in first 
to find another job.” The actual amount of help participants receive to 
change or upgrade their jobs is unclear. One manager noted that getting 
staff to provide that type of service to working individuals is not easy, 
given the large number of people they serve and the fact that job devel-
opers often think that “their job is done” once someone gets placed. 
VARIATION IN APPROACHES
Employment retention efforts vary considerably. Some sites focus 
mainly on obtaining verifications—proof that people are working so 
that the program can get paid for those milestones—whereas oth-
ers provide more intensive follow-up and assistance. These different 
approaches are illustrated by a program that had recently shifted from 
a less-intensive approach to retention services to a more-intensive one. 
Prior to the change, case managers were in charge of verification and 
retention, but in practice, they had little time to do either. A new reten-
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task was contacting participants every two weeks. A job developer from 
this program explained: 
Now they’re actually managing the case as opposed to calling to 
make sure you’re still at the company. When case managers were 
doing retention, they were basically just collecting pay stubs . . . 
[Now] they’ve become your postplacement manager and they’ll 
call you up: “I know you’re working at this place for a while. Are 
you ok? Is there anything we can do to help you?” [The participant 
may say:] “Yeah, I have a problem with my child care,” or “Yeah, 
HRA called me for a meeting, but I have to work, so what do I do?” 
This site has one of the highest ratios of retention staff per capita and 
is also a top performer in terms of retention. It has the highest rate (74 
percent) of placed participants still working after three months, and the 
second-highest rate (56 percent) after six months.2 On the other hand, 
other programs that provide robust retention services had more modest 
results. Across all the 26 programs in New York City, in fact, there is 
no statistically significant correlation between the number of retention 
staff per participant and retention outcomes.3 This result underscores a 
theme in the welfare-to-work literature of the difficulty in finding effec-
tive practices for promoting job retention. 
The way staff members track retention-related data also varied. For 
example, a few programs have customized computer systems that allow 
staff to track the number of contacts with each working participant, 
their retention milestone dates, and more. Others use pen and paper 
lists. Moreover, some program directors monitor staff in terms of the 
frequency of retention follow up, while others are more informal. Yet 
no simple connection apparently exists between program performance 
and these tracking or management factors. The program with the most 
sophisticated computer tracking system and close monitoring by man-
agement of employment retention issues had only average retention 
outcomes. 
Finally, in terms of variation, at least one program, a small faith-based 
nonprofit, has an explicit strategy of calling participants a week before 
their retention milestone dates and, if they are unemployed, attempt-
ing to quickly place them into new jobs. The staff calls this approach 
“rapid reattachment.” The results show only average employment-
retention rates at the three-month mark, but the highest rates at six 





sured by milestone achievement. Of course, this strategy could also be 
viewed as gaming the contract, since this program’s retention focus is 
on getting people reemployed just prior to the contractual milestone 
dates on which programs get paid if people are working. The staff said 
that this was simply doing what the contract wanted: placing people 
in jobs and following-up to help them get new jobs if they were un-
employed again. 
Notes 
1. Programs also use wage stubs to document their retention milestones so they can 
be compensated by the city under their pay-for-performance contracts. 
2. Other factors at this program may have contributed to this program’s strong reten-
tion results. This is the same site that discouraged unmotivated participants from 
staying in the program during the first few days and, likely as a result, had high 
dropout rates. 
3. The correlation at the six-month mark was 0.12 (P = 0.57). The correlation at the 
three-month mark was actually slightly negative. 
Part 2 
Differences in Organizational 








Different Practices among Programs 
Although work-first employment programs share several common 
elements, important differences exist as well. This chapter explores four 
of the most evident differences among welfare-to-work programs in 
New York City. These differences include the extent to which programs 
emphasize a quick-placement versus a case-management approach, 
encourage short-term job training prior to job search versus immedi-
ate job search, deem participants employable, and refer participants to 
sanctioning for noncompliance. As we will see later in this volume, 
some of these operational differences help explain why certain pro-
grams have better employment outcomes than others. 
QUICK PLACEMENT VERSUS CASE MANAGEMENT 
A “quick-placement approach” means something different today 
than it did in the past. Relative to programs that operated before national
welfare reform in 1996—and before a work-first approach became 
ubiquitous—every one of the 26 welfare-to-work programs in New 
York City would be considered quick-placement focused. In other 
words, all of the programs have employment as the goal and all of them 
aim to move participants into work within a few weeks or a couple of 
months. Yet within today’s work-first framework, there is still consid-
erable variation in placement speeds among programs. The variation 
stems from the fact that some programs have a stronger emphasis on 
getting people into jobs quickly (referred to here as a quick-placement 
approach), whereas others have a stronger emphasis on providing job-
readiness assistance (a case-management approach). 
Figure 7.1 shows the median number of days it takes each program 
to place participants (among those who became employed) into jobs.1 
At the fastest site, half of all participants who became employed do so 
within 35 days. At the slowest site, this occurs within 84 days, almost 
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two-and-a-half times as long as at the fastest one. The average among 
programs is 56 days. Not surprisingly, programs that place people into 
jobs faster have more urgency about making placements. At some pro-
grams, in fact, a significant portion of individuals goes on job inter-
views within a few days. To speed up the placement process, quick-
placement programs spend less time on case management. The figure 
also shows that most of the programs that use job training (defined as 
sending at least 5 percent of participants to training) are at the slow end 
of placement speeds. 
One might conjecture that placement speeds are not only a func-
tion of urgency among program staff, but also a function of staffing 
capacity. In other words, having a larger staff (relative to the number of 
participants) could speed up job-readiness activities and job matching. 
But the data show, however, that placement speeds are not a function of 
staff-to-participant ratios, whether defined in terms of specific types of 
staff or the staff as a whole. Instead, a focus on quick placement—and 
a de-emphasis of case management—appears to be the main driver of 
Figure 7.1 Median Number of Days between Program Entry and Job 
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placement speeds. What program staff members do appears to matter 
more than how many of them do it. 
The Rationale for Quick Placement 
The rationale for having more urgency about getting people into 
jobs comes, in part, from a belief that welfare recipients can often fix 
their own barriers to work, or at least work around them, once they 
become employed. To illustrate this point, Peter Cove, founder of 
America Works, provided an example of a hypothetical participant, 
Shirley, who fixes her lack of child care. New York City pays for child 
care for welfare recipients with young children, so this example pre-
sumably deals with someone with school-aged children. 
Barnes & Noble says, “Shirley, can you come in next Monday for 
training to be a cashier?” What do you know, the next day Shirley 
found an aunt that can take care of the kid, or she found a local 
day care provider. What was going on before was insecurity about 
going to work—that she’d been paid for a long time not to go to 
work [so she used to say] “I don’t have any day care to take care of 
my kids.” All of a sudden somebody wants Shirley. Shirley’s like, 
“Wow, wait a second. Maybe I can find somebody to take care of 
my kids.”2 
Another rationale for quick placement is that a sense of urgency 
about getting people into jobs is the most motivating to participants. 
“We have motivational workshops,” a program director noted, “but the 
one motivation that best works for us is real job leads.” A job developer 
also explained how participants were wary when they heard that they 
would be going on job interviews within a few days. “Then all of a sud-
den,” she said, “I’m sending people out [on interviews]. And by Friday 
there’ll be [only] five people sitting here because we have them all out 
and hopefully working. So they start realizing we’re serious.” Another 
job developer added, “You have to earn their respect . . . When they 
start meeting our companies [i.e., employers], when they finally get an 
interview, not just some [workshop] nonsense, that alone makes them 
feel better.” 
A third reason for emphasizing quick placement is that the job-







employability—a more effective way, according to proponents, than 
assessments by case managers. In the words of Peter Cove: 
We said the job is the important thing, and we can’t make an 
assumption about which of the things [barriers] is going to blow 
them out of the water. We don’t know . . . So what we’re going to 
do is to provide them a path to let them move toward the job, but 
we’re going to stay on top of them very carefully so if something 
comes up that gets in the way, that’s when we intervene. 
In particular, some participants appear to be work ready until they 
face the actual prospect of a job interview, and they call in sick or say 
they do not have child care. “You start to realize that, although they 
want to work, they’re afraid,” a case manager explained. “They’re not 
as job ready as they seem.” At the same time, some people who initially 
do not appear job ready can do fine once they start working. “Many 
times clients that you believe don’t have the motivation may end up 
actually getting a job and doing well,” noted a job developer. “If they 
have a fear [of starting work] and if they actually overcome that fear 
working on the job . . . it changes them.” 
A final rationale for quick placement articulated by some pro-
gram leaders is that, according to them, it is the only financially viable 
approach under New York City’s pay-for-performance contracts. While 
more “hand holding” might be helpful for some participants, more per-
sonalized case management is too expensive to provide. This rationale 
is not limited to for-profit providers. A director of one nonprofit, for 
example, said that he would be willing to allow his case managers to 
provide more individualized help “if we got paid for it.” He instructs his 
staff to focus on getting people jobs, not on social work. 
Program Practices within a Quick-Placement Approach 
Programs create a sense of urgency about getting people into jobs in 
several ways. One is by setting expectations, during orientation, about 
quickly placing participants into jobs, explaining that work is the goal, 
jobs are available, and people will be sent on interviews as soon as they 
are deemed job ready—likely a matter of days or a couple of weeks. Job 
training is typically not encouraged. 
Participants at quick-placement sites usually meet with job developers 
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views or, for those who are already job ready, to be sent on interviews. 
Job developers at these programs have an obvious focus on speed. “Part 
of why I’ve been successful here is that I work with a sense of urgency,” 
one said. “I want to get you working as soon as possible. I don’t need to 
talk to you 10 times before I can figure out where I need to place you.” 
Case managers, meanwhile, reinforce a sense of urgency in one-
on-one meetings by focusing on vocational issues rather than broader 
life issues. These vocational issues include practicing for job interviews 
and dealing with immediately pressing barriers to work such as having 
the appropriate work clothes and ensuring that child care arrangements 
have been made. The message from case managers, a staff member 
explained, is: “I’ve got two weeks to hold your hand and then I’m going 
to let you go. Tell me what I need to do for you and we will do this. Just 
know that by the end of two weeks, you need to have gotten yourself 
together.” She said that participants often prefer case managers who do 
not apply that type of pressure because “they think that person is help-
ing them [by being more lenient], but you’re really not.” 
Interestingly, one for-profit provider with relatively quick placement 
speed has no case managers at all. There is a social worker available if 
people need special assistance, but meeting with him is not mandatory. 
A program leader explained the rationale, “If they have a problem, they 
get referred to someone here [the social worker] to try to help them 
with that problem. But we don’t assume there’s a problem. When you 
assume there’s a problem, you’re going to find it, because that will be 
someone’s job.” 
Looking across programs, though, there is essentially no correlation 
between placement speed and the number of case managers per par-
ticipant.3 Some quick-placement programs actually have robust case-
management staffs, including one that has the second-highest case-
management capacity. A robust case-management staff, in other words, 
does not preclude a program from creating urgency about placement. 
The focus of case managers and the messages they convey to partici-
pants are more important than how many case managers there are. 
Job-readiness workshops at quick-placement programs last for 
a week or two—somewhat shorter, on average, than those at case-
management-focused programs. Moreover, staff at some quick-
placement providers noted that they send people on job interviews as soon 
as they are ready, rather than waiting until they complete the workshops.
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An interesting perspective on these issues comes from a site direc-
tor who was hired to restructure a program to emphasize quicker place-
ments. Before he was hired, job-readiness workshops were two weeks 
long and participants only met with job developers after the workshops 
were completed. “That changed,” he said. “I cut down the workshops to 
a week. And those who can be fast tracked see their job developer right 
away . . . The job developers introduce themselves during the second 
day of orientation. They are sharing job leads and people are going out 
[on interviews] that day.” 
To encourage a sense of urgency among the staff, a few quick-
placement programs give their job developers financial bonuses for 
meeting placement goals. And managers at most programs, whether 
quick-placement or case-management focused, set monthly placement 
goals for job developers. But quick-placement sites were more likely 
to have office-wide placement or revenue goals as well, not just indi-
vidual goals for job developers. “Every week we try to have a meeting 
to discuss the billing, the placements, how it’s going,” a case manager 
at a nonprofit explained. “It sort of gives us a little push, since we know 
we have to meet our goal of $125,000 a month.” At another quick-
placement site, a faith-based one, the director holds a staff meeting each 
week “so the staff knows where we are goal-wise for the month,” he 
said. “They know what our operating cost is, monthly. It has to be real 
for them. If it’s just these numbers and there’s no dollar figures attached 
to it, to them it means nothing.”4 
Another distinction is that staff at quick-placement programs are 
more likely to view their organizations as both social service agen-
cies and businesses, while staff at programs with a case-management 
approach see themselves more solidly in the social service field. Lead-
ers at quick-placement sites also place more emphasis on covering pro-
gram costs. “This agency is a nonprofit but I’m supposed to have a 
balanced bottom line or else we don’t stay operating,” explained Linda 
Stewart, Senior Vice President of Goodwill Industries of New York and 
Northern New Jersey, which operates three of the welfare-to-work sites. 
“That trickles down to staff . . . We are very much run like a business 
compared to a lot of nonprofits. I get monthly revenue and expense 
reports for every single program and detailed budget sheets from every-
thing we purchase.” 
 
 
Different Practices among Programs  75 
The Rationale for Case Management 
Rather than emphasizing speed in placing people into jobs, work-
first providers with a case-management approach emphasize job readi-
ness. The main rationale for providing more job-readiness assistance 
is that, according to proponents, people will stay employed longer if 
their barriers are addressed before they begin working. Anyone can be 
“pushed” into a job, a staff member explained, but that rarely leads 
to sustained employment. By working with people more intensively 
before employment, and by allowing them more time to get their lives 
in order, these programs aim to increase participants’ employment 
retention. This type of assistance can take weeks, if not months, as this 
director of a case-management-focused site explained: 
If they were ready for work they would not be here. They [the city 
welfare department] are sending these individuals to us because 
they are difficult to place or else they would have been placed 
already. So I see if these people [can become employed] with a lit-
tle bit of understanding, a little bit of coaxing . . . We need to keep 
them a little longer because we see a person who [for example] is 
very introverted. It takes a month to warm up. They start talking. 
They start looking you in the eyes. 
The need to address barriers is especially important today, some 
staff noted, because the welfare caseload has gotten more disadvan-
taged over time. A program director explained the implications: 
You can’t operate the way we did in 1999 because we’re operating 
with people that, first of all, really don’t want to work. But HRA
is mandating, “You have to go do work.” We need to say to them, 
“Alright, let’s change this whole mindset here.” Changing a mind-
set is not done overnight, especially for someone that’s come with 
a strong resistance that “I’m not going to work. I’ve made it so far 
on public assistance for 10 or 15 years.” 
The view among these programs that job-readiness is the first issue 
that needs to be addressed, prior to job search, contrasts with the view 
among quick-placement programs, where employment is the first prior-
ity. Each approach, in other words, has a different conceptual model of 
the most effective path to self-sufficiency (see Figure 7.2). Of course, 
all of the programs provide some upfront help to address work barri-






matter of service intensity. Moreover, neither set of programs naïvely 
believes that their approach produces a direct route to self-sufficiency 
for most participants, given the high rate of job loss among those placed 
in jobs. But each side believes that their approach puts people on a 
faster track towards sustained employment and self-sufficiency. 
Another rationale for the case-management approach is that, 
according to proponents, taking time to help people with their problems 
builds stronger relationships with staff. Stronger relationships, in turn, 
make it more likely that people will stay in contact with the program 
after placement. That contact allows staff to assist participants who are 
having difficulties in their jobs or have lost their jobs. “The retention 
rates are much better if you address the big issues [in people’s lives] 
because they’ll always come back to you like you’re their mentor, their 
friend, their psychotherapist,” a case manager explained.
Staff members at programs with a case-management approach have 
mixed opinions about whether more intensive job-readiness assistance 
also increases placement rates, as opposed to employment-retention 
rates. Some felt that it does. As a job developer noted, there can be job 
leads available, “but if the clients aren’t ready—don’t do well on inter-
views, don’t have their resumes ready, don’t have the right attire, don’t 
have the right attitude—they’re not going to get the job.” On the other 
Figure 7.2  Two Models of Moving to Self-Sufficiency 
Quick-placement Case-management 
approach approach 
Employment Barriers to work 
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hand, a director at a program with a case-management approach pre-
dicted that if they provided less individual attention they would make 
more placements, but their employment retention rates would suffer. 
Program Practices within a Case-Management Approach 
Providers with a case-management focus take a more holistic 
approach to addressing people’s problems, rather than focusing only 
on immediate job-preparation issues. More time is spent on work readi-
ness through one-on-one meetings and in workshops. Moreover, job 
developers at these sites are more willing to spend time finding people 
jobs that have better pay or are better matched with people’s interests. 
Some programs, for example, try to avoid placing any participants in 
minimum-wage jobs. This contrasts with the view at quick-placement 
programs, where staff members tend to see minimum-wage jobs as use-
ful starting points for people with low skills. 
Programs with a case-management approach are also less focused 
on performance measures than their quick-placement counterparts. In 
fact, staff members tend to characterize their programs as purposefully 
not “numbers” focused. A director at a nonprofit that emphasized job-
readiness assistance, for example, characterized her program as more 
“help driven” than “number driven.” She said her program has monthly
placement targets, but she was unsure exactly what they were. Too 
much of a focus on placement targets, she noted, can lead staff to push 
people into taking jobs that are not a good fit for them. 
SHORT-TERM JOB TRAINING VERSUS 
IMMEDIATE JOB SEARCH 
Another key difference among programs is that some encourage 
participants to enroll in short-term, classroom-based job training prior 
to job search, while others discourage training altogether.5 Even for the 
most training-friendly programs, though, the message is not that train-
ing is always a better option than direct job placement. Instead, the 
message is that training may be a useful option for some participants. 
“Everyone [in the welfare system] is telling them what to do,” a direc-
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tor explained. “No one is listening and saying ‘What would you like to 
do?’ . . . So we let them choose what they want to do—either to go to 
work or to go to training. Most of the clients choose training because 
they know they’re lacking the skills to be able to become employable 
in the marketplace.” The training programs used by these programs run 
for up to six months, the maximum allowed by New York City. But 
courses generally last just one or two months or less—much shorter 
than the typical training programs of a few decades ago, reflecting the 
shift towards work first. 
Most programs that encourage training refer participants to outside, 
private training providers, but some run training courses themselves. 
Figure 7.3 shows the percentage of participants at each site that receive 
training vouchers. The $1,500 vouchers are paid for by the city and 
allow qualified participants to attend one of hundreds of city-approved 
training programs. These include training in customer service, carpen-
try, and office-computer skills. Most voucher-eligible training courses 
are geared towards the more advantaged participants in the caseload 
who have strong basic skills and, often, a high school degree. As the 
figure shows, half of the sites refer participants to training, with the 
percentage ranging from 1 to 16 percent of their caseloads. 
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Programs also refer participants to short-term free training provided 
by employers or employer associations. These courses include training 
to be a home health aid, security guard, or food service worker. They 
typically last between a week and six weeks and are more accessible 
to participants with lower skills compared to voucher-eligible courses. 
System-wide data on the usage of these free courses are not available, but 
fieldwork shows that programs that send a higher proportion of partici-
pants to voucher training also send more participants to free employer-
sponsored training. 
The Rationale for Job Training 
Programs that encourage short-term training do so for three main 
reasons. The first, according to proponents, is that it helps motivate peo-
ple to want to work because it allows them to obtain higher paying jobs. 
“That’s why training is so valuable,” a program director explained. “If 
you’re making . . . $11.75 an hour, or certainly $15, $16, now we’re 
talking about a paycheck. They can see a possible light at the end of 
the tunnel. They can see a career track.”6 A second rationale is to make 
people more marketable. “A lot of times [programs] send people out on 
interviews, but they’re not focused on what is going to make that person 
more marketable if their skills are not up to par,” explained a case man-
ager at a program that runs several training programs itself. “If they’re 
going for a clerical or customer service job, they need to know basic 
computer [skills].” Some staff said that training is especially beneficial 
for those who have not worked recently or who are having trouble being 
placed in a job. “If they’ve been sent out on interviews and they don’t 
land [any jobs], then there’s a good possibility they need to upgrade 
their skills,” a staff member said. “We put them in training and send 
them back out again. Give them a brush up course.” And finally, a third 
rationale is that it leads to better employment retention. In particular, 
training can lead to higher paying jobs that tend to be more stable. And 
participants may make more of an effort to keep higher paying jobs. 
Proponents also argue that having training as an option is useful 
because, as Career and Education Consultants owner Susan Melocarro 
explained, one size does not fit all: “Some people need training and 
want it. Other people just want to go to work. I think you’re force fitting 






Common Approaches to Job Training 
Programs that encourage training often develop close relationships 
with training providers. A few programs, in fact, have training providers 
co-located with them at their sites. Alternatively, a handful of programs 
operate their own training courses and are therefore able to collect train-
ing voucher payments themselves. Programs that encourage training 
often have training providers give presentations to participants during 
orientation to describe their training courses and placement results. If 
a participant expresses an interest in job training, staff members screen 
them to see if they are good candidates. Because some participants use 
training to avoid work requirements or to try to continue working off the 
books, the staff must investigate if there is a legitimate need for train-
ing. To do that, they determine whether participants’ skill levels match 
the training course requirements, ask participants about their employ-
ment goals, and examine their attendance records at past employment 
programs via computerized case histories. They also examine current 
attendance, since eligibility for a training voucher requires at least a 
month of excellent attendance at their current employment program.7 
If the staff agrees that training is a useful option, they suggest train-
ing providers that they know have good placement results to partici-
pants. This knowledge is based on their experience, rather than data, 
since New York City does not track training outcomes. If the training 
program is voucher eligible, the staff applies for an HRA voucher. To 
be approved, individuals must show that they have considered a few 
different training providers, so staff members typically ask participants 
to do site visits at several providers. 
While participants attend training, the staff monitors their atten-
dance, as required by the city, by getting weekly attendance reports 
from the training providers. Some staff members ask trainers to contact 
them right away if someone starts skipping classes so they can intervene 
quickly to investigate why the person is truant and to let them know that 
they risk sanctioning if they continue to be absent without cause. 
Most programs that encourage training view it as something that 
precedes job search, but a few programs encourage training only after 
someone has been unsuccessful in their job search. This approach can 
mesh training with a quick-placement focus. Programs create a sense of 
urgency about direct placement but discuss training options with those 
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Some programs discourage any type of training before placement, 
but they offer to help people find evening classes once they become 
employed. The staff at these programs noted, however, that once people 
start working, interest in training usually wanes, either because train-
ing seems less necessary or because of a lack of time. As a result, few 
people actually take this employment-then-training route. 
Staff at programs that encourage training said the effort they expend 
to evaluate trainers and participants, and to monitor participants during 
training, is worth it. Some programs, for example, credit the majority 
of their job placements to training programs. And some reduce staffing 
costs by relying on trainers to make some or most of their job place-
ments. As a director explained, “We only deal with voucher schools 
[i.e., training providers] that do job placement. If vouchers weren’t in 
the mix, you might hear me sing a different tune [about needing more 
job developers on staff].” Moreover, the handful of programs that oper-
ate their own training programs can control the quality of the train-
ing directly while also receiving another source of revenue from the 
vouchers. 
The Rationale for Discouraging Job Training 
As strongly as some program leaders and staff articulate the ben-
efits of short-term job training, others—those at sites that discourage 
training—feel strongly that it is unhelpful to participants and to pro-
gram performance.8 In the words of Peter Cove of America Works: 
You’re talking about people who have been failed by the education 
and training system—they’ve been failed in high school, they’ve 
been failed by other training programs. Ask them how many train-
ing programs they’ve been in. You say to yourself: “They don’t 
need another classroom where they may think they’re going to fail. 
What they need is a success” . . . The job can be a success. That’s 
the first thing—work can build self-esteem and success. 
Others noted that, on average, about half of participants drop out 
of training programs. And even those who complete training programs 
do not necessarily go directly into jobs.9 Finally, there is the cost of 
screening and monitoring that, some said, can be significant. The only 
motivation for that level of effort, one nonprofit director argued, would 





about a family member that this person is going to the right school.” 
That effort, he added, was “all without compensation and all under the 
assumption that somebody’s going to . . . get placed in a job that relates 
to that training which I would say happens less than 10 percent of the 
time. The majority drop out of the training, or get to the end of the train-
ing and come back into a job-search program because no one is helping 
them get placed.” 
THE EMPLOYABILITY OF HARD-TO-SERVE INDIVIDUALS 
Athird area of difference among work-first programs relates to judg-
ments about whether particular hard-to-serve individuals are “employ-
able” or not. As mentioned before, everyone who is assigned to one 
of the 26 employment programs in New York City has already been 
evaluated at Job Centers, the city-run welfare offices, to ensure that 
they are currently employable. Those deemed currently unemployable 
are referred to specialized programs for drug or alcohol dependency, 
mental health issues, physical disabilities, illiteracy, language barriers, 
parents with infant children, or pregnant women.10 
Once participants arrive at their employment programs, however, 
staff members sometimes become aware of serious barriers that were 
not identified at the Job Centers. This can occur when case managers 
meet with new arrivals during orientation or later in the program as staff 
members prepare to send people out on job interviews. If serious barri-
ers are detected, staff members have the option to “deassign” individu-
als from their programs, meaning referring them back to Job Centers 
for further evaluation and ending their participation in that employment 
program. 
Deassignment rates at most programs range from 5 to 20 percent, 
with two outliers, both nonprofits, at 39 percent and 42 percent (Fig-
ure 7.4). The director of one the outlier programs explained that par-
ticipants who are not motivated to work are often deassigned from the 
program. “We just haven’t been able to help them,” he said. “Maybe 
someone else [another program] will.” 
Even excluding these two outliers, the variation in deassignment 
rates is fairly large. It is unlikely that most of this variation stems from 
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different levels of barriers to employment among participants, given 
the city’s random assignment of participants to programs within their 
boroughs. (Nor do average deassignment rates vary widely among 
boroughs.) Instead, it appears that different deassignment rates largely 
reflect different views among program leaders and staff about the 
employability of hard-to-serve individuals. Some programs conduct 
detailed screening for barriers and deassign people with more signifi-
cant challenges. Others do little screening and assume, in essence, that 
they can help almost anyone find a job. 
Whether people with significant work barriers are better off being 
deassigned or not is beyond the scope of this study. Some staff mem-
bers feel that deassignments help participants by connecting them with 
specialized services elsewhere. An example is a faith-based provider 
with a fairly high deassignment rate. The orientation facilitator asks 
new participants to write down their barriers in the form of a letter to 
her, since she found that it is easier for people to discuss their personal 
issues in writing. 
You’d be surprised what I get in those letters. Sometimes it’s more 
than I bargained for . . . Then I talk to them one-on-one. If I feel 
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like it’s too much for us to handle as a program, I ask [the case 
manager] to deassign them and send them where they can actually 
get the help . . . I don’t look it as “I don’t want to be bothered—you 
told me something and now I want to get rid of you.” It’s not the 
case. The case is that you need to take care of this. 
In contrast, staff at the program with the lowest deassignment rate, 
a for-profit, purposefully tried to avoid deassignments. The director 
explained that people with, say, very low basic skills in reading or math 
could be deassigned from the program, but in her experience, people 
with low basic skills can often become employed. She also noted that the 
program tries to resolve certain serious barriers such as homelessness: 
We’ll say, “How long is it going to take you [to get a housing 
voucher]?” [They’ll say,] “I need the next three weeks.” They’ll 
come here everyday until they get that voucher. When they get the 
voucher we’ll give them an excusable absence so they can pick up 
the voucher, look for housing, and go shopping for their furniture. 
Once that’s done . . . HRA is paying only a portion of their rent so 
they need a job then. 
In terms of screening for barriers, some programs spend more time 
assessing people when they arrive, so they are more likely to be aware of 
serious life challenges. At the other end of the spectrum, one for-profit 
program has no case managers, although a social worker is available. 
Staff members purposefully do not spend much time on assessment 
since, in the program’s view, case management shifts the focus from 
what welfare recipients can do to what their limitations are, reducing 
the momentum towards employment. This for-profit is quick-placement 
focused, but the data show that programs with a quick-placement focus 
do not have significantly different deassignment rates than ones with a 
case-management focus. 
Deassignments are an important programmatic feature of New York 
City’s welfare system. Most U.S. cities do not have the range of spe-
cialized services for hard-to-serve individuals like New York City does, 
giving those cities fewer options to deassign individuals from their 
regular employment programs. Even so, the concept of deassignment
does have relevancy across the nation. Every state is allowed to exempt 
20 percent of its caseload from federal TANF work requirements. These 





Different Practices among Programs 85 
SANCTIONING PARTICIPANTS FOR NONCOMPLIANCE 
The final area of difference in the operations of work-first programs 
relates to their level of strictness, or laxity, when participants break pro-
gram rules. When participants violate those rules, staff can ask them 
to leave the program. This is called a “referral to sanctions” (hereafter 
referred to simply as “sanctioning”), and individuals are sent back to 
their Job Centers for reevaluation and their welfare benefits may be 
reduced (although usually are not). The rates of sanctioning among 
participants who showed up for at least one day to their employment 
programs and who were not deassigned varies widely, from 36 to 75 
percent, with an average of 55 percent (Figure 7.5). 
The most frequent reason for sanctioning is that people drop out of 
their employment programs. Staff estimated that about half of all partic-
ipants drop out within the first week. Other examples of noncompliance 
include repeatedly showing up late, not engaging in program activities, 
and rejecting job offers without cause. 
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Staff noted that actual rule breaking—whether resulting in sanc-
tioning or not—is very common, since most participants violate rules at 
some point. For example, consistent attendance is rare and people tend 
to be truant a few times a month. Sanctions therefore are focused on 
repeat offenders who are seen as purposefully “gaming the system” to 
avoid employment or who are being disruptive. 
An observer of these employment programs would find it difficult to 
guess which programs have higher sanction rates than others. Some pro-
grams appear stricter about rules than others, but a correlation between 
perceived strictness and sanctioning is not apparent. Moreover, none of 
the programs emphasizes the threat of sanctions. According to staff, one 
reason is that a punitive approach undermines efforts to engage people 
at the start of a program, especially since many people arrive angry 
and distrustful. Another reason is that participants, especially longer 
term welfare recipients, know how to comply “just enough” to avoid 
breaking the rules. They know, for example, to bring in documentation, 
such as a doctor’s note, to excuse them from extended absences. A final 
reason is that most participants are aware of New York City’s relatively 
lenient sanction policies, including a conciliation policy that enables 
most people to avoid actual benefit reductions and, instead, be referred 
to another employment program. 
Since most sanctions stem from dropping out of programs, sanc-
tioning is not fully within the discretion of staff. In other words, partici-
pants who drop out “refer themselves to sanctions,” as a case manager 
put it. But staff may be able to influence dropout rates, especially in 
terms of engagement at the start of the program. In a few cases, the 
staff’s emphases appear to have a noticeable influence on sanction rates. 
An example is the nonprofit, discussed earlier, that considers the first 
three days of the program a “probation period” during which the staff 
assesses participants to determine their legitimate interest in becom-
ing employed. People who are not motivated to work often drop out 
anyway, the director noted, but those who appear to be unmotivated are 
sanctioned at their first violation of program rules. He explained: 
It’s easier to dismiss someone for concrete, flagrant violations 
when in fact the real issue (i.e., the source of their lack of moti-
vation) is more complicated than that and can perhaps be turned 
around in a minority of cases. But there again there’s the issue of 
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caseload per caseworker) to no more than 50. It usually hovers 
around 30 because of our high (sanctioning) rate. 
This program has the third highest sanction rate. Almost two-
thirds of those who show up to this program and are not deassigned 
end up being sanctioned. At the other end of the spectrum, the director 
of the program with the third lowest rate (just over 50 percent) tells 
her employees to keep sanctioning to a minimum. In staff meetings, 
for example, she asks case managers to explain their rationales for the 
sanctions they made.11 
Notes 
1. The date of placement used for these calculations is the job start date. The date of 
hire is not available. 
2. Cove added, “Does that mean we don’t have a day care problem [in this country]? 
Of course we have a day care problem.” But he argued that employment should be 
a central component in helping people address their life challenges. 
3. The correlation between median days to placement and the number of case manag-
ers per capita is −0.03 (P = 0.53). 
4. At one program, officewide pressure was created by having teams, each with a 
job developer, case manager, and retention specialist. Although teams were not 
given placement targets (to encourage them to share job leads with each other), 
team performance was posted on the wall to encourage friendly competition. That 
competition, the director said, is an important driver of performance at the site. 
5. Recall that longer term training or on-the-job training are not service options 
offered in New York City’s welfare system, so they are not examined in this 
volume. 
6. On a related point, training can also boost people’s confidence, staff said, because, 
after training, “they have skills and what they have to offer is important to the 
employer, rather than going out saying ‘I just need a job.’” 
7. This waiting period was set at two weeks prior to 2005, but high drop-out rates 
from training programs led the city to extend the waiting period. 
8. This is not to say that all staff at these programs agreed. In one case, for example, 
a job developer felt strongly that his program’s focus on direct placement, without 
any training options, hindered people’s opportunities. 
9. The exact placement rates are not known because data are not available on which 
individuals in the study sample received training. What is known, instead, is the 
total number of individuals, by program, sent to voucher-eligible training. 
10. The definition of employability in New York City also includes having child care 




11. If people’s noncompliance stem from their barriers to work, such as drug addic-
tion, she emphasized to staff that they should deassign them, not sanction them, so 
that these individuals could receive specialized help. While this example suggests 
a negative correlation between sanction rates and deassignment rates, the actual 





Different Practices among 
Program Types 
Another useful way of exploring the main differences between 
today’s work-first employment programs is to look across organiza-
tional types. For example, in what ways do nonprofit and for-profit pro-
grams differ in their service strategies? Do programs that are compen-
sated solely based on performance—that is, by their success at helping 
people get and keep jobs—have different practices than programs that 
are compensated only partly based on performance? And how do pro-
gram practices differ between large and small programs, or between 
faith-based and secular ones? The 26 welfare-to-work programs in New 
York City provide preliminary insights into these issues. 
NONPROFIT VERSUS FOR-PROFIT
The views of program leaders illustrate the blurred nature of the 
categories “nonprofit” and “for-profit.” For example, several nonprofits 
said that they try to run like for-profits. William Forrester, Executive 
Vice President of Goodwill Industries of Greater New York and North-
ern New Jersey, explained how his nonprofit organization (which runs 
three of the 26 sites) draws on for-profit management techniques: 
It’s a business. My philosophy is that a nonprofit business is the 
same as a for-profit business except that our shareholders are the 
clients we serve everyday . . . We try to model ourselves after a 
for-profit in the sense that we have a vision, a strategic plan, we 
do marketing, we hold people to account . . . You have pressures 
to produce. Then you have the pressures that you want to treat a 
person with dignity. How long can we spend engaged in counsel-
ing and case management? . . . [Spend too much time on that] and 










Likewise, Karen Smith, Senior Vice President of the nonprofit Wild-
cat Industries noted, “Nonprofit agencies call themselves nonprofit, but 
they’re really in it for the profit. They just call it something else.” Other 
staff members at nonprofit programs emphasize that covering costs is 
a challenge but is necessary to stay in business. “You have to have a 
for-profit mentality because otherwise you won’t survive,” one staff 
member said. 
But leaders at other nonprofit programs express very different senti-
ments. Covering costs is not their primary concern, and they are willing 
to fundraise to address budget shortfalls so they can provide the level of 
service they believe is appropriate. For example, the director of a small 
faith-based program recalled the message she received from the nuns 
who founded the organization: 
Sister Mary Paul and Sister Geraldine were the founders of the pro-
gram and their model was “You do the work, we’ll find the money.” 
I remember Sister Geraldine when we lost a contract and we had 
no money. [I asked,] “Are we going to close the program?” [She 
said] “We’re not closing the program. We will find the money.”
And they always did. They had the pressure but they didn’t put the 
pressure on me or on the staff. 
Interestingly, the person overseeing a for-profit program, New 
York Job Partners, discussed how their program philosophy essentially 
matches that of a nonprofit. New York Job Partners is part of a national 
company (Affiliated Computer Services) that was new to the social ser-
vice field and trying to gain a reputation for providing quality services. 
Charlotte Curan, Operations Manager of their contracts in New York 
explained, “I’ve been told to do a super quality program and make it 
grow. I’ve gotten the support from [the regional manager]: ‘If you need 
another job developer, hire them’ . . . Maybe someone else will make 
millions of dollars for the company, but right now this line of business 
has to show the quality services that we can produce.”1 
Staff members at other for-profits, however, emphasize their pro-
grams’ distinctiveness from their nonprofit counterparts. For example, 
Pete Cove of America Works said one advantage of for-profits is their 
greater flexibility in terms of employee compensation, including the use 
of performance pay. Another advantage, he said, is resource flexibility, 
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to changing conditions. And Susan Melocarro of Career and Education 
Consultants said that pressure to cover costs distinguishes for-profits 
from nonprofits: 
I’ll tell you the difference with the nonprofits. If they are not gen-
erating enough revenue from the contract, they do fundraising or 
they have foundation funds or funds from other sources that subsi-
dize the shortfall. In a private sector business it’s not like that . . . 
So you cannot miss a beat. You have to, as management, be on 
top of this every day . . . because if you’re placement numbers 
go down, you don’t have enough revenue coming in to fund your 
operation. There’s a lot of pressure. 
Although one might guess that for-profit providers would downplay 
their profit motive to participants, that was not the case. Some staff even 
used their organizations’ for-profits status as a selling point during ori-
entations. As one job developer explained: 
[When participants arrive] they’re bitter about all the agencies 
they’ve been to. I’ll say “Look, they are nonprofit organizations. 
We are a for-profit organization . . . I’m not going to fool you. 
I’m here for one purpose—to make my company money and make 
myself money. And if I don’t get hires, I don’t make bonuses. Do 
you think I’m going to waste your time and my own sending you 
to jobs you’re not going to get?” . . . They appreciate the honesty. 
How do for-profit and nonprofit practices differ? Figure 8.1 shows 
differences across a range of practices, starting with deassignments. 
Recall that deassignments occur when staff members believe that cer-
tain individuals are currently unemployable. These people are referred 
back to Job Centers for further evaluation, ending their participation at 
the employment program. For-profits deassigned participants at almost 
half the rate of nonprofits.2 This contradicts conventional wisdom that 
for-profit service providers are more likely to “cream” the caseload by 
focusing on the easiest to employ. At least among these programs, for-
profits may be more motivated to try to place a broader range of partici-
pants into jobs than nonprofits.3 
Sanctioning, on the other hand, is higher among for-profits, pos-
sibly because nonprofits are better at engaging participants, leading to 
fewer dropouts and more compliance with program rules, but fieldwork 


























Deassignments (%) Sanctions (%) Participants Days to placement 
receiving training
vouchers (%) 
† Difference is statistically significant at the 0.05 level. 
among for-profits. Another possibility is that nonprofits are simply less 
willing to exert their administrative authority over participants, leading 
to fewer sanctions. 
Few participants are referred to voucher job training at either type 
of program, although the rate at nonprofits is almost twice as high.4 
Moreover, for-profits have slightly quicker placement speeds, on aver-
age—a difference of four days.5 Interestingly, though, the five fastest 
sites in terms of placement, as well as the six slowest, are all nonprofits. 
Nonprofits’ wider dispersion in terms of program strategy is discussed 
in more detail in Chapter 10. 
COMPENSATION: FULL VERSUS PARTIAL
PERFORMANCE-BASED PAY
Nine small nonprofit community-based organizations (CBOs) in 
New York City are part of the “EarnFair Alliance” and operate employ-
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nity development organization. The Alliance began when three of the 
CBOs decided to begin providing welfare-to-work services. The New 
York Community Trust, the city’s community foundation, gave them a 
planning grant to develop a partnership in which they, and other CBOs 
that wanted to join, would apply for a contract with New York City 
under an umbrella organization. The result was the EarnFair Alliance, 
with SEEDCO acting as the prime contractor. As a SEEDCO manager 
explained, the Alliance was designed so that “one central organization 
managed all of the relationships with the agencies, acted as the primary 
vendor, and handled the administrative burden of providing these ser-
vices so that the CBOs could focus on what their strength was, which is 
providing the case management and the training and also the job devel-
opment piece.” 
An important difference between EarnFair programs and other 
employment service providers in New York City relates to compen-
sation. While New York City pays the nine EarnFair programs solely 
based on performance, just as it does for the other employment pro-
grams, the Alliance has a unique compensation arrangement. SEEDCO 
pools EarnFair programs’ revenues (i.e., their placement and retention 
milestone payments) and redistributes those funds back to these nine 
programs using a formula that is only partially performance based. In 
particular, half of the compensation is based on line-item compensa-
tion for expenses and the other half is based on performance in terms 
of milestone achievements.6 The rationale for this payment structure 
relates to the fact that performance-based contracts necessitate wait-
ing for compensation until contractual milestones are achieved. The 
Alliance’s payment structure allows small, capital-constrained CBOs 
to enter into performance-based contracts with the city while still fund-
ing current operations. From a research perspective, this arrangement 
allows us to compare the practices of programs (those in the Alliance) 
that receive partial performance pay with others (those not in the Alli-
ance) whose compensation is solely based on performance. 
EarnFair members have autonomy to run their own programs, but 
SEEDCO sets employment and retention goals, provides technical 
assistance, and conducts semi-annual audits to ensure that EarnFair pro-
grams’ case files meet the standards set by New York City. “It keeps you 
on your toes,” a program director said. “They don’t want to wait until 
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are having with the files or the numbers [performance levels].” More-
over, SEEDCO organizes monthly program design meetings in which 
staff from the nine programs exchange ideas about useful practices. And 
EarnFair members have access to SEEDCO’s job development capac-
ity. SEEDCO operates EarnFair LLC, a social purpose business that 
runs a temporary-help agency to connect disadvantaged workers with 
companies needing entry-level workers. One director estimated that 20 
percent of her program’s placements came from these leads. 
EarnFair programs that do not meet their milestone goals are put into 
“corrective action” and receive more intensive assistance. The director 
of one site that was in the middle of a corrective action explained that 
SEEDCO had provided a full-time staff person during the turnaround 
period to help the program examine their internal processes and restruc-
ture their job responsibilities. 
Figure 8.2 compares the organizational practices of EarnFair sites 
with those of other programs. Deassignment rates are higher among 
EarnFair programs, while referrals to sanctions are lower.7 EarnFair 
programs rarely refer participants to job training—1 percent received 
training vouchers, on average. One reason may be that these small 
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CBOs cannot afford to have specialized staff to focus on helping par-
ticipants choose and apply for training courses, as some of the larger 
programs can do. 
The figure also shows that EarnFair programs have somewhat faster 
placement speeds than other programs, but the pattern of placement 
speeds across programs shows little consistency. In fact, one Earn-
Fair program has the fastest speeds among the 26 programs in the city, 
while another has the second slowest. Fieldwork also shows that some 
EarnFair programs emphasized quick-placement while others empha-
sized job-readiness assistance. This variance in strategy underscores 
the autonomy these providers have to design and operate their own 
programs. 
PROGRAM SIZE
Size is the most obvious difference one notices when spending time 
in the city’s employment programs. Some programs take up whole 
floors of large office buildings, with dozens of staff members and class-
rooms filled with participants. At other programs, an entire new cohort 
of participants can sit around a single table during orientation, and the 
program comprises only a few rooms. Figure 8.3 shows the variation 
in the average size of new cohorts in the 26 programs.8 Most programs 
range from about 20 to 90 new entrants every two weeks, although one 
program has an average cohort of 175. 
Interestingly, staff members at both large and small sites see benefits 
to their programs’ size.9 For example, those at larger programs said they 
are better able to cater to companies that have large job orders—say, a 
hospital that needs 20 custodians. These staff members see large job 
orders as important for getting people employed quickly. A job devel-
oper at a larger program noted: 
We’re pumping fast—a volume place. You [an employer] might 
as well take 10 people in one week from me. Great! I just cleared 
out 10 more people. There’s nothing wrong with high volume. And 
they’re not garbage jobs. They are things they [participants] ask 
for specifically. I have a ton of people working in home health aide 
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[Certified Nursing Assistant], then you can go to LPN [Licensed 
Practical Nurse], then you can go to RN [Registered Nurse]. Next 
thing you know you could make $40, $50 an hour. 
Program leaders also said that size was an advantage in terms being 
able to weather funding fluctuations. 
Staff members at smaller programs, on the other hand, see at least 
two advantages of their size. One is communication. With smaller 
caseloads, details about participants’ needs and progress can be shared 
quickly among the staff. One staff member had recently moved from a 
larger program to a smaller one. She explained how information from 
the job developer would “eventually get back to the case manager, but 
there was a lag time there . . . Here we instantly know. We’re constantly 
discussing with [the program director]: ‘What do you think about this 
person?’ We’re discussing it within [the staff].” In her view, organiza-
tional size, not just different management emphases, led to better com-
munication and teamwork. 
Another advantage of smaller programs is that engaging partici-
pants and building trust is easier because participants receive more indi-
vidual attention. “Our groups are a lot smaller [than most programs] 
Figure 8.3 Number of Participants per Program (average size of group 
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and it gives us the opportunity to get more personal with them,” a case 
manager explained. “There’s a lot of motivation [among participants] 
that first day.” Moreover, staff at larger programs may be more special-
ized, making people “feel like you’re passing them around a little,” as a 
staff member at a smaller program put it. “The case manager does this, 
the job developer does that. See this person, see that person.” 
To examine program practices by size, sites can be grouped into cat-
egories of small, medium, and large, each with 8 to 10 programs in it.10 
As Figure 8.4 shows, deassignment rates are higher, on average, among 
smaller programs. This could occur if smaller programs provide more 
in-depth screening for barriers to work. Sanctioning, on the other hand, 
is lower among smaller programs, possibly because these programs 
are better able to engage participants, or because smaller, community-
based programs are less willing to exert authority over participants by 
enforcing rules of behavior. 
The third variable, use of training, rises with program size. This may 
relate to staffing capacity. Midsize and larger programs that encourage 
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† Difference between large and small programs is statistically significant at the 0.05 
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* Difference between that size category and one smaller is statistically significant at 
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training often have “training specialists” that help connect people to 
training programs. When asked how more staff might help, for exam-
ple, a job developer at a small faith-based program said it would boost 
placements, produce better job matches, and help “get them into a train-
ing program.” “It’s hard, believe me,” she said, in describing the work 
of running a program with three staff members and a director. “I’m tired 
right now.” 
Finally, the results for placement speeds imply that a program’s 
decision to emphasize quick-placement versus barrier-removal is not 
dependent on its size. All three groups have similar average placement 
speeds. 
FAITH-BASED VERSUS SECULAR 
Four of the 26 programs are run by faith-based (Christian) orga-
nizations. Faith-based providers working under pay-for-performance 
social service contracts are not well studied, so even this limited sample 
provides some helpful preliminary insights. Surprisingly, staff at faith-
based programs did not emphasize, or even usually mention, religious 
factors in describing their work. This may reflect, in part, sensitivity 
to controversies surrounding the use of faith-based providers as gov-
ernment contractors. Most staff at faith-based sites said they viewed 
their organizations as “regular” nonprofits that happened to be part of 
religiously affiliated organizations. For example, a case manager at one 
faith-based program was asked if there were any ways to tell that the 
program was run by a Christian organization. She answered: 
I don’t think so. I’m actually Jewish, but the organization is Catho-
lic. I’ve worked for a couple other nonprofits and it seems pretty 
similar to me, except that we have next Friday off for Good Friday. 
I appreciate the history of the organization and where it comes 
from, but I don’t feel like it has any direct effect on what we do. 
The director of this program expressed a similar sentiment, saying 
that, although the parent organization was founded by nuns, its cur-
rent leadership was lay and it is essentially “just a nonprofit.” Staff at 
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said one case manager. “If you see a difference, it’s a problem from my 
perspective.” 
An executive at one faith-based site, however, explained that his 
program’s commitment to serving the community was difficult to jibe 
with the demands of implementing a performance-based contract. “We 
are a community development corporation and it just happens to be 
that we’re faith-based,” he said. “Maybe as a faith-based organization 
we bring to the table certain sensitivities that other organizations may 
not, but those sensitivities in many instances have gotten us in trouble 
because you do have to operate as a business.” He noted that the pro-
gram’s parent organization was subsidizing the contract with New York 
City because the program was not able to cover costs: 
If we were really a nuts and bolts for-profit or not-for-profit orga-
nization where the fiscal piece is the bottom line, we would drop 
[the contract]. But we’ve made that commitment . . . Therein lies, 
I think, the major difference between a regular organization and a 
faith-based one. You have to go beyond the bottom line, which is 
a fiscal one. 
On the other hand, a different faith-based program has a much dif-
ferent philosophy, with a focus on meeting financial targets and get-
ting people into jobs quickly. In fact, it has the fastest placement rates 
among all 26 programs in the city. It is also the only one with an explicit 
strategy (or at least the only one whose staff was willing to discuss it) to 
try to reemploy participants just before their retention milestone dates. 
The staff calls participants the week before their milestone dates to 
check if they are still employed. If not, they encourage them to come to 
the program office that week to be placed into a new job. This approach 
is within the rules of the contract with New York City, although some 
might see it as gaming the contract. In any case, this program’s focus on 
achieving milestone payments, in contrast with the prior program dis-
cussed, shows the diversity in program philosophy among faith-based 
providers. 
Interestingly, religion was mentioned several times, unprompted, by 
staff at programs that are not faith based. Some individuals explained 
how faith is a central part of their lives, both as a source of emotional 
support in a challenging line of work and a source of inspiration that 
participants’ troubles can be overcome. In a few cases, staff said they 
spoke about faith with participants. “We pray,” said a job developer 
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at a small secular nonprofit. “People give their life to Christ. People 
start going to church. I have people who have stopped drinking.” She 
emphasized that turning around people’s lives was much more than just 
giving people a job. At another secular program, a workshop facilita-
tor described show she tries to inspire people by drawing on a higher 
power: 
I use inspiration. We talk about the Lord. I don’t go into religion 
but I always speak about what has worked for me. There’s a higher 
power and we have to tap into that higher power each and every 
day of our lives . . . I don’t use the term religion. I use the term 
inspiration. Let’s inspire each other. I tell them, “Let’s ask for that. 
Let’s ask for a higher power to intervene in this new start and let’s 
all come together as one.” 
Comparing the practices of faith-based and secular providers, Fig-
ure 8.5 shows that, like other nonprofits, these faith-based programs 
deassign at a higher rate but sanction at a lower rate.11 Also, like other 
smaller nonprofits, training is not encouraged at faith-based programs. 
The two groups are quite similar, however, in terms of their average 
Figure 8.5 Organizational Practices among Faith-Based and Non-Faith-
Based Programs 
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placement speeds, with a median days-to-placement (55 days) that is 
only two days faster than other programs. But that average reflects wide 
diversity in placement speeds among faith-based providers (as with sec-
ular ones too), including the site with the fastest placement speed and 
the site that is the second slowest.
Notes 
1. This example recalls the observation by Eggleston, Miller, and Zeckhauser (2001) 
that “when reputation is an asset, for-profits may act like altruistic nonprofits, 
using quality as an instrument of competition.” 
2. Without the two outlier sites (both nonprofits) with high deassignment rates, the 
average deassignment rate for nonprofits drops from 15 to 12 percent versus 8 
percent at for-profit programs. 
3. The use of random assignment reduces the chances that these differences are 
a result of participant characteristics. Moreover, for-profits have a lower de-
assignment rate even after controlling for observable participant characteristics. 
4. The denominator for these training-usage rates excludes anyone who was de-
assigned or sanctioned. (Recall that most people who are sanctioned either never 
showed up or dropped out within a few days.) 
5. Specifically, the average among for-profit programs in terms of median number of 
days to placement (the number of days it takes to place half of a program’s partici-
pants into jobs, among participants who get jobs) is 53 days. The average among 
nonprofit programs is 57 days. 
6. Each year SEEDCO asks the nine organizations to estimate how many participants 
they will serve that year and to create a line-item budget for providing placement 
and retention services. Once the budget is approved, SEEDCO pays 50 percent 
of those costs via monthly payments. (Alliance members have to submit monthly 
expense reports to SEEDCO.) The other 50 percent of Alliance members’ rev-
enues is performance based and tied to their milestone achievements. SEEDCO 
provides lower milestone payments compared to the HRA payment because these 
milestones are only meant to cover 50 percent of costs (the other half being cov-
ered by line-item reimbursement). The end result is that members receive about 
the same amount of money as they would if they contracted directly with HRA, 
but they get half the money in advance. 
7. The difference in deassignment rates is not driven by the two outlier sites with 
high deassignment rates. One of the outliers is an EarnFair member but the other 
is not. Excluding both from the sample, EarnFair members deassign 14 percent 
while other programs deassign 9 percent. The higher deassignment rates at Earn-
Fair sites may result from more thorough screening of participants because these 
programs are partially compensated for doing intake and assessment. It could also 
be that these programs feel less need to place hard-to-serve participants because 






deassign people whom they believe would be better served by other, more special-
ized programs. 
8. These data show the flow into programs. Data on the stock, or the average number 
of participants in programs, are not available. 
9. Some interviewees had worked at other programs, so they could compare across 
programs of different sizes. 
10. Categories are created by dividing programs using natural breakpoints in the data. 
Results of the “large” category are very similar if the especially large (outlier) 
program is excluded. 
11. Without the outlier programs in terms of deassignments (one of which is faith 










What Works within Work-First? 
The last two chapters described the main differences in strategy and 
structure among the 26 work-first employment programs in New York 
City. Now we turn to the subject of effectiveness. Which of those organ- 
izational differences helps explain performance differences among pro-
grams? In other words, why are some of today’s work-first programs 
more successful at helping people become and stay employed? 
Outcome data show that performance varies considerably among 
the programs. For example, the job placement rate varies from 9 to 29 
percent. Another performance measure is employment retention. The 
share of placed participants that is still working six months after joining 
the program (at any job, not necessarily the original one) ranges from 
42 to 74 percent. 
The best measure of overall performance is termed the “caseload 
employment rate” in this study. It is the share of all participants (not 
just placed ones) that becomes employed and is still working at any job 
six months later. This measure ranges from 4 to 12 percent—three times 
higher at the top-performing program than the bottom. The fact that 
individuals are randomly assigned to programs within their boroughs 
makes it likely that organizational practices, rather than demographic 
factors, are the main driver of these performance differences. 
At the same time, these statistics illustrate the stark challenge—in 
New York City and across the nation—of helping welfare recipients 
achieve sustained work. Even at the most successful program in the 
city, only 12 out of every 100 participants are able to become and stay 
employed for at least six months. Innovations in the design and manage-
ment of employment and training policies for low-income Americans 
are clearly needed to ratchet up performance. Evidence about which 
practices are more effective than others among today’s employment 
programs can help further that goal. 
The findings in this chapter are based on data from the more than 
14,000 participants assigned to programs during the sample period who 









rate results are discussed for custodial and noncustodial individuals. 
Results for custodial individuals are the most relevant to national policy 
because the vast majority of welfare recipients in the United States are 
custodial parents. But results for noncustodial individuals are relevant to 
important policy efforts in the nation as well, including those designed 
to reduce prison recidivism by providing employment services to ex-
convicts, most of whom are noncustodial men. 
To investigate effective practices among programs, this study uses 
regression analysis. This statistical technique models the relationship 
between a dependent variable (such as participants’ employment out-
comes) and independent variables (including program characteristics). 
In particular, multilevel logistic regressions are used. Logistic regres-
sions are useful when dependent variables are constrained between 
two outcomes, such as whether participants are placed in jobs or not. 
Moreover, multilevel models take into account the nested structure of 
the data, with participants grouped by employment programs. Further 
methodological details are provided in Appendix A, and Appendix C 
provides a sample of the regression results. The rest of this chapter pres-
ents the key findings based on the regression results as well as those 
based on more simple cross tabulations. 
FACTORS THAT AFFECT PERFORMANCE 
For-Profit versus Nonprofit 
Comparing outcomes of for-profit and nonprofit employment pro-
grams in New York City shows that the six for-profit programs have 
better overall results. Figure 9.1 shows that participants have a higher 
probability of obtaining jobs when they are assigned to for-profit sites 
than to nonprofit ones.1 In particular, the placement rate among for-
profits (24 percent) is seven percentage points higher, on average, than 
among nonprofits (17 percent), a difference of more than a third. Among 
people who become employed, however, nonprofits have a larger share 
that enters high wage jobs, as defined by the HRA. They also have bet-
ter six-month employment retention rates among placed individuals.2 
But using the best measure of overall performance—the share of all 
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participants who become employed and are still working six months 
later—for-profits have a two-percentage-point advantage over non-
profits (10 percent versus 8 percent), a difference of 25 percent, although 
it is not statistically significant (P = 0.12). The figure shows the results 
for the full sample, but the relative performance of nonprofits and for-
profits is similar for custodial and noncustodial subgroups. 
Figure 9.2 shows the average number of milestones achieved per 
100 participants, based on programs’ contract with the city, including 
the potential to earn one placement milestone and two retention mile-
stones per participant. For-profits achieve more than a third more mile-
stones than nonprofits (48 versus 35).3 By getting more people into jobs, 
for-profits earn more placement milestones and—despite their lower 
employment-retention rates—earn more retention milestones as well. 
If we controlled for organizational practices such as the use of 
training and an emphasis on case management versus quick placement, 
would we still see performance differences between nonprofits and for-
profits? This question may be more of interest to management schol-
ars than practitioners, but it is another way of examining what makes 
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Figure 9.2 Average Number of Placement and Retention Milestones 
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form, while also controlling for demographic differences among pro-
grams’ participants. The results show no statistically significant differ-
ences between nonprofits and for-profits in the chances that an indi-
vidual (custodial or noncustodial) will be placed in a job, nor that they 
will find a job and still be working six months later. Because of large 
standard errors, however, we cannot say if there is an actual difference 
in performance between these two types of providers. So, although the 
raw data show performance differences between for-profit and nonprofit 
programs, once we control for organizational practices, there are no 
clear inherent differences between these two categories of providers. 
Stronger versus Weaker Performance Incentives 
To examine the effect of performance incentives, we can compare 
the outcomes of participants served by the nine programs in the Earn-
Fair Alliance with those served by other programs. Recall that EarnFair 
programs receive compensation based partly on their results (that is, 
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on their expenses. All other programs are paid solely based on results. 
Regression analysis is used to isolate the effect of this difference in pay 
structure from other differentiating factors measured in this study, such 
as demographics, use of training, and a focus on quick placement versus 
case management. 
The results imply that stronger incentives for performance produce 
better overall employment results. Put another way, EarnFair programs 
have less success in helping individuals find and keep jobs. For custo-
dial individuals, for example, being served by an EarnFair site lowers 
the chances of placement by almost five percentage points, a 22 per-
cent reduction.4 Noncustodial individuals are also less likely to become 
employed when served by EarnFair sites, and in fact, the negative effect 
carries over into employment retention as well for them. Although 
speculative, having less performance-based pay may lead programs to 
be less aggressive in terms of retention services.5 If so, though, it is 
unclear why this would have a greater effect on noncustodial individu-
als than custodial ones. 
Finally, the results for the full sample show that being served by 
an EarnFair site reduces one’s chances of becoming employed and still 
working six months later by about three percentage points, or 38 per-
cent. For custodial participants, the effect is negative, but the estimate 
is not precise enough to say whether it is meaningful. For noncustodial 
participants, the effect is negative and statistically significant. 
Might other characteristics of EarnFair sites contribute to these out-
comes? EarnFair programs are smaller than average, being local CBOs, 
so they may face greater challenges in terms of access to capital and 
economies of scale. Staffing data show, however, that if capitalization 
is an issue, it does not affect staffing capacity, which is similar to other 
programs on a per-participant basis. Moreover, organizational size has 
no statistically significant correlation with any of the performance mea-
sures. So, although we cannot definitively say that the EarnFair sites’
form of compensation is the main cause of their lower performance, it 
is a plausible candidate. 
Immediate Job Search versus Short-Term Job Training 
The results point to the benefits of immediate job search over short-
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idea that this type of training facilitates job entry by boosting people’s 
skills or by providing a signal to employers of people’s abilities.6 In 
terms of placement rates, for example, the results imply that increasing 
the share of custodial participants that receives training by one percent-
age point reduces the chance of placement by 0.8 percentage points, a 4 
percent reduction. The effect for noncustodial participants is also nega-
tive, although somewhat smaller. The apparent negative effect of train-
ing on placement, at least for custodial individuals, could stem from 
several factors. For example, the training itself could be of low value, or 
programs that encourage training could use other practices that lead to 
fewer placements, such as conveying less urgency about employment.7 
Fieldwork did not highlight a particular answer. 
Turning to employment retention, a greater use of training by pro-
grams reduces the chances of six-month employment retention for 
both custodial and noncustodial individuals who are placed into jobs, 
although the effect is stronger and statistically significant only for the 
latter group. For them, each percentage point increase in the share of 
the caseload that is referred to training reduces retention rates by 1.3 
percentage points, or about 3 percent. The finding that a greater use of 
training reduces programs’ employment retention results is surprising. 
It contradicts the argument that short-term training is an effective way 
to promote more sustained employment, either by allowing people to 
obtain more desirable jobs or more confidence on the job. Again, field-
work did not point to a particular answer.8 
A caveat to these retention-related findings is that two sites, both run 
by the same organization, have relatively high rates of training usage 
and unusually steep drop-offs in retention between three and six months 
after placement.9 One of the sites appeared to be poorly run, with vis-
ible disorganization. When these two sites are excluded, the effect of 
training at six months for noncustodial participants is smaller and sta-
tistically insignificant. For custodial participants, the effect becomes 
slightly positive but remains statistically insignificant. In short, even if 
we disregard the two programs that are especially ineffective at reten-
tion, there is still no clear positive effect of training on employment 
retention. 
Finally, in terms of programs’ abilities to get people into jobs and 
keep them working for at least six months, the effect of training is nega-
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ticipants. In fact, for custodial individuals, the use of training is the only 
program characteristic that has a statistically significant effect on this 
key outcome measure.10 Increasing referrals to training by a percentage 
point is estimated to reduce participants’ chances of achieving sustained 
employment by 0.5 percentage points or about 6 percent.11 
A Quick-Placement Approach versus a Case-Management Approach
All of the programs provide some case management and coaching, 
including job interview preparation. But following these initial activi-
ties, the results for the full sample show that a quick-placement focus is 
more beneficial to individuals than an emphasis on case management. 
In particular, the latter emphasis reduces the chances of job placement 
as well as the chances that people find jobs and are still working six 
months later. 
That being said, in some cases, a healthy amount of case manage-
ment can be useful, at least for custodial individuals. For them, the 
results imply that more case management initially has a positive effect 
on people’s chances of job placement (including placement at a high 
wage) but with a diminishing return.12 This reflects the fact that some 
of the most successful programs are not among the fastest in terms of 
placement speeds, but they are in the medium to medium-fast range. 
For sites that provide an average level of case management, though, fur-
ther increases in case management reduce placement rates. The results 
imply, for example, that programs that move from providing an average 
amount of case management (fiftieth percentile in terms of placement 
speed) to an above-average amount (seventy-fifth percentile) reduce the 
probability of participants’ placement by one percentage point, or just 
over 4 percent.13 For noncustodial individuals, the effect of case man-
agement on job placement rates is more strongly negative. 
The results also show that the amount of case management pro-
vided has little effect on employment retention among placed individu-
als, at least by the six-month mark. Recall that some staff felt that more 
intensive case management prior to job search helps people stabilize 
their lives and deal with barriers to work, thus facilitating job retention 
once employed. The evidence does not support this view. 
On the most important measure of performance, the ability of pro-
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months later, more case management has a negative effect for noncus-
todial individuals. For them, attending a program that provides above-
average amount of case management reduces their chances of achieving 
six months of employment by 0.7 percentage points or 8 percent.14 For 
custodial individuals, the effect is negative but smaller and not statis-
tically significant. Overall, then, we can say that a case-management 
approach either has a negative effect on sustained employment or has 
no clear positive effect, depending on the type of participant. 
FACTORS THAT DO NOT DRIVE PERFORMANCE 
Some organizational characteristics turn out to have little or no 
apparent effect on performance, even though they are areas of obvious 
difference among programs. 
Deassignment Rates 
Programs that deem participants to be currently unemployable can 
deassign them and refer them back to the city-run Job Centers for fur-
ther evaluation. As we saw earlier, deassignment rates vary considerably 
among programs. Do higher deassignment rates boost programs’ results 
by enabling staff to focus their energy on those with a better chance of 
becoming employed? Or do fewer deassignments boost results because 
some people with more serious barriers can still become employed? 
The results suggest that the answer to these questions is “neither.” De-
assignment rates do not noticeably impact longer term performance. 
Although higher deassignment rates lead to lower placement rates, they 
also boost employment retention among those who get jobs. Overall, a 
program’s deassignment rate has a statistically insignificant effect on 
participants’ chances of finding a job and staying employed for at least 
six months. 
Program Size
Field research suggests no consistent patterns in terms of organiza-
tional practices by program size. For example, programs that emphasize 
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quick placement are run by both small CBOs and large social service 
agencies. The same goes for programs that emphasize case manage-
ment. Maybe not surprisingly, then, there are no significant relation-
ships between program size and performance. Some researchers have 
expressed concerns that CBOs may have difficulty competing for welfare- 
to-work contracts, given the scale of the task of moving welfare recipi-
ents into employment. For example, Grønbjerg (2001) argues “large, 
multiservice agencies will do better because they have flexibility and 
discretion in how to allocate their many funding sources among pro-
gram activities.” Small CBOs, on the other hand, “tend to be undercapi-
talized, cannot easily alter their service mix, and are politically weak, 
but they often provide niche services targeted at a specific neighbor-
hood or client group.” But the evidence from New York City suggests 
that large employment programs do not have a consistent performance 
advantage over smaller ones. Some of the lowest performing programs, 
in fact, are run by large multiservice agencies, as are some of the top-
performing ones. Small CBOs have a wide range of performance results 
as well, including one that has the fourth-highest rate of total milestones 
achieved per participant (a proxy for both performance and revenues) as 
well as two at the very bottom. Smaller programs, in other words, can 
compete with larger programs if they use effective practices. 
Sanctioning Rates 
When programs sanction individuals for breaking program rules, 
their participation is terminated and they are referred back to their Job 
Centers. The rate at which programs impose sanctions varies consider-
ably among programs, as we saw earlier, yet these rates are not signifi-
cantly correlated with placement or retention rates. One possible reason 
is that individuals who are sanctioned might have been unlikely to have 
become employed anyway. As a result, employment programs with 
lower sanction rates may not necessarily have higher placement rates. 
Past research has also found little or no effect of an emphasis on adju-
dication for noncooperative participants or actual rates of sanctioning 
on the performance of welfare-to-work programs (Mead 1983, 1997; 
Mitchell, Chadwin, and Nightingale 1980; Riccio and Orenstein 1996). 
Does it not matter, then, whether programs are stricter or more 
lenient in terms of enforcing program rules and workplace norms? Not 
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necessarily. Some programs may set high expectations about behavior 
while choosing not to use the threat of sanctions to enforce them. This 
may be particularly true in New York, where the state’s sanction rules 
are relatively lenient. Because the likelihood of benefit cuts as a result 
of noncompliance is lower than in most states, staff may choose other 
ways of enforcing rules. 
Faith-Based versus Secular Programs 
Faith-based programs show little commonality in their approaches. 
For example, one program has the fastest placement speed among all 
the sites and is clearly “number focused” in terms of achieving perfor-
mance goals. Another has the second-slowest placement speed and has 
a strong commitment to case management. In other words, being faith-
based tells us little about organizational practices. Correlations between 
faith-based status and outcomes imply a lower placement rate among 
these providers, but there are no clear connections with longer term 
results. 
RESULTS BY GENDER 
Nationally less than 10 percent of welfare recipients are male 
because most welfare systems require adult recipients to be custodial 
parents. As a result, little research exists on the effects of welfare-to-
work programs for men. Although now quite dated, some evidence 
comes from one of the first rigorously evaluated welfare-to-work pro-
grams, the Supported Work Demonstration, which ran in the 1970s. The 
program produced large positive effects on women’s earnings, while 
men had only small gains (Hollister, Kemper, and Maynard, 1984). 
Men in the sample were all ex-addicts or ex-offenders. 
New York City’s welfare system is a useful setting to investigate 
the role of gender in welfare-to-work programs because, unlike most 
welfare systems, it has an assistance program for the noncustodial poor 
called the Safety Net Program. In New York City, these individuals are 
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fare recipients. As a result, 31 percent of participants in the 26 employ-
ment programs are men.15 
The data show that men and women in the programs have similar 
employment outcomes, on average. Men have slightly higher place-
ment rates, but lower employment retention. As a result, the share of 
participants who find jobs and are still working at least six months later 
is essentially identical (8 percent) for both men and women. Moreover, 
an examination of how program practices affect men and women shows 
no evidence of important differences by gender in terms of how those 
practices affect outcomes. The results contradict what may be conven-
tional wisdom that poor men fare poorly, relative to women, in employ-
ment programs. 
THE EFFECTS OF ADOPTING BETTER PRACTICES 
The results in this chapter imply that programs that adopt more 
effective practices within work first can see a substantial boost in 
their outcomes, including on the most important measure of perfor-
mance in this study: getting participants into jobs and having them still 
be employed at least six months later. For example, cutting training 
usage from the seventy-fifth percentile among programs (8 percent of 
participants referred to training) to the twenty-fifth percentile (no one 
referred to training) boosts custodial participants’ chances of sustained 
employment by four percentage points, or by more than 45 percent. The 
effect for noncustodial participants is similar. Switching to a quicker 
placement approach, meanwhile—increasing placement speed from the 
seventy-fifth percentile (67 days to place the median placed individual 
in a job) to the twenty-fifth percentile (47 days)—raises performance 
by almost 18 percent for noncustodial participants and by slightly less 
for the full sample. 
The findings also have implications for public agencies that con-
tract with service providers. Moving from a compensation scheme 
based partly on performance to one that is fully performance-based 
increases sustained employment by more than half (55 percent) for non-
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What is the predicted effect of changing these three practices at 
once? The results for the full sample suggest that the combined effect 
of using less training, becoming more focused on quick placement, and 
moving from partial to full performance-based pay would more than 
double the share of participants that get and keep jobs for at least six 
months, from 6 percent to almost 14 percent. This increase in perfor-
mance, in a large welfare system such as New York City’s, would result 
in thousands more individuals achieving sustained employment each 
year. Even so, the fact that even with these “best practices,” only 14 
percent of participants in the city’s programs would achieve employ-
ment and still be working six months later is sobering. It is a reminder 
of the urgent challenge in antipoverty policy, both in New York City 
and elsewhere, of finding better ways to help welfare recipients become 
employed and, especially, to stay employed. Moreover, for New York in 
particular, the fact that almost a third of individuals assigned to employ-
ment programs in the city do not show up, and about half of those that 
do attend drop out within a week, makes connecting those individu-
als with work more difficult. Strengthening sanctioning policy in New 
York, even to national averages, could reduce noncompliance with wel-
fare rules and promote greater engagement with welfare-to-work pro-
grams, factors that could boost employment rates. 
Notes 
1. Note that the six-month employment rates (10 percent and 8 percent) in Figure 9.1 
are higher than the overall average shown earlier in Figure 2.2 (6 percent) because 
Figure 9.1 uses participants (those who showed up for at least a day to their pro-
grams) as the denominator, whereas Figure 2.2 uses all individuals referred to 
programs. 
2. At the three-month mark, for-profits have a slight advantage, with an employment 
retention rate of 64 percent versus 63 percent for nonprofits. 
3. In dollar terms, for-profit programs earn about 25 percent more revenue per par-
ticipant, on average, than nonprofit programs under their contract with the city, 
due to for-profits’ greater milestone achievement. 
4. Regression results in this chapter apply to the modal participant in the sample. 
5. Alternatively, they might be less aggressive at verifying employment retention, 
meaning obtaining documentation from participants to prove that they are still 
working. That documentation is required in order for programs to receive pay-
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6. Available data include the percentage of participants at each program that are 
referred to training, but not which specific individuals received training or if they 
completed their training programs. Anecdotally, staff said that many participants 
drop out of training—around half, in some cases. 
7. Another possibility is that individuals who complete training programs may be 
more selective in their job searches, focused on particular jobs in the fields of their 
training, and this could delay or hinder placements. Although that is possible, it 
was not discussed as a concern by any of the staff interviewed. 
8. Employment programs often try to steer participants to training programs that 
have job development staff, so that when individuals finish the training, the train-
ing program staff (rather than the employment program staff) will help them find 
a job. One possibility is that training programs make poorer job matches, leading 
to worse employment retention. 
9. Interestingly, the executive overseeing both programs set staff goals for three-
month retention rates but not six-month rates. 
10. If we exclude the two sites that encourage training and have particularly weak 
employment retention results, the marginal effect for custodial participants 
becomes smaller and is no longer statistically significant. For noncustodial indi-
viduals, the marginal effect remains the same and is still statistically significant. In 
short, the results show that this type of short-term training, at least as implemented 
in New York City, does not produce more sustained employment and may substan-
tially reduce it. 
11. It is worth noting that these findings, as with all of those in this chapter, relate 
to near-term employment outcomes. Longer term follow-up data might show 
different results for short-term, classroom-based training. Even so, the type of 
training used, typically lasting a few weeks to three months, allows staff several 
months to try to place participants into jobs once they complete training. Recall 
that programs are given six months to place participants in jobs before they are 
re-randomly assigned to other programs. 
12. Without the squared term, the marginal effect is negative (−0.001) and is less 
statistically significant, with a z-value of 0.08 compared to 0.02 with the squared 
term. 
13. Specifically, the model predicts this effect when moving from a median days-
to-placement at the fiftieth percentile for custodial individuals (57 days) to the 
seventy-fifth percentile (65 days). The combined marginal effect of moving from 
the twenty-fifth percentile of placement speeds (46 days) to the median (57 days) 
only increases the chances of placement slightly, from 24.1 to 24.3 percent. Going 
from a low level of case management to a modest level, in other words, has little 
effect on performance. 
14. Specifically, this means attending a program whose median placement speed is a 
week longer than average, as compared to one at the average. 
15. Much of the analysis in this chapter presents separate results for custodial and 
noncustodial aid recipients. Custodial participants are mostly female (89 percent) 
whereas the majority of noncustodial participants are male (58 percent). Here, 





Nonprofits and For-Profits 
A Closer Look 
As we have seen, the six for-profit and 20 nonprofit work-first 
employment programs in New York City use somewhat different prac-
tices. On average, for-profits are more focused on quick placement, and 
they use less job training and case management. Moreover, performance 
varies by organizational form, with for-profits achieving higher place-
ment rates, on average, and nonprofits having better employment reten-
tion rates among those who get jobs. Overall, for-profits have somewhat 
better results, measured as the share of all participants who get jobs and 
are still working at any job six months later. 
In this chapter we look beyond these comparisons of averages to 
better understand what makes these nonprofits and for-profits different. 
With such a small sample size, the findings of this chapter are necessar-
ily suggestive and may not be generalizable to nonprofits and for-profits 
in general. Even so, New York City is one of only a handful of cities to 
privatize its employment programs, and it provides a useful opportunity 
to shed new light on the role of organizational form and performance. 
THE DISPERSION OF PRACTICES AND RESULTS 
BY ORGANIZATIONAL FORM 
Comparing the average characteristics of nonprofit and for-profit 
work-first providers in New York City overlooks a key insight—non-
profits have wider variance in their practices and performance. Some 
nonprofits strongly encourage participants to consider short-term train-
ing while others use no training at all. Likewise, the focus of non-
profits ranges from case management to quick placement. The variance 
in practices among for-profits, on the other hand, is somewhat smaller. 







of the spectrum in terms of placement speeds. (Recall that placement 
speed is a proxy for the degree to which programs emphasize case man-
agement and training.) But they are not, in fact, among the fastest. For 
example, in terms of median days-to-placement among placed partici-
pants, for-profits range from 46 days to 58 days, while nonprofits range 
from 35 days to 84 days. In terms of training, for-profits range from 0 to 
7 percent of participants receiving training vouchers, while nonprofits 
range from 0 to 14 percent. 
The fact that these for-profit programs have less variance in their 
approaches is consistent with theory. For-profits are thought to have a 
so-called single-argument objective function. In other words, they have 
one goal: maximizing profits. If there is a set of profit-maximizing prac-
tices, then we would expect to see a convergence around those practices.
In contrast, nonprofits are thought to have a two-argument objective 
function: maximizing profits (or at least breaking even) and “something 
else” (Needleman 2001). That “something else” often relates to the 
wishes of its donors. As Moore writes, “In this important sense, there 
are two bottom lines: mission effectiveness and financial sustainability” 
(Moore 2000). Given these multiple objectives, it is not surprising that 
nonprofits have greater willingness to deviate from profit-maximizing 
practices in the interest of other goals (Weisbroad 1998). 
Frumkin and Andre-Clark (2000) describe these dynamics in their 
examination of welfare-to-work programs: 
[N]onprofits must address the inconsistencies between their values 
and the quest for short-term and well-defined rules for engage-
ment. Driven by commitments to justice and charity, many non-
profit organizations are consciously oriented away from finding 
the shortest distance between two points . . . [They] take a more 
holistic approach to welfare-to-work processes, emphasizing a set 
of values that providers believe will lead to a better life that are not 
necessarily closely linked to holding an entry-level job. 
In contrast, Frumkin and Andre-Clark argue that for-profit welfare-
to-work programs “appear comfortable being tied to the narrowly tai-
lored, short-term goals connected to client employment activity . . . 
For many for-profits, the shortest distance between welfare receipt and 
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The findings from New York City show that the “something else” 
part of nonprofits’ objective functions—their “mission effectiveness” 
goal, to use Moore’s term—is more important to some organizations 
than others. At one end of the spectrum, in fact, “something else” 
approximates “nothing else.” These findings imply that what makes 
nonprofits unique is not a guaranteed commitment to buck the profit 
motive to achieve their organizational missions, but rather their ability 
to choose to do so by fundraising, if they wish, to support that choice. 
While nonprofits’ willingness to deviate from profit-maximizing 
practices to advance their missions appears to be one factor behind their 
greater variance in practices, another less benign factor may also be at 
play—inefficiency. Nonprofits’ nondistribution constraint is thought to 
(beneficially) reduce nonprofit managers’ abilities to pursue personal 
gain or to cut service quality. But Dees and Anderson (2004) remind 
us that this constraint can also lead to complacency, inefficiency, and 
waste as they state, “A nonprofit can survive, even thrive, with very 
inefficient and ineffective practices.” 
In any case, a “soft and fuzzy” view of nonprofits as necessarily 
mission driven, or necessarily more empathetic, is certainly not accu-
rate. Some of the 20 nonprofit providers fit those descriptions, but oth-
ers do not. For example, a director of one of the nonprofit employment 
programs was asked whether he looks to case managers to help partici-
pants deal with more personal barriers to work, such as family prob-
lems. His answer was clear, even if a participant were to ask for help in 
dealing with a sick child: 
Not at all, but they often do it. They often get sucked into it. 
Even job developers get sucked into that because they get client-
oriented rather than employer-orientated. Imagine a private 
employment agency if somebody said “My kid’s sick, what should 
I do about it?” This is a private employment agency. You’re in a 
shoe store—talk to me about shoes. 
Does greater variation in strategies among nonprofits lead to greater
variance in results? In terms of placement, it clearly does. Nonprofits’
placement rates range from 9 to 26 percent, while for-profits’ rates are 
clustered mostly in the top half, ranging from 18 to 27 percent (Figure 
10.1). In terms of overall results, though, for-profits’ have only some-
what smaller variance than nonprofits. This is shown in Figure 10.2, 
20
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which ranks programs by their six-month caseload employment rate, 
meaning the share of all participants who get jobs and are still working 
at any job six months later. 
The results of this section suggest that, not surprisingly, for-profits 
are more responsive to contractual incentives than nonprofits.1 They 
also imply that government welfare agencies that design service con-
tracts with for-profits need to be especially careful that the financial 
incentives are aligned with the results agencies wish to achieve. On 
the upside, if those agencies are able to specify particular outcomes 
they wish to maximize, and if they target financial rewards to those 
outcomes, for-profits should be more responsive than nonprofits to 
those rewards—in other words, more focused on achieving the desired 
outcomes. 
In the case of New York City, clear outcomes are specified and 
rewards are targeted to those outcomes via milestone payments. And 
for-profits do, in fact, achieve those milestones at a higher rate than 
nonprofits. Of course, from a broader policy perspective, it is a mat-
ter of opinion whether for-profits’ apparently greater responsiveness to 
their contracts makes a meaningful difference to performance. Recall 
that for-profits have a two-percentage-point advantage over nonprofits 
(10 percent versus 8 percent) in terms of the share of participants that 
become employed and are still working six months later, a difference 
of 25 percent. Moreover, the city pays for-profits considerably more, on 
average, since they achieve 36 percent more total milestones per par-
ticipant than nonprofits, a result driven by higher placement rates. If one 
views the performance advantage of for-profits as relatively small, then 
it appears that the city pays more for for-profit services despite receiv-
ing roughly similar results as nonprofits. This would argue for shifting 
contractual incentives towards six-month employment retention rates 
and away from more immediate outcomes such as placement. This shift 
could be justified for a broader reason as well, since both for-profits and 







INSIGHTS INTO THE PRACTICE OF CREAMING 
THE CASELOAD 
When welfare-to-work programs focus on the most job-ready indi-
viduals, while providing less assistance to harder to serve individuals, it 
is known as “creaming” or “cream skimming.” Creaming is often a con-
cern with welfare-to-work programs, particularly when for-profit pro-
viders are involved. For instance, Salamon (1993) argues, “As for-profit 
firms enter the social market . . . they will inevitably siphon off the more 
affluent ‘customers,’ leaving nonprofit firms with the most difficult and 
least profitable cases.” Frumkin and Andre-Clark (2000) add, “many 
nonprofits—through mission and program design—have demonstrated 
a special commitment to helping the individual overcome the multiple 
barriers to employment that many long-term recipients face, [while] 
business firms have strong incentives to avoid these recipients.” Some 
empirical work from the employment and training literature, how-
ever, finds that for-profits do not cream more than nonprofits. Heinrich 
(2000) examines nonprofit and for-profit contractors in Illinois, operat-
ing under the Job Training Partnership Act. Using data from about 750 
contracts over a 10-year period, she finds that for-profits are more likely 
to enroll disadvantaged participants. The results “refute the assertion 
that nonprofit organizations are inherently more charitable and more 
likely than for-profit contactors to serve more disadvantaged individu-
als in delivering publicly funded job-training services.” 
The outcomes from New York City provide new evidence on the 
question of whether for-profit service providers engage in cream-
ing to a larger extent than nonprofit ones, particularly under pay-for-
performance contracts. The next sections examine the evidence of 
creaming at three different stages of service delivery: program entry, 
deassignments and sanctions, and employment services. 
Creaming at Program Entry 
Because the city randomly assigns welfare recipients to employ-
ment programs, those programs cannot “cream” in their original allot-
ment of individuals assigned to them. However, they can try to cream in 
other ways. For example, programs could attempt to discourage hard-
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to-serve individuals who are assigned to them from showing up in the 
first place. They could do this by, say, creating a reputation of being 
callous to people’s problems. Neither fieldwork nor administrative data 
showed any evidence of this. The 20 nonprofit and six for-profit sites 
have roughly equal shares of disadvantaged participants (those who 
show up for at least a day), including the same fraction without a high 
school degree (45 percent) and with less than a ninth-grade education (6 
percent). Both types of programs also have very similar shares of long-
term welfare recipients. 
Creaming through Deassignments and Sanctions 
Once people begin participating, programs have two routes by 
which they can remove hard-to-serve individuals from their caseloads. 
First, they can deassign people they categorize as unemployable. Sec-
ond, they can sanction people for breaking program rules. When some-
one is deassigned or sanctioned, they are referred back to the city-run 
Job Centers, and their participation at the employment program ends. 
Remarks by a director of a nonprofit program are illustrative of 
how sanctioning can be used to remove hard-to-serve individuals. He 
explained that many participants violate at least one rule during their 
first few days, such as coming in late or not following directions. Most 
of the time, he said, small infractions are overlooked. But he encour-
ages staff to identify people who are clearly not interested in becoming 
employed and to sanction them at their first violation. “We’re always 
concerned about diluting staff involvement,” he explained, “because 
even the people who have good prognoses require a lot of service to 
find a job that’s acceptable.” He added that every case manager “knows 
it’s in her interest to get rid of the people she doesn’t want.”2 
Are for-profit programs in the city more likely to use de-
assignments or sanctions to cream? The data suggest they are not. For 
example, Figure 10.3 presents outcomes for the almost 800 long-term 
custodial welfare recipients in the sample, a population that is particu-
larly challenging to employ and keep employed. Nonprofits deassign at 
twice the rate of for-profits, and sanctioning rates are quite similar, with 
for-profits having a slightly higher rate. Comparisons using different 
definitions of “disadvantaged,” including having less than a ninth-grade 
education, show a similar pattern. 
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Creaming in Employment Services 
Finally, we examine whether for-profits are more likely to cream in 
their job placement and retention services. The best available test of this 
is whether hard-to-serve individuals have lower employment outcomes 
when served by for-profits. The data show, in fact, that for-profit pro-
viders achieve somewhat better results than nonprofits for these types 
of participants. For example, Figure 10.4 shows employment outcomes 
for long-term welfare recipients. For-profits place a larger share into 
jobs, and their six-month employment retention rates are identical to 
nonprofits. As a result, a higher percentage of long-term custodial wel-
fare recipients becomes employed and is still working six months later 
when served by for-profits (8 percent) than by nonprofits (5 percent).3 
At least among employment programs in New York City, for-profit pro-
viders do not appear to engage in creaming to a larger extent than non-
profit providers. 
Notes 
1. Heinrich (2000) examines Job Training Partnership Act (JTPA) providers and 
finds no significant differences in the influence of contract performance incentives 
on outcomes by service provider type. She notes: “This does not imply, however, 
that the different types of service providers were equally responsive to or likely 
to satisfy performance requirements.” For-profits, in fact, were three times more 
likely to exceed contract performance standards. While she does not find that for-
profits have greater responsiveness to financial incentives in particular, she does 
find that they have greater responsiveness overall. 
2. A legitimate question is whether this type of creaming is an efficient practice from 
society’s point of view. In other words, is it worthwhile to expend limited staff 
resources on people who, according to staff, do not want jobs? These questions are 
beyond the scope of this analysis. 
3. Results for those with less education show a similar pattern. Moreover, to separate 
the effects of deassignments and sanctions from placement and retention perfor-
mance, results were also run using samples that include only participants who 
were not deassigned or sanctioned. The same overall picture holds. 
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Figure 10.3 Organizational Practices among For-Profit and Nonprofit 


















† Difference is statistically significant at the 0.05 level. 
Figure 10.4 Employment Outcomes among For-Profit and Nonprofit 
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The Role of Management 
and Leadership 
Decisions about which organizational practices to use can signifi-
cantly affect the performance of work-first employment programs, as 
we saw in Chapter 9. This fact in itself underscores the importance of 
management. After all, a key aspect of management (or leadership, if 
you prefer) is choosing the organization’s strategy. In the case of work-
first employment services, those choices include whether to empha-
size immediate job search or short-term training and whether to take a 
quick-placement or a case-management approach. 
But other, more frontline aspects of management might also be 
important to performance, such as the ability to establish a clear mis-
sion, measure and monitor performance, set organizational goals, and 
align and motivate staff around those goals. This chapter examines the 
effect of frontline management practices on welfare-to-work outcomes. 
The analysis is qualitative—aspects of frontline management are not 
quantified across programs. Instead, the analysis is more suggestive, 
drawing on observations from field research as well as programs’ out-
come data. 
HOW MANAGEMENT MATTERS: AN OVERVIEW
OF THE LITERATURE 
A range of studies demonstrate that public management, defined in 
a variety of ways, affects the delivery of government services. Brown 
and Potoski (2006) review the literature and find, “Though a notoriously
complex and difficult topic of study, effective management improves 
government service delivery.” Past studies, they note, show a range 
of managerial tasks and functions that were found to be necessary 
for successful service delivery, including planning and strategizing,







ing human resources, evaluating and tracking service quality, and man-
aging across organizational boundaries. 
On the other hand, some scholars question how significant a role 
management plays in service delivery. Looking specifically at welfare-
to-work programs, for example, Meyers, Glaser, and MacDonald 
(1998) find that frontline practices are difficult for management to influ-
ence. And Riccucci (2005) writes, “at the front lines of service delivery, 
where workers may be guided by pervading work norms and customs as 
well as by shared experiences and knowledge, street-level bureaucrats 
often perform their job duties and functions while relying very little 
on management directives.” Kettl (2006), commenting on the broader 
public policy literature, explains that although there is broad agreement 
among scholars that management matters, some believe that policy 
matters more. In his words, the latter argument is: “Design the policy 
well, construct the right incentives, and management will work.” Oth-
ers, he notes, argue that management matters but the odds of successful 
management are low. 
A few studies have examined which frontline management prac-
tices matter the most for employment programs. Behn (1991) focuses 
on Massachusetts’ welfare-to-work efforts in the late 1980s and finds 
that successful program leaders establish a clear mission, set goals for 
their organizations, personally monitor results, and reward success. Bar-
dach (1993) examines California’s Greater Avenues for Independence 
(GAIN) Program, a statewide welfare-to-work initiative. He argues that 
useful management practices include delegation of responsibility to 
line staff; setting measurable, challenging, and fair performance goals; 
persuading staff that the mission and goals are worthwhile and achiev-
able; and providing proper training to employees. 
More recently, Bloom, Hill, and Riccio (2003) pool data from three 
large-scale experiments to examine the relationship between program 
implementation and earnings impacts. They find a negative effect 
of disagreement between staff and supervisors over what a program 
should be doing or how it should be done. Riccucci (2005) surveys 
the management literature and finds that job satisfaction is important 
to organizational outcomes. Her field research in welfare offices also 
suggests that open communication and participatory management are 
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LOOKING ACROSS PROGRAMS 
To shed new light onto how management affects the performance of 
today’s work-first employment programs, we turn to the findings from 
New York City. First, there is no obvious correlation between programs 
that appear to be better managed and actual participant outcomes. For 
example, while I was still “blind” to performance (I purposefully had 
not yet seen programs’ performance data), I identified two programs 
that, based on field research, exemplified strong management capa-
bilities. Both were midsized nonprofits and had directors who were 
passionate about their work, dedicated to creating high-performance 
organizations, and thought carefully about how best to keep their staffs 
motivated. And their staffs did, in fact, appear to be motivated, profes-
sional, well trained, and satisfied with their jobs. But as described next, 
these two programs—referred to here as Sites A and B—achieved quite 
different employment outcomes. First, though, we take a closer look at 
the management of each program. 
Management at Site A 
Site A had a director who showed savvy about organizational design 
and goal setting. For example, she created teams, each having a case 
manager, job developer, and retention specialist, and used friendly com-
petition among the teams to spur performance. She avoided setting indi-
vidual quotas for teams, though, to encourage them to share job leads 
and useful practices with each other. Moreover, the director closely 
monitored the program’s placement and retention rates, and held weekly
staff meetings to review progress and discuss specific cases. “It’s not 
that I want to micromanage the case managers,” she explained. “But I 
also want to make sure that we’re thinking about our actions and that 
we’re understanding what the ramifications are. These [participants] are 
people. They’re not a number.” 
The director also used staff recognition to underscore program 
goals. For instance, to encourage everyone on the staff to be “place-
ment driven,” she awarded certificates to those not part of a team, such 
as workshop facilitators, who helped the most people find jobs. She 





awarding vacation days to anyone able to find work for participants she 
deems especially tough to employ. 
Management at Site B 
Site B also had a director who was successful at developing a moti-
vated and professional staff. She described her role in creating a posi-
tive work environment: 
I’m so lucky and grateful to say I look forward to coming to work. 
I think if you asked them [the staff] that question, everyone would 
say that, or at least, the large majority would . . . It’s because we 
work in a very team fashion . . . I so value the staff and they know 
that. They know that I would back them to the hilt . . . If I’m not 
supporting them, then they’re not going to support the client . . . So 
it’s all modeling and mirroring. 
Although she set placement goals for the program, staff motivation also 
appeared to stem from the director’s ability to create a strong sense of 
mission about serving participants and treating them with respect. Her 
message to the staff, she explained, was that, “The client’s not broken. 
You don’t have to fix them. There’s a tremendous amount of strength 
within each person . . . [The participants] feel that mutual respect.” The 
participants were, in fact, constructively engaged with the staff. 
Outcomes at Sites A and B 
These two programs were not the only ones with skilled leaders 
at the helm, but they exemplify thoughtful, participatory leadership 
focused on creating a culture of performance. Even so, these programs 
had considerably different results. Figure 11.1 shows the six-month 
caseload employment rate, meaning the share of participants that are 
placed in jobs and are still working at any job six months later. Site 
A had the second-highest rate among the programs, with 12 percent 
achieving sustained employment. Site B, on the other hand, had a rate 
that is only half as high (6 percent), placing it sixth from the bottom. 
When we control for demographic differences, participants were still 
significantly more likely to achieve six months of employment at Site 
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Programs (ranked by six-month caseload employment rate) 
Why did these two programs’ results differ so much? Although both 
had capable leaders, the programs used different strategies. The staff at 
Site A had a clear sense of urgency about getting people into jobs. In 
fact, a bell rang each time someone got a job, eliciting cheers from the 
staff and participants. The program was not, in fact, among the fastest 
in terms of placement speeds (it was the thirteenth fastest), and case 
management was a valued component of program services. But staff 
emphasized moving people into jobs with alacrity. Teaming case man-
agers with job developers reflected that emphasis—the purpose of case 
management was to support and further the goal of speedy placements. 
Moreover, the level of job training usage at Site A was less than a fourth 
of that at Site B. 
Site B, in contrast, had a goal of teaching people to obtain their own 
jobs, with guidance from the staff. Only the most job-ready individuals 
were served by a job developer, while most participants worked in a 
resource room doing guided job search, or they were referred to train-
ing. The staff felt strongly that teaching people to find jobs, or referring 
them to training, was the most effective way to promote self-sufficiency, 
rather than finding jobs for people. “Teach a man to fish,” as one of the 





This service strategy, though, resulted in slow placements. Site B 
ranked last in terms of placement speed, with the median placed partici-
pant becoming employed 84 days after program entry, versus 54 days 
at Site A (thirteenth fastest). That, in turn, meant that people had more 
time to drop out of the program, and those who stayed likely felt less 
urgency about becoming employed. As a result, the placement rate of 
Site B (10 percent) was less than half that of Site A (25 percent). The 
employment retention rate of placed participants was higher at Site B, 
an outcome that may be a selection effect, since fewer people got jobs 
at Site B. Even so, considerably more people became employed and 
were still working six months later at Site A, as we saw in Figure 11.1. 
LOOKING AT PROGRAMS WITH SIMILAR STRATEGIES 
The examples of Sites A and B, above, suggest that programs’ ser-
vice strategies are more important to performance than their frontline 
management practices. Even so, frontline practices do appear to play 
a noticeable role in determining the outcomes of programs with simi-
lar strategies. For example, Sites C and D were similar along several 
dimensions. Both were nonprofits, had slow placement speeds (the third 
and fifth slowest, respectively), and encouraged training (the second 
highest and highest users of training). Although Site D was substan-
tially larger than Site C, both had similar caseload demographics. Yet 
performance differed between these programs, as shown in Figure 11.1. 
Site C had a six-month caseload employment rate of almost 7 percent, 
while Site D had the lowest rate among all programs at about 4 per-
cent, both of which are obviously quite low. Nonetheless, the difference 
between these rates represents an almost two-thirds advantage for Site 
C. To explore the possible source of that advantage, we turn to the man-
agement of each program. 
Management at Site C 
Site C had a director that emphasized continually finding ways to 
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The biggest challenge is constantly trying to motivate people to 
function at their highest capacity . . . [and] maintaining a level of 
excitement and creativity . . . What we try to do is, one, make sure 
they have the best equipment possible in terms of computers and 
everything else; their workspace is as good as it can possibly be; 
we try to give them as much autonomy as we can to make deci-
sions on their own; . . . try to be flexible in terms of time and leave. 
The way he managed, he explained, was “participatory, democratic,” 
but with close oversight of the program: “You give people as much 
decision-making capabilities as you possibly can. You have them check 
in. For instance, everybody feeds me information. When we have a new 
group coming in, I get the test results. Whenever we make a submission 
to HRA [to be paid by the city] for placements, I get those results.” His 
efforts to make the workplace a positive environment included small 
gestures, such as allowing employees to listen to music at their desks. 
Fieldwork showed that staff did, in fact, enjoy their jobs and worked 
cooperatively together. 
Management at Site D 
The situation at Site D was quite different. Staff generally felt unap-
preciated and many were dissatisfied with their jobs. As a job developer 
explained, speaking about the program’s leaders: 
[T]hey’re on you about quotas; they’re on you about time sheets; 
they’re on you if you’re 15 minutes late when you sign in . . . 
they put a yellow line by your name which means you’re late . . . 
[Employees] are not happy . . . They feel underpaid . . . So there’s 
no real motivation because they are busting their butts and not 
being compensated for the work. Where’s the motivation to come 
to work and smile?
Employees’dissatisfaction also stemmed from a lack of cooperation 
between the staff, particularly between case managers and job develop-
ers. From the view of case managers (as one explained), job developers 
“usually blame the case managers for everything . . . It’s supposed to 
be a cohesive effort, but it’s not.” The fact that this case manager felt 
no responsibility for making placements (he stated, “I have nothing to 





Moreover, conflict within this program also occurred among job 
developers. Pressure to meet placement quotas set by management was 
intense, a job developer explained, calling the quotas “unfair.” Because 
of the pressure, some job developers “hoarded” participants, not allow-
ing them to work with other job developers. This, not surprisingly, led 
to conflict among job developers. 
Finally, Site D was struggling with disorganization. As a result of 
recent program modifications, staff members were not always sure 
where they should be or what they should be doing. At one workshop I 
attended, no staff members showed up for the first 45 minutes, leaving 
participants sitting in a classroom, visibly frustrated. 
Despite this program’s problems, the director appeared smart and 
personable, and had many years of management experience. But her 
comments showed less emphasis on motivating and monitoring the 
staff than those of Site C’s director. When asked to describe her role, 
for example, she noted that she was frequently at meetings away from 
the office: “I have a deputy director here who oversees the day-to-day.” 
While the director set placement quotas for job developers, case 
managers “don’t really have any goals” set by management, she noted. 
She also explained that case managers had up to 100 people on their 
caseloads, acknowledging, “You cannot case manage a hundred peo-
ple—it’s not going to happen.” Finally, she spoke about her frustration 
with the staff and blamed them for high dropout rates: 
This has been a bone of contention . . . to get the staff to understand 
what needs to be done. And I’m saying “If you’re not on task and 
not on board, don’t expect the customer to be. And when you go 
to class [i.e., teach a workshop] you start with 30 people and you 
only end up with 10 [at the end of the two weeks], why is that? It’s 
not the customer’s fault. It’s your fault. Because they showed up. 
Given the tension between management and staff, and among the staff, 
it is not surprising that turnover was high, according to interviewees.1 
Outcomes at Sites C and D
Surprisingly, placement rates were actually slightly higher at Site 
D (13 percent) than at Site C (12 percent). The employment retention 
rate, on the other hand, was much lower at Site D. Only a third of those 
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half at Site C. As a result, the six-month caseload employment rate is 
higher at Site C, as shown in Figure 11.1. 
Did the lack of job satisfaction and teamwork at Site D lead to its 
worse overall performance? It may have, even though placement rates 
were similar at both programs. Job developers at Site D were still able 
to place people into jobs despite not working productively with case 
managers and having low morale. But without the cooperation of case 
managers to get people job ready, it appears that retention rates suf-
fered. In addition, retention services may have been inadequate at Site 
D. The director noted, in fact, that she set goals for her retention staff 
related to three-month retention rates but not to six-month rates. Not 
surprisingly, there was a large drop in employment retention at Site D 
between three and six months after placement. The type of goals set, in 
other words, is another area of frontline management that apparently 
affected performance. 
THE IMPORTANCE OF AN EFFECTIVE STRATEGY
The examples of Sites C and D demonstrate that two programs with 
similar program strategies (a case-management focus and an emphasis 
on short-term job training) can produce somewhat different results, with 
management practices appearing to play a role. But the more definitive 
finding is that organizational strategy is a more powerful determinant 
of outcomes than frontline management. As we saw with Sites A and 
B, employing a quick-placement focus rather than a case-management 
focus and requiring immediate job search rather than encouraging train-
ing were decisions that had much more obvious consequences to per-
formance than whether managers were able to develop a motivated and 
cohesive staff. 
Further evidence on this point is shown in Figure 11.2. Like the pre-
vious figure, it shows the share of participants who become employed 
and are still working six months later. Gray-shaded bars signify pro-
grams that refer at least 5 percent of their participants to training or 
have slow placement speeds (an indicator of a case-management focus), 
but not both. Black bars, on the other hand, indicate programs that fit 
both these categories, encouraging training and having slow placement 
138 Feldman 
Figure 11.2 Six-Month Caseload Employment Rates: Results for 
Programs with Slow Placement Speeds and/or That 
Encourage Job Training 
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Slow placement speed and encourages job training 
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speeds. The figure shows that only two of the four programs that empha-
size case management or encourage training (the gray bars) are in the 
top half of performance, while none of the four programs that do both 
is in the top half (the black bars). To a large extent, therefore, strategy 
is destiny. Even programs with insightful, dedicated leaders and moti-
vated staff are constrained from being top performers if they implement 
a less effective strategy—in this case, emphasizing both case manage-
ment and the type of short-term, classroom based training used in New 
York City. So why would employment service providers use these types 
of less effective practices? The next chapter investigates that question. 
Note 
1. This program leader, and others interviewed, had control over the hiring process. 







Why Programs Choose 
Suboptimal Practices 
The findings from New York City suggest that the service strate-
gies of work-first employment programs have important consequences
on their outcomes. For example, as shown in Chapter 9, the esti-
mated combined effect of using less short-term job training, becom-
ing more focused on quick placement, and moving from partial to full
performance-based pay is to more than double the share of participants 
that achieve at least six months of employment. Yet many programs do 
not use these “better practices,” choosing instead to implement—and 
to continue using—less effective or “sub-optimal” ones. This chapter 
discusses four possible explanations for why certain programs use sub-
optimal practices. The explanations are not mutually exclusive, so a 
combination of factors may be at play for some programs. 
IMPERFECT INFORMATION 
Which specific practices within work first are effective is a subject 
that has not been well studied. It is not surprising, then, that program 
leaders sometimes use practices that they believe are effective, but 
about which they have little hard evidence. For example, one nonprofit 
director wondered out loud about whether his program would have bet-
ter results if it were more focused on quick placement, with more pres-
sure on job developers to place people in jobs, “Do those job developers 
that are driven by absolute outcomes and quotas, do a better job? I don’t 
know the answer to that, but it would be interesting [to find out].” 
In terms of accessible information about whether certain programs 
are performing better or worse than others—data that can help program 
leaders decide if different practices are needed—New York City pro-
vides a uniquely large amount of information. Every month, the city’s 









tains data on 20 performance measures for each program, as well as 
program rankings on those measures and citywide averages. The data 
allow program leaders to gauge their relative performance in terms of 
job placement, employment retention, and other measures. 
Even with these data, though, determining causal linkages between 
specific practices and outcomes is not easy. Moreover, program leaders 
typically do not know what practices other programs are using—infor-
mation that could help illuminate those causal linkages. Programs that 
run multiple sites, or that are in coalitions such as the EarnFair Alliance, 
would presumably have an advantage in terms of sharing “what works.” 
But the data show no evident advantages from these relationships. In 
fact, EarnFair Alliance programs underperform as compared with other 
programs, despite the fact that they have regular meetings in which staff 
from different programs discuss their practices and share advice. 
MAXIMIZING ALTERNATIVE DEFINITIONS 
OF PERFORMANCE
Another potential reason that some employment programs achieve 
fewer placement and retention milestones (the achievements on which 
programs’ compensation is based) is that some programs may not, in 
fact, be trying to maximize those milestones. The clearest examples 
within New York City’s system are programs that reject the “any job 
is better than no job” philosophy. They emphasize case management 
and job-readiness assistance, including job training in some cases, 
and are reluctant to put pressure on participants to accept jobs. Their 
intent, it appears, is to maximize people’s well-being (with a still-
evident emphasis on placement into jobs) as opposed to the more com-
mon focus among programs of maximizing placement into jobs (with a 
still-evident emphasis on improving people’s well-being). 
A specific example is a small community-based program, part of 
the EarnFair Alliance, that was committed to case management and to 
giving people enough time to become work ready. That commitment, 
the director explained, does not help the program financially, since “we 
aren’t focusing on the numbers, [but] if we don’t perform on the basis of 
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philosophy was to find people jobs that were “desirable for them” rather 
than saying “we need to get this placement no matter what.” The pro-
gram ranked 19 out of 26 in terms of placement, although its retention 
rates among placed participants was above average (eleventh). Overall, 
it ranked fifteenth in terms of the share of participants who got jobs and 
were still working after six months. The organization was losing money 
on the contract with the city, but it was willing to fundraise to cover 
costs and maintain its service strategy. 
Contrast that example with another program, a for-profit, which 
clearly had maximizing contractual milestones as its goal. One of the 
job developers, for example, explained how their focus was on “sales,” 
meaning pitching participants to employers and pitching jobs to par-
ticipants, rather than on case management: “We have an emphasis on 
doing the sales. Plus, we have a social conscience. They [nonprofits] 
are the reverse: They have the social conscience, then the sales thing 
comes afterwards.” Fieldwork shows that for-profit programs in New 
York City are somewhat more focused on quick placement than case 
management, on average. Nonprofits, on the other hand, span a wider 
spectrum, from placement driven to case-management focused. The 
main point here, though, is that different definitions of “performance” 
and “success” help explain why programs use different practices. 
COMPETENCY TRAPS 
A “competency trap” exists when organizations become skilled 
at doing certain things and, as a result, face disincentives towards 
searching for better ways of operating (March 1994). For example, 
several employment programs in New York City have been using job 
training for years, either providing it themselves or referring people to 
external providers. Over time, program leaders and staff presumably 
gained confidence in their abilities to use training effectively. Shift-
ing away from training would entail several possible costs, including 
developing new practices and staffing capabilities, and severing rela-
tionships with training providers. In fact, formerly training-focused 
programs might need to develop a whole new organizational culture. 




tions to stick with their current practices, even if those practices are 
less effective. 
A similar competency trap could occur for programs with a case-
management approach. Leaders at these programs tend to have back-
grounds in social work and feel personally committed to providing qual-
ity job-readiness assistance. Shifting to a quick-placement approach 
would involve not only staff retooling, but uprooting practices that may 
be central to employees’ conceptions of what it means to serve the job-
less and the poor. The latter factor also relates to another type of trap, 
the identity trap, which is discussed next. 
IDENTITY TRAPS 
An “identity trap” occurs when an organization is unable to adapt 
to changes in its environment because the change would be inconsistent 
with its core identity (Bouchikhi and Kimberly 2003). For example, 
program leaders who see their organizations as social-service agencies 
might find it difficult to adopt a quick-placement approach that pro-
vides only light case management. Another example involves the three 
employment programs in New York City run by community colleges. 
The mission of these colleges is to provide education and training, so it 
is not surprising that they designed their welfare-to-work programs to 
emphasize skill building. Each program sends an above-average level 
of participants to job training. In fact, staff members at these three pro-
grams even call their participants “students,” underscoring the link with 
their educational settings. Switching to a quick-placement approach, 
with little training usage, would be difficult for these programs. 
Fieldwork suggests that all four of the potential explanations, dis-
cussed above, play a role in explaining why some programs use sub-
optimal practices. An implication is that simply attributing less effec-
tive practices to “managerial incompetence” overlooks factors that can 
have a quite rational basis. Those factors include the costs of changing 
practices and the fact that some organizations are trying to maximize 
different outcomes. Even with perfect information, therefore, we might 
not see similar practices across programs. Nonetheless, hard evidence 
about the effects of various practices on outcomes can help programs 
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make better decisions about their service strategies, and help govern-
ment lawmakers and administrators make better decisions about policy 
design and implementation. 
THE NEED FOR INNOVATION 
Leaders of work-first programs can improve their organizations’
performance by being alert to competency and identity traps, and by 
dealing with imperfect information by seeking out or generating evi-
dence about what works.1 The goal of this book is provide that type 
of new evidence. The unique characteristics of New York City’s wel-
fare system, and its sample size of 26 programs, mean that the findings 
may or may not be applicable elsewhere. Even so, New York City’s 
experience provides several interesting insights and hypotheses for fur-
ther research. In particular, the data suggest that programs have better 
employment outcomes when they offer a quick route into employment, 
rather than emphasizing short-term classroom-based job training, more 
intensive case management, or both. Programs with stronger perfor-
mance incentives also have better outcomes, according to the data. 
Yet the broader and most startling finding, or reminder, of the book 
is the stark challenge of helping welfare recipients become and stay 
employed. Of the 20,677 individuals referred to the city’s employ-
ment programs during the sample period in the mid 2000s, only 6 per-
cent became employed and was still working at any job six months 
later. New York City’s relatively lenient sanction policies are likely an 
important factor behind this result, given the widespread noncompli-
ance within the system. But more effective employment programs and 
policies are clearly needed as well. As a start, if all of the employment 
programs in New York City used the “better practices” discussed in the 
previous chapters, including having a quick-placement focus and fully 
performance-based contracts, the data suggest that the percentage of 
participants that would get jobs and would still be working six months 
later could reach almost 14 percent, more than double the current rate. 
This would be an important achievement, with thousands of additional 







These findings underscore the need in New York City, and across 
the nation, for innovations that can significantly boost the employment 
success of welfare recipients and other low-income Americans. Innova-
tions might relate to employment strategies, such as increased financial 
rewards to work or restructured public service jobs. They might relate 
to skill-building strategies, such as different ways of integrating work, 
education, and job training, or new ways of tying training to in-demand 
jobs. Or they might relate to job-retention strategies, such as more effec-
tive forms of postplacement follow-up and coaching or new partner-
ships between programs and employers. Significant advancements will 
require fresh ideas combined with opportunities to rigorously test and 
evaluate them. A better understanding of today’s work-first programs 
and their results is a building block for that innovation. 
Note 
1. Ways that leaders can generate new evidence about what works include imple-
menting new practices and seeing if they affect performance, or comparing their 
programs’ performance to other programs and investigating what organizational 








I conducted this study as a performance analysis, meaning my aim was 
to not only describe how organizations implement their programs, but also 
to relate those practices to measures of performance (Mead 2003). First, I 
undertook exploratory fieldwork to form hypotheses about what affects per-
formance, conducting full-day site visits at 20 of the 26 sites during November 
2004 through March 2005. Sites were chosen with input from New York City’s 
HRA to include a range of organizational sizes and types, as well as high, aver-
age, and low performers in terms of placement and retention. I conducted the 
site visits “blind” to performance, meaning that I did not know the programs’
performance levels, to allow for the formation of unbiased hypotheses.1 Orga-
nizational characteristics were identified that represented the clearest differ-
ences among programs. 
Interviews were semistructured (Weiss 1994), which allowed me to dis-
cuss new or unexpected determinants of program performance. An interview 
protocol was created based on topics investigated by past studies of welfare-to-
work programs (Behn 1991; Bardach, 1993; Bloom and Michalopoulos, 2001; 
Bloom, Hill, and Riccio, 2003). It covered issues relating to organizational 
strategy, current operations, and the use of specific practices. 
CHARACTERIZING SITE-LEVEL PRACTICES 
Performance analyses require quantitatively characterizing the organiza-
tional characteristics at each program. For some variables, administrative data 
exist, including deassignment rates, referrals to sanctions, and program size. 
Programs’ use of training is measured by the percentage of participants at each 
program that receive training vouchers. To measure the degree to which pro-
grams use a quick-placement approach versus a case-management approach, 
average placement speed is used, which is measured as the number of days 
it takes a program to place the median participant among placed participants 
only. It is assumed that programs with faster placement speeds have greater 
urgency about getting people employed, whereas those with slower speeds 
have a greater focus on case management and other job-readiness activities.2 











gest a strong connection between programs’ focus on quick placement ver-
sus case management and their placement speeds. An example is the program 
mentioned in Chapter 7 whose director had redesigned his program to empha-
size quick placement, cutting the time participants spent in workshops and 
having people meet with job developers more quickly. This site had the third 
fastest placement speed, with a median of 42 days to placement. 
As an example from the other end of the spectrum, staff at the program 
with the second-slowest placement speed (83 days to placement) had a strong 
commitment to helping people become job ready and not to “push” anyone 
into a job.3 Staff characterized themselves as not “numbers focused,” and the 
director said that making good job matches was more important than achiev-
ing placement milestones. Programs with moderate placement speeds typically 
display a mixed approach, with case managers playing an important role, but 
staff having a sense of urgency about placement. 
Evidence that placement speed is linked to programs’ sense of urgency 
about placement and level of emphasis on barrier removal is also supported 
by the fact that other potential influences of placement speeds do not appear 
to play significant roles. First, the number of job developers relative to pro-
gram size has no statistically significant correlation with placement speed or 
performance, making it unlikely that staff capacity, rather than staff actions, 
drives the connection between placement speeds and performance. Second, 
the use of random assignment within boroughs for most individuals means that 
unmeasured demographic characteristics are less likely to influence placement 
speed differences. Between boroughs, average placement speeds differ mod-
estly. Finally, fieldwork did not suggest a connection between a longer time to 
placement and staff incompetence. 
A legitimate concern with using placement speed as a variable is that it 
is partially endogenous. The fact that the variable is constructed based on the 
outcomes of placed participants only, rather than all participants, helps limit 
endogeneity. Moreover, when this variable is removed from the regression 
models presented below, results are similar.4 
DEFINING THE SAMPLE 
At the organizational level, the sample includes all 26 programs. The 
analysis focuses on programs rather than the 19 providers (some providers 
run more than one program). Although programs run by the same firms imple-
mented roughly similar strategies, program leaders had discretion in choosing 
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run by the same company or provider noted differences in the ways they were 
run. Because organizational-level variables are of primary interest here, the 
effective number of observations in this study is the number of programs, not 
the number of participants. However, having individual-level demographic 
data on participants allowed a more accurate account of variation in the popu-
lations across programs. 
An important methodological decision is how to define the sample at the 
individual level. The main definition used here is all individuals assigned to 
programs during the sample period who showed up for at least one day, a group 
that is termed “participants.” Other individual-level sample definitions are pos-
sible as well, including all individuals referred to programs (whether or not 
they showed up). Results based on alternative samples tell a similar story of 
“what works,” showing that the sample definition does not drive the findings. 
INVESTIGATING EFFECTIVE PRACTICES
To investigate effective practices among programs, logistic regressions 
are used based on data on all individuals who entered programs during the 
five months of fieldwork. In particular, the results in Chapter 9 are based on 
multilevel logistic regressions, which account for the nested structure of the 
data, where sample members (level 1) are grouped by programs (level 2). As a 
result, a two-level hierarchal model is estimated (Raudenbuch and Bryk 2002), 
which is similar to the methodology used by Bloom, Hill, and Riccio (2003). 
The purpose of using a multilevel model is to produce unbiased estimators for 
level 2 because research has demonstrated bias with models using ordinary 
least squares (OLS). The model, which also produces more efficient estimates 
in a multilevel setting than OLS, is shown in Figure A.1. Explanatory variables 
at the organizational level (O) relate to program practices and characteristics.5 
The purpose of the model is to test how programs’ organizational charac-
teristics affect performance, focusing on characteristics where programs differ 
most markedly. Because the program-level sample size is 26, a limited number 
of characteristics can be tested. Therefore, variables are excluded from the 
models where two conditions are met: 1) field research did not suggest that 
the characteristic has an important influence on performance, and 2) correla-
tions show few or no significant relationships with performance.6 Excluded 







Figure A.1  Multilevel Model of Participant Outcomes 
Level 1 (individual-level submodel) 
P = α + γD + ΨL + ε , 
where P = binary measure representing if the participant became employed 
or not (or, for other models, whether they became employed and 
were still working three or six months later) 
α = intercept 
D = vector of individual-level demographic controls 
L = vector of borough fixed effects 
γ,Ψ = vectors of regression coefficients 
ε1 = error term 
Level 2 (program-level submodel) 
α = λ + βO + ε , 
where α = intercept from the individual-level submodel 
λ = intercept 
O = vector of organizational variables (measured at the site level) 
related to ESP practices 
β = a vector of regression coefficients 
ε2 = error term 
Full model 
P = (λ + βO + ε2) + γD + ε1 → P = λ + βO + γD + ε3 
NOTE: The model is based on a logit transformation of the expected probability, and 
the distribution of the error term is logistic. 
SAMPLE MEANS 
Variables related to the five characteristics where programs differ are 
included in the model: for-profit status, EarnFair Alliance membership, de-
assignment rate, share of participants referred to training, and length of time to 
median placement among placed individuals.7 Five organizational-level vari-
ables was considered to be a judicious number because the variables’ standard 
errors do not increase significantly (and often continue to decrease) when each 
variable is added to the model. The regression models use several definitions 
of performance, and the dependent variable is specified at the individual level. 
Even so, the relevant sample size remains at the program level (26) because 
organizational variables are of primary interest. 
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Table A.1 provides overview statistics for the five program-level vari-
ables, and Table A.2 does the same for the demographic variables included 
in the regression models. The latter table includes data on the national TANF 
caseload during the study period (mid 2000s) for comparison. Since all TANF 
recipients are custodial parents, national data should be compared with the 
column for custodial participants in New York City. Also note that the city 
has a much larger share of long-term recipients than the national average. One 
reason is because of New York State’s more lenient welfare rules, but another, 
probably more important factor, is that long-term recipients in New York City 
are concentrated in these 26 programs. Recall that new recipients are served by 
another set of programs. The sample is also somewhat older and has a much 
larger share of black non-Hispanic recipients than the national TANF caseload. 
THE USE OF RANDOM ASSIGNMENT 
Most previous nonexperimental studies of welfare-to-work program per-
formance have two methodological challenges. First, clients self-select which 
program in which participate, and this selection is, presumably, at least par-
tially based on unobservable characteristics that cannot be accounted for in 
the analysis. Second, program characteristics are not assigned randomly to 
sites, complicating researchers’ abilities to compare program performance. 
The methodology of this study largely solves the first challenge (but not per-
fectly, given that anecdotal evidence indicates that participants are sometimes 
able to request assignments to particular programs). While this is an important 
improvement over most of the literature, it is important to note that the second 
challenge remains. Because program characteristics are not assigned randomly 
to sites, there may be unobservable factors that influence program performance 
that could bias the results. Overcoming this limitation would require programs 
Table A.1  Program Characteristics 
Mean Min Max 
Program size (per new class) 50 14 174 
Deassignment rate (%) 13 5 42 
Sanction rate (%) 55 36 75 
Training referrals (%) 3 0 16 
Length of time to median placement 56 days 35 days 84 days 
(among placed) 
Sample size 26 programs 
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Table A.2  Participant Characteristics (%) 
Study sample National data 
Noncustodial Custodial U.S. TANF 
Full sample individuals individuals caseload 
12+ years of education 54.9 58.1 52.6 58.6 
Long-term recipienta 31.0 11.6 45.3 4.9 
Male 30.9 58.0 10.9 9.4 
< 20 years old 2.5 1.9 3.0 7.4 
20–29 years old 31.0 17.8 40.7 47.6 
30–39 years old 28.1 21.2 33.4 28.2 
40 or older 38.4 59.2 22.9 16.8 
0 custodial children 42.4 100.0 0.0 0.0 
1 custodial child 25.4 0.0 44.1 48.9 
2 custodial children 17.5 0.0 30.5 27.7 
3+ custodial children 5.9 0.0 25.4 21.6 
Black, non-Hispanic 64.6 66.7 62.9 38.9 
White, non-Hispanic 5.2 6.8 4.0 36.7 
Hispanic 30.3 26.9 32.9 19.1 
Asian 0.7 0.7 0.6 1.5 
Other 1.7 1.6 1.7 3.9 
Sample size 14,079 5,995 8,103 2,113,090 
NOTE: The sample is individuals who were assigned to programs between November 
2004 and March 2005 and who showed up for at least a day. Data for U.S. averages 
relate to adult TANF recipients and are from Characteristics and Financial Circum-
stances of TANF Recipients, FY 2004 (U.S. Department of Health and Human Ser-
vices 2006). 
a Data from New York City on the exact amount of time on welfare (lifetime or cur-
rent cycle) are not available. However, data do exist on whether custodial parents 
have been on welfare for five or more years during their lifetimes, and whether non-
custodial parents have been on welfare for two or more years during their lifetimes. 
Therefore, the definition of “long-term receipt” varies between these two groups. 
to be randomly assigned a “style” of operating—for example, how much job 
training and case management to provide. 
In terms of the extent to which assignments are random, one way to inves-
tigate this issue is to compare participants’ demographic characteristics at dif-
ferent programs. For example, a comparison of the distribution of long-term 
welfare recipients by program shows considerable variation in Manhattan and 
Queens, and somewhat less variation in Brooklyn and the Bronx. Statistical 
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sites within most boroughs in terms of the share of long-term recipients. Sta-
tistically significant differences also exist among the boroughs in terms of the 
share of participants with less than 12 years of education. These findings sug-
gest that nonrandom assignments occur, to some extent, in all of the boroughs. 
Although consistent random assignment would be ideal, most performance 
analyses of welfare-to-work programs do not have even partial random assign-
ment, so this feature of New York City’s welfare system remains valuable to 
the study. Moreover, individual-level controls on a range of demographic vari-
ables are available, and were used in the quantitative analysis presented in 
Chapter 9, to control for observable caseload differences. 
Notes 
1. Those hypotheses turned out to be mostly incorrect. I predicted, based on my field 
research, that programs that provided more case management and more referrals 
to job training would do better, although the results suggest the opposite. This 
underscores the value of using both qualitative and quantitative research elements. 
Quantitative performance data allowed me to test my hypotheses, while qualitative 
research helped me frame the questions and to better interpret and understand the 
results. Hollister (2008), commenting on an earlier version of this book, writes: 
“Here is an example of ‘mixed methods’ capitalizing on the necessity to allocate 
scarce ‘slots’ in programs [by employing random assignment] to obtain a causal 
inference, and at the same time see how well a priori assessment of likely ‘perfor-
mance’ predicts the actual impacts.” 
2. Since training also slows placement speeds, the speed-to-placement variable indi-
cates a quick-placement versus a case-management approach with training held 
constant in the econometric models. 
3. The program with the overall slowest speed is not used as an example because it 
emphasized training as well as teaching people how to find their own jobs (some-
thing unique to this site). This contributed to its slow speed regardless of the level 
of case management provided. 
4. The only noteworthy change caused by removing the “placement speed” variable 
is that the effect of training becomes larger because programs that encourage train-
ing have slower average placements. 
5. Although a three-level model could be used to reflect the fact that participants are 
grouped within offices that are grouped within boroughs, for simplification, bor-
ough dummy variables are included in level 1 of a two-level model instead. This 
may produce inaccurate standard errors for the borough fixed effects, but this is 
not critical to the analysis. 
6. This semiexploratory approach is also used because making a priori predications 
about the connection between program characteristics and performance is difficult. 
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7. A related methodological issue is the “bundling” of these organizational charac-
teristics—that is, the degree to which programs display useful variation in terms 
of those characteristics. For simplicity, we can think of all five variables as binary 
by characterizing the continuous variables as either high or low values. Doing 
so would allow for 24 possible combinations of operating styles. One style, for 
example, is: for-profit, non-EarnFair, low deassignment rate, low use of training, 
and quick placement speed. It could be, moreover, that programs come in only 
a handful of operating styles. If that were true, it would be harder to distinguish 
which characteristics are important. It would also be more difficult to assume that 
program managers could adjust one variable while holding other variables con-
stant. But the data show this is not the case. Sites come in a relatively wide variety 
of operating styles. Among the 24 possible operating styles, 17 are represented by 
different programs. This variation increases our ability to measure which charac-
teristics and practices are most important for performance and also makes it more 





Using Guided Job Search 
Although most programs use job developers as the primary method of con-
necting participants with jobs, some also encourage participants to search for 
their own jobs, while assisting and monitoring them in the process. This super-
vised approach to job search is called “guided job search” to differentiate it 
from the more traditional “independent job search,” where people spend time 
job searching on their own, with little supervision. 
At a fairly large program, for example, participants who are not meeting 
individually with their job developers meet in a resource room where another 
job developer teaches them how to conduct their own job searches. “The way 
the job development network rooms are set up is to get maximum efficiency 
in the time that they have here,” the director explained. “Each room has five 
computers with internet access, fax machine, three phones, and a job developer 
fully engaged with them.” 
Interestingly, none of the programs in New York City uses independent job 
search.1 As a case manager explained, “If they were able to do independent job 
search, there would be no reason for them to be referred to our program.” A
job developer at a different program explained how she had been able to fake 
independent job search as a welfare recipient, years ago: 
In here there’s no independent job search. As a former welfare recipient, 
that’s all I did . . . They said “Go ahead, do your job search and bring back 
business cards [as proof].” For one day, I just walked all over and got 
about 50 business cards and then stayed out for three or four days [and 
then said] “Here—this is where I was.” They allowed that to happen. 
One reason programs today are able to avoid using independent job search 
is the Internet, which enables participants to search for jobs without physically 
leaving the site, enabling staff to directly monitor and assist their efforts. 
RATIONALE FOR USING GUIDED JOB SEARCH 
Staff members at programs that use guided job search (usually as a supple-
ment to the work of job developers) cite several reasons for doing so. One is 








When participants are not meeting with job developers or are not in work-
shops, guided job search can keep people busy and, hopefully, lead to some 
job placements. 
Others encourage guided job search as a way to reduce a mindset of depen-
dency by having people take partial responsibility for finding jobs. In the words 
of one job developer, who was also a former welfare recipient: 
Public assistance allows people to [be dependent] . . . Someone’s paying 
your rent, medical, food stamp, giving you a little chump change. Before 
the end of the month, you’re broke and you’re waiting for that check . . . 
So when you come here [you might say] “Now give me a job!” [But I say:] 
“No, my job is not to give you a job. My job is to show you how to find a 
job so you won’t ever be in this position again.” 
A third rationale is based on the belief that guided job search leads to 
higher rates of job retention and less welfare recidivism. “Because they learned 
how to [find jobs] themselves—they got the job they wanted … they’ll stay at 
that job,” a job developer explained. “And they’ll know that, ‘Even if I don’t 
want to stay here [in the current job], I can always go find my own job. I don’t 
have to come back within the system.’” 
GUIDED JOB SEARCH AS A PRIMARY TOOL
Only one program uses guided job search as the primary way in which 
participants are connected with jobs. There, all but the most job-ready indi-
viduals (who meet directly with the job developer) are taught how to find their 
own jobs, rather than being referred to interviews by a job developer. The 
process begins by having case managers meet one on one with participants 
to discuss employment fields they wish to pursue. They then discuss specific 
jobs that would be appropriate based on their skills, interests, and salary goals. 
Next, participants investigate job opportunities in a computer resource room 
where staff teach people how to set up free e-mail accounts, create resumes, 
use on-line job-search programs such as Monster.com, and write cover let-
ters. Before going on job interviews, participants meet with the job developer
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ARGUMENTS AGAINST GUIDED JOB SEARCH 
Staff members at most other programs see the use of job developers as 
more effective than guided job search. In particular, they cited the motivating 
nature of going on job interviews quickly after program entry, without having 
to wait to learn job-search techniques. Moreover, quality control is easier, they 
said, when job developers have the primary responsibility for finding jobs. 
“When people find their own jobs, it can be a job that’s off the books, it’s a job 
without benefits, there are all kind of problems that come up,” explained Susan 
Meloccaro, President of the for-profit Career and Education Consultants. Oth-
ers noted that tapping into job developers’ knowledge of employers was valu-
able, especially in terms of knowing the types of skills particular employers are 
looking for, and what types of work environments those employers provide. A
job developer’s comments underscore this point: 
An HR person [at a business], if they put an ad in the paper, they’re look-
ing at a hundred resumes a day. My job is to get my person an inter-
view . . . [And] I don’t want to have people just walking around going 
on interviews without getting a job. The reality is that they’re on public 
assistance. They need to get jobs. It’s very frustrating being on public 
assistance. It’s very frustrating going on interviews without getting hired. 
IS GUIDED JOB SEARCH MORE EFFECTIVE? 
Do programs that use guided job search produce better results than those 
that rely only on job developers? One way to investigate this question is by 
comparing the results of the site that uses guided job search as a primary job-
matching method (call it Program G) with the average of the other 25 pro-
grams. As Figure B.1 shows, the placement rate at Program G (10 percent) 
is substantially below that of other programs (18 percent). In fact, it is the 
third-lowest placement rate among the programs. On the other hand, the share 
of placed participants that received higher wage jobs (43 percent) is the high-
est among all programs and is more than double the average for the other pro-
grams (20 percent). The third set of columns shows that the employment reten-
tion rate among placed participants is also much higher at Program G, ranking 
it second among the programs. 
The results suggest that a guided job-search model can connect placed 
participants with higher quality jobs and produce better employment retention 
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Figure B.1 Guided Job Search as a Primary Job-Matching Tool 
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rates. Yet this likely reflects, at least in part, a selection effect. Fewer people 
become employed at this program, so those who are placed are likely to be 
more advantaged, with higher wages and better employment retention regard-
less of the program. Data on participant demographics confirm that placed par-
ticipants at Program G are more likely to have a high school degree and are less 
likely to be a long-term welfare recipient as compared to the average placed 
participant at other programs. 
Finally, as a result of this program’s low placement rate, fewer partici-
pants actually become employed and keep working for at least six months. Six 
percent of all participants achieved at least six months of employment at Pro-
gram G, as compared with 8 percent at other programs, on average. Although 
these findings are based on only one program that uses guided job search as 
its primary job-placement strategy, they provide preliminary evidence that this 
strategy does not produce better results for a broad range of welfare recipients 
than a job-developer-driven approach. 
Note 
1. Research has shown that independent job search is not the most effective method 
of helping welfare recipients find employment. For example, Sandfort (2000), 
using data from Michigan, finds that independent job search has no effect on the 





Chapter 9 Regression Results 
This appendix presents regression results for custodial participants 
because these results are the most relevant to national policy. The regression 
tables show marginal effects for the modal (that is, the most common) type 
of participant. In this study, that would be a black non-Hispanic woman who 
lives in Brooklyn, has one child, has 12 or more years of education, is between 
the ages of 20 and 30, and is not a long-term welfare recipient. These figures, 
when multiplied by 100, represent the percentage-point change in probability 
of achieving a given outcome resulting from a one-unit change in the inde-
pendent variable. A marginal effect of 0.015, for example, would represent 
a 1.5 percentage-point increase in the probably of the outcome, such as job 
placement. To assist readers in gauging how important various percentage-
point changes are, Table C.1 shows the outcomes for the modal and average 
participant for comparison. 
Tables C.2 through C.6 present the regression results. Note that Tables 
C.3, C.4, and C.5 show results for placed custodial participants only, meaning 
those who become employed. Table C.6 defines performance using the study’s 
best measure of sustained employment—the probability of being placed in a 
job and still working at any job six months later among all participants. This 
measure gets closest to the main question of this study: Which factors affect 




Table C.1  Participant Outcomes (%) 
Performance measure 
Placed in job and still Placed in job and still 
Job placement with a working at any job six working at any job six 
high wage (among placed months later (among months later (among all 
Job placement participants) placed participants) participants) 
Custodial participants 
Modal 22.0 21.6 37.8 8.3 
Average 16.6 18.4 46.1 7.7 
Noncustodial participants 
Modal 21.8 21.1 38.5 8.4 
Average 19.2 16.8 43.3 8.3 
All participants 
Modal 21.8 21.6 37.8 8.2 
Average 17.7 17.6 44.8 7.9 
158 
NOTE: Average outcomes are provided for comparison, although regression results present marginal effects for the modal individual. 
Averages may differ slightly from those reported in the text because this table presents averages among individuals (N = 14,079) while 
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Table C.2  The Effects of Participant Characteristics, Economic 
Environment, and Organizational Characteristics 
on Performance, Measured as Job Placement for
Custodial Participants 
Characteristic Marginal effect Z-value Standard error 
Participant characteristics 
12+ years of education  0.059*** 0.000 0.011 
Long-term welfare recipient −0.076*** 0.000 0.011 
(5+ years lifetime) 
Male  0.018 0.327 0.018 
<20 years old −0.054* 0.087 0.032 
20–29 years old −0.025 0.107 0.016 
30–39 years old 0.006 0.699 0.016 
40 or older (omitted category) 
1 custodial child  0.0002 0.990 0.015 
2 custodial children  0.008 0.618 0.016 
3+ custodial children (omitted 
category) 
Black, non-Hispanic  0.001 0.983 0.030 
Hispanic  0.029 0.368 0.033 
Asian −0.117** 0.035 0.055 




ESP in Brooklyn  0.015 0.376 0.017 
ESP in Bronx  0.001 0.949 0.018 
ESP in Queens  0.029 0.218 0.024 
ESP in Staten Island  0.056 0.167 0.040 
ESP in Manhattan 
(omitted category) 
Program characteristics 
For-profit  0.002 0.914 0.015 
EarnFair Alliance member −0.049*** 0.004 0.017 
Deassignment rate −0.001 0.656 0.001 
Training referrals −0.008*** 0.000 0.002 
Length of time to median 0.009a** 0.039 0.004 
placement (among placed) 
Length of time to median −0.0001a** 0.022 0.00003 





Table C.2  (continued) 
NOTE: *** significant at the 0.01 level; ** significant at the 0.05 level; and * signifi-
cant at the 0.10 level. The model is based on a logit transformation of the expected 
probability, and the distribution of the error term is logistic. Individuals are clus-
tered by sites. The values are marginal effects for the modal custodial participant and, 
when multiplied by 100, represent the percentage-point change in the probability of 
achieving the outcome. The dependent variable is dichotomous, indicating whether a 
participant was placed in a job or not. The sample size is 26 at the site level and 8,103 
at the individual level. 
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Table C.3  The Effects of Participant Characteristics, Economic 
Environment, and Organizational Characteristics on 
Performance, Measured as Job Placement with a High 
Wage for Placed Custodial Participants 
Marginal Standard 
Characteristic effect Z-value error 
Participant characteristics 
12+ years of education  0.091*** 0.000 0.024 
Long-term welfare recipient (5+ years lifetime) −0.105*** 0.000 0.025 
Male  0.005 0.887 0.035 
<20 years old −0.126** 0.012 0.050 
20–29 years old −0.099** 0.012 0.039 
30–39 years old 0.040 0.247 0.035 
40 or older (omitted category) 
1 custodial child  0.076*** 0.005 0.027 
2 custodial children  0.031 0.423 0.039 
3+ custodial children (omitted category) 
Black, non-Hispanic −0.057 0.374 0.064 
Hispanic −0.052 0.223 0.043 
Asian −0.039 0.800 0.155 
Other −0.092 0.115 0.058 
White, non-Hispanic (omitted category) 
Economic environment 
ESP in Brooklyn  0.015 0.710 0.041 
ESP in Bronx  0.042 0.374 0.047 
ESP in Queens  0.061 0.307 0.060 
ESP in Staten Island −0.047 0.450 0.062 
ESP in Manhattan (omitted category) 
Program characteristics 
For-profit  0.047 0.218 0.038 
EarnFair Alliance member  0.145*** 0.006 0.052 
Deassignment rate −0.001 0.704 0.002 
Training referrals  0.005 0.115 0.003 
Length of time to median placement 0.002* 0.081 0.001 
(among placed participants)
NOTE: *** significant at the 0.01 level; ** significant at the 0.05 level; and * significant 
at the 0.10 level. The model is based on a logit transformation of the expected probabil-
ity, and the distribution of the error term is logistic. Individuals are clustered by sites. 
The values are marginal effects for the modal custodial participant and, when multi-
plied by 100, represent the percentage-point change in the probability of achieving the 
outcome. The dependent variable is dichotomous, indicating whether a placed partici-
pant received a “high wage” or not. High wage is defined by the HRA as paying at least 





Table C.4  The Effects of Participant Characteristics, Economic 
Environment, and Organizational Characteristics on 
Performance, Measured as Three-Month Employment 
Retention for Placed Custodial Participants 
Marginal Standard 
Characteristic effect Z-value error 
Participant characteristics 
12+ years of education  0.038 0.180 0.028 
Long-term welfare recipient (5+ years lifetime) −0.066* 0.034 0.031 
Male −0.040 0.352 0.043 
<20 years old −0.109 0.274 0.099 
20–29 years old −0.116*** 0.000 0.032 
30–39 years old −0.009 0.815 0.038 
40 or older (omitted category) 
1 custodial child  0.083** 0.026 0.037 
2 custodial children  0.032 0.347 0.034 
3+ custodial children (omitted category) 
Black, non-Hispanic  0.065 0.373 0.073 
Hispanic  0.074 0.230 0.062 
Asian  0.209 0.135 0.140 
Other 0.027 0.756 0.088 
White, non-Hispanic (omitted category) 
Economic environment 
ESP in Brooklyn  0.036 0.400 0.043 
ESP in Bronx  0.038 0.345 0.040 
ESP in Queens −0.049 0.363 0.054 
ESP in Staten Island  0.006 0.941 0.080 
ESP in Manhattan (omitted category) 
Program characteristics 
For-profit  0.033 0.328 0.034 
EarnFair Alliance member −0.041 0.367 0.045 
Deassignment rate 0.001 0.598 0.002 
Training referrals  0.003 0.493 0.004 
Length of time to median placement −0.0004 0.757 0.001 
(among placed participants) 
NOTE: *** significant at the 0.01 level; ** significant at the 0.05 level; and * signifi-
cant at the 0.10 level. The model is based on a logit transformation of the expected 
probability, and the distribution of the error term is logistic. Individuals are clustered 
by sites. The values are marginal effects for the modal custodial participant and, when 
multiplied by 100, represent the percentage-point change in the probability of achiev-
ing the outcome. The dependent variable is dichotomous, indicating whether a placed 
participant was still working three months later at any job or not. The sample size is 
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Table C.5  The Effects of Participant Characteristics, Economic 
Environment, and Organizational Characteristics on 
Performance, Measured as Six-Month Employment 
Retention for Placed Custodial Participants 
Marginal Standard 
Characteristic effect  Z-value error 
Participant characteristics 
12+ years of education  0.093*** 0.001 0.029 
Long-term welfare recipient (5+ years lifetime) −0.068** 0.029 0.031 
Male −0.052 0.236 0.044 
<20 years old −0.100 0.310 0.098 
20–29 years old −0.081** 0.028 0.037 
30–39 years old 0.022 0.553 0.038 
40 or older (omitted category) 
1 custodial child  0.022 0.561 0.038 
2 custodial children  0.005 0.905 0.039 
3+ custodial children (omitted category) 
Black, non-Hispanic −0.004 0.959 0.073 
Hispanic  0.023 0.757 0.075 
Asian −0.068 0.780 0.244 
Other 0.028 0.763 0.094 
White, non-Hispanic (omitted category) 
Economic environment 
ESP in Brooklyn  0.090 0.108 0.056 
ESP in Bronx  0.032 0.581 0.057 
ESP in Queens  0.015 0.832 0.070 
ESP in Staten Island −0.073 0.500 0.108 
ESP in Manhattan (omitted category) 
Program characteristics 
For-profit −0.002 0.967 0.049 
EarnFair Alliance member  0.007 0.907 0.056 
Deassignment rate 0.001 0.821 0.003 
Training referrals −0.007 0.213 0.005 
Length of time to median placement 0.00002 0.992 0.002 
(among placed participants) 
NOTE: *** significant at the 0.01 level; ** significant at the 0.05 level; and * signifi-
cant at the 0.10 level. The model is based on a logit transformation of the expected 
probability, and the distribution of the error term is logistic. Individuals are clustered 
by sites. The values are marginal effects for the modal custodial participant and, when 
multiplied by 100, represent the percentage-point change in the probability of achiev-
ing the outcome. The dependent variable is dichotomous, indicating whether a placed 
participant was still working six months later at any job or not. The sample size is 26 





Table C.6  The Effects of Participant Characteristics, Economic 
Environment, and Organizational Characteristics on 
Performance, Measured as Placed in a Job and Still Working 
at Any Job Six Months Later for Custodial Participants 
Marginal Standard 
Characteristic effect Z-value error 
Participant characteristics 
12+ years of education  0.047*** 0.000 0.009 
Long-term welfare recipient (5+ years lifetime) −0.049*** 0.000 0.009 
Male −0.005 0.731 0.014 
<20 years old −0.042* 0.071 0.023 
20–29 years old −0.037** 0.012 0.015 
30–39 years old 0.008 0.537 0.013 
40 or older (omitted category) 
1 custodial child  0.004 0.737 0.012 
2 custodial children  0.004 0.765 0.013 
3+ custodial children (omitted category) 
Black, non-Hispanic −0.003 0.914 0.024 
Hispanic  0.017 0.522 0.027 
Asian −0.070* 0.059 0.037 
Other 0.046 0.249 0.040 
White, non-Hispanic (omitted category) 
Economic environment 
ESP in Brooklyn  0.028* 0.092 0.017 
ESP in Bronx  0.016 0.488 0.022 
ESP in Queens  0.026 0.373 0.029 
ESP in Staten Island  0.012 0.784 0.042 
ESP in Manhattan (omitted category) 
Program characteristics 
For-profit  0.003 0.861 0.017 
EarnFair Alliance member −0.022 0.211 0.017 
Deassignment rate −0.001 0.155 0.001 
Training referrals −0.005** 0.015 0.002 
Length of time to median placement −0.0002 0.681 0.0005 
(among placed participants) 
NOTE: *** significant at the 0.01 level; ** significant at the 0.05 level; and * signifi-
cant at the 0.10 level. The model is based on a logit transformation of the expected 
probability, and the distribution of the error term is logistic. Individuals are clustered 
by sites. The values are marginal effects for the modal custodial participant and, when 
multiplied by 100, represent the percentage-point change in the probability of achiev-
ing the outcome. The dependent variable is dichotomous, indicating whether a par-
ticipant was placed in a job and was still working at any job six months later or not. 
The sample size is 26 at the site level and 8,103 at the individual level. 
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About the Institute 
The W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research is a nonprofit re-
search organization devoted to finding and promoting solutions to employment-
related problems at the national, state, and local levels. It is an activity of the 
W.E. Upjohn Unemployment Trustee Corporation, which was established in 
1932 to administer a fund set aside by Dr. W.E. Upjohn, founder of The Upjohn 
Company, to seek ways to counteract the loss of employment income during 
economic downturns. 
The Institute is funded largely by income from the W.E. Upjohn Unem-
ployment Trust, supplemented by outside grants, contracts, and sales of pub-
lications. Activities of the Institute comprise the following elements: 1) a re-
search program conducted by a resident staff of professional social scientists; 
2) a competitive grant program, which expands and complements the internal 
research program by providing financial support to researchers outside the In-
stitute; 3) a publications program, which provides the major vehicle for dis-
seminating the research of staff and grantees, as well as other selected works in 
the field; and 4) an Employment Management Services division, which man-
ages most of the publicly funded employment and training programs in the 
local area. 
The broad objectives of the Institute’s research, grant, and publication pro-
grams are to 1) promote scholarship and experimentation on issues of public 
and private employment and unemployment policy, and 2) make knowledge 
and scholarship relevant and useful to policymakers in their pursuit of solu-
tions to employment and unemployment problems. 
Current areas of concentration for these programs include causes, conse-
quences, and measures to alleviate unemployment; social insurance and income 
maintenance programs; compensation; workforce quality; work arrangements; 
family labor issues; labor-management relations; and regional economic de-
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Catalyzed by welfare reform legislation in 1996, welfare systems across the nation shifted to a “work first” approach aimed at moving recipients quickly into unsubsidized employment. Yet today, almost a decade and a half after 
those changes, we still know little about which frontline practices are most effective 
within the work-first framework. In particular, why are some work-first employment 
programs more successful at helping individuals get and keep jobs? Insights into that 
question can help states and localities better serve the more than two million American 
families currently on the welfare rolls. 
This book is a case study of how New York City’s welfare-to-work programs were 
managed and implemented in the mid 2000s. It is a performance analysis, using both 
qualitative and quantitative methods to examine the operations and performance of 26 
nonprofit and for-profit welfare-to-work programs. The book draws on individual-
level data on more than 14,000 participants, and the use of random assignment creates 
a natural experiment that assists in comparing program performance. 
The findings provide insights, based on New York City’s programs, into: 
• The unique characteristics that differentiate New York City’s welfare system from 
others across the country; 
• The broad similarities that exist among work-first employment programs in the 
city. 
• Whether encouraging quick placement into jobs is more or less effective than 
emphasizing short-term training or more intensive case management prior to 
placement; 
• How the use of performance incentives may affect outcomes; 
• Differences between nonprofit and for-profit employment programs; and 
• The effect of frontline management, as well as broader strategic management 
decisions, on performance. 
The book also contains a foreword by Mary Jo Bane, Harvard University. 
